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THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY AND ITS WORK.

The "Westminster Assembly of Divines" derives its name from the ancient conventual church of Westminster Abbey, situated in the western district of the county of London. It was convened in the most ornate portion of this noble fabric, the Chapel of Henry VII, on the first day of July, 1643; but, as the cold weather of autumn came on, it was transferred (October 2nd, 1643) to a more comfortable room (the so-called "Jerusalem Chamber") in the adjoining Deanery. In that room it thereafter sat, not merely to the end of the 1163 numbered sessions, during which its important labors were transacted (up to Feb. 22, 1649), but through some three years more of irregular life, acting as a committee for the examination of appointees to charges and applicants for licensure to preach. It ultimately vanished with the famous "Long Parliament" to which it owed its being. The last entry in its Minutes is dated March 25th, 1652.¹

The summoning of the Westminster Assembly was an important incident in the conflict between the Parliament and the king, which was the form taken on English soil by the ecclesiastico-political struggle by which all Europe was

¹ In the ordinance convening the Assembly, it is commissioned to sit "during this present Parliament, or until further order be taken by both the said houses".

convulsed during the seventeenth century. It was the difficult task of that century to work out to its legitimate issue what had been auspiciously begun in the great revolution of the preceding period; to secure from disintegration what had been won in that revolution; to protect it from reaction; and to repel the destructive forces set in motion against it by the counter-reformation. The new Protestantism was, during this its second age, cast into a crucible in the heats of which it everywhere suffered serious losses, even though it emerged from them, wherever it survived, in greater compactness and purity. The form which the struggle took in England was determined by the peculiar course the Reformation movement had followed in that country. There, on its official side, the Reformation was fundamentally a contest between the king and the pope. The purpose which Henry VIII set before himself was to free the state from foreign influences exerted by the pope through the church; and his efforts were directed, with great singleness of aim, to the establishment of his own authority in ecclesiastical matters to the exclusion of that of the pope. In these efforts he had the support of Parliament, always jealous of foreign interference; and was not merely sustained but urged on by the whole force of the religious and doctrinal reform gradually spreading among the people, which, however, he made it his business rather to curb than to encourage. The removal of this curb during the reign of Edward VI concealed for a time the evils inherent in the new powers assumed by the throne. But with the accession of Elizabeth, who had no sympathy whatever with religious enthusiasm, they began to appear; and they grew ever more flagrant under her successors. The authority in ecclesiastical matters which had been vindicated to the throne over against the pope, was increasingly employed to establish the general authority of the throne over against the Parliament. The church thus became the instrument of the crown in compacting its absolutism; and the interests of civil liberty soon rendered it as imperative to break the absolutism of the

king in ecclesiastical affairs as it had ever been to eliminate the papacy from the control of the English Church.

The controversy was thus shifted from a contest between pope and king to a contest between king and Parliament. And as the cause of the king had ever more intimately allied itself with that of the prelatical party in the church, which had grown more and more reactionary until under the leading of Laud (1573-1645) it has become aggressively and revolutionarily so,² the cause of Puritanism, that is of pure Protestantism, became ever more identical with that of the Parliament. When the parties were ultimately lined up for the final struggle, therefore, it was king and prelate on the one side, against Parliament and Puritan on the other.³ The main issue which was raised was a secular one, the issue of representative government over against royal absolutism. This issue was fought to a finish, with the ultimate result that there were established in England a constitutional monarchy and a responsible government. There was complicated with this issue, however, also the issue, no doubt, at bottom, of religious freedom over against ecclesiastical tyranny, for it was impatience with ecclesiastical tyranny which gave its vigor to the movement. But the form which was openly taken by the ecclesiastical issue was rather that of a contest between a pure Protestantism and catholicizing reaction. It was in the mind of neither of the immediate contestants in the main conflict to free the church

² "Laud's real influence was derived from the unity of his purpose. He directed all the powers of a clear, narrow mind and a dogged will to the realization of a single aim. His resolve was to revise the Church of England to what he conceived to be its real position as a branch, though a reformed branch, of the great Catholic Church throughout the world. . . . The first step in the realization of such a theory was the severance of whatever ties had hitherto united the English Church to the Reformed Churches of the Continent. . . . His policy was no longer the purely conservative policy of Parker and Whitgift; it was aggressive and revolutionary." (Green, *Short History*, etc., p. 499, etc.)

³ As Mr. J. A. R. Marriott, *The Life and Times of Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland*, 1907, p. 248, puts it: "On the side of King Charles all the Romans and Anglicans; on that of 'King Pym' all the many varieties of Puritanism."

from the domination of the state: they differed only as to the seat of the civil authority to which the church should be subject—whether king or Parliament. This fundamental controversy lay behind the conflict over the organization of the subject church and the ordering of its forms of worship—matters which quickly lost their importance, therefore, when the main question was settled. It can occasion little surprize, accordingly, that, when the heats of conflict were over and exhaustion succeeded effort, the English people were able to content themselves, as the ultimate result on the ecclesiastical side, with so slight a gain as a mere act of toleration (May 24, 1689).

This struggle had reached its acutest stage when "the Long Parliament" met, on the third of November, 1640. Profoundly distrustful of the King's sincerity, and determined on its own behalf to be trifled with no longer, Parliament was in no mood for compromises with respect whether to civil or to ecclesiastical affairs. On the ecclesiastical side it was without concern, indeed, for doctrine. It was under no illusions, to be sure, as to the doctrinal significance of the Catholic reaction, and it was fully sensible of the spread of Arminianism in high places.⁴ But although there were not lacking hints of such a thing, Tract No. 90 had not yet been written,⁵ and the soundly Reformed character of the Church of England as well in its official Articles of Religion as in its general conviction was not in dispute. John Milton accurately reflects the common senti-

⁴ Cf. the Resolutions on Religion of Feb. 24, 1629; reprinted in Gee and Hardy, *Documents Illustrative of English Church History*, 1896, pp. 521 sq.

⁵ A precursor of Tract No. 90, however, had been published in 1634 by "Franciscus a Sancta Clara", a pervert to Romanism of the name of Davenport, entitled "God, Nature, Grace, or a Treatise on Predestination, the Deserts and Remission of Sin, etc.,—*ubi ad trutinam fidei Catholicae examinatur confessio Anglicana et ad singula puncta quid teneat, qualiter differat, excutitur*, etc. . . . A new edition of this Tract was called for in 1635. The reactionary divines meanwhile were already acting on such a theory. For the state of the case in the later years of James' reign see Bishop Carleton's *Examination of Bishop Montague's Appeal*, pp. 5, 49, 94.

ment of the day when he declares that "in purity of doctrine" English Churchmen "agreed with their brethern", that is, of the other Reformed Churches, while yet "in discipline, which is the execution and applying of the doctrine home" they were "no better than a schism from all the Reformation and a sore scandal to them".⁶ What the nation in Commons assembled was determined to be rid of in its church establishment was, therefore, briefly, "bishoprics" and "ceremonies",—what Milton calls "the irreligious pride and hateful tyranny of prelates" and the "senseless ceremonies" which were only "a dangerous earnest of sliding back to Rome". The Convocation of 1640, continuing illegally to sit after the dissolution of the "Short Parliament", had indeed endeavored to protect the established organization of the church. It had framed a canon, requiring from the whole body of the clergy the famous "et cetera oath," a sort of echo and counterblast to the "National Covenant" which had been subscribed in Scotland two years before (Feb. 28, 1638). By this oath every clergyman was to bind himself never to give his consent "to alter the government of this Church by archbishops, bishops, deans, and archdeacons, etc., as it stands now established, and by right it ought to stand".⁷ It was even thought worth while to prepare a number of petitions for Parliament with the design of counteracting the effect of this act of convocation. The most important of these, the so-called "London" or "Root-and-Branch" petition bore no fewer than 15,000 signatures, and the personal attendance of some 1500 gentlemen of quality when it was presented to Parliament lent weight to its prayer. This was to the effect that "the government of archbishops and lord bishops, deans, and archdeacons, etc." (the same enumeration, observe, as in the "et cetera oath") "with all its dependencies, roots and branches, may be abolished, and all laws in their behalf made void, and the government according

⁶ Cf. *Reformation in England*, etc. 1641.

⁷ Wilkins, iv., p. 549; reprinted in Gee and Hardy, *Documents Illustrative of English Church History*, 1896, p. 536.

to God's word may be rightly placed amongst us".⁸ Parliament, however, was in no need of prodding for this work, though it was for various reasons disposed to proceed leisurely in it. The obnoxious act of Convocation was at once taken up and rebuked. But even the Root and Branch Petition, which was apparently ready from the beginning of the session,⁹ was not presented until Dec. 11, and after its presentation was not taken into formal consideration by the House until the following February. As was natural, differences of opinion also began to manifest themselves, as to precisely what should be done with the Bishops, and as to the precise form of government which should be set up in the church after they had been dealt with. There is no reason to doubt the exactness of Baillie's information¹⁰ that the Commons were by a large majority of their membership for erecting some "kind of Presbyteries", and "for bringing down the Bishop in all things, spiritual and temporal, so low as can be with any substance". In Parliament as out of it the great majority of leading men had become Presbyterian in their tendencies, and the Independents were for the present prepared to act with them. But there was very little knowledge abroad among the members of Parliament of what Presbytery really was,¹¹ and even the most convinced Presbyterians doubted the feasibility of setting up the whole Presbyterian system at once, while an influential party still advocated what Baillie calls¹² "a calked Episcopacy".¹³ It still hung in the balance, there-

⁸ Rushworth, *Hist. Coll.*, Ed. 1721, iv., p. 93; reprinted in Gee and Hardy, p. 537.

⁹ Baillie, *Letters* (Ed. Laing), i., p. 273.

¹⁰ Baillie, i., p. 303.

¹¹ Baillie, ii., p. 167.

¹² Baillie, i., p. 287.

¹³ The views of this party find full expression in what Mr. Marriott (*The Life and Times of Lucius Cary, Lord Falkland*, 1907, p. 197) calls Falkland's "powerful speech" in opposition to the "Root and Branch Bill". It is printed by Mr. Marriott, pp. 198-204. Falkland was a typical example of the party, says Mr. Marriott (p. 248), which "anti-Laudian but not anti-Episcopal" felt strongly the evils of the Laudian reaction but were devoted to the traditional settlement of the

fore, whether Bishops should be utterly abolished; and any hesitation which may have existed in the Commons was more than matched in the House of Lords. Above all it never entered the thought of Parliament to set up in the church any manner of government whatever over which it did not itself retain control.¹⁴ The result was that actual legislation dragged. Abortive bill after abortive bill was

church. "He is a great stranger in Israel", said he in a speech of Feb. 8, 1641 (Marriott, pp. 181-2), who knows not this kingdom hath long labored under many and great oppressions, both in religion and liberty; and his acquaintance here is not great, and his ingenuity less, who doth not both know and acknowledge that a great, if not a principal, cause of both these have been some Bishops and their adherents. Mr. Speaker, a little search will serve to find them to have been the destruction of unity under pretense of uniformity; to have brought in superstition and scandal under the titles of reverence and decency; to have defiled our Church by adorning our churches; to have slackened the strictness of that union which was formerly between us and those of our religion beyond the sea", . . . and the like. The remedy, however, for these evils, he insisted, was not to take away Bishops but to reduce them to their proper place and functions as spiritual officers of a spiritual body. He expresses the opinion (Marriott, p. 200) that the utter destruction of Bishops was not desired by "most men", and that the petitions before Parliament were misleading, "because men petition for what they have not and not for what they have", and the like. Yet he betrays his conviction (p. 203) that "the Scotch government" is in store for England. Similarly Baxter (*Autobiog.*, i., p. 146) tells us that Presbytery was "but a stranger" in England, and "though most of the ministers then in England saw nothing in the Presbyterian way of practice which they could not cheerfully concur in, yet it was but few that had resolved on their principles". He adds that "the most that ever he could meet" were averse to the *jus divinum* of lay elders and "for the moderate primitive Episcopacy".

¹⁴ It was this "trenchant secularity" of Parliament—its ingrained Erastianism—which afterwards made it so earnest and persistent for the government of the church by a Parliamentary Commission. It was in this direction that its thoughts turned at the beginning of its discussion of the settlement of the church (see the lucid account of the debates on the Root and Branch Bill given by Shaw, i., p. 90 sq., and cf. Fiennes' speech, pp. 35-36); and from this determination it never receded. Mr. Marriott (*Falkland*, as cited, p. 208) remarks so far justly: "The fact is that the dominant sentiment of the Long Parliament as regards the Church was neither Episcopalian, Presbyterian nor Independent; it was Erastian. Amid infinite variety of opinions, two conclusions more and more clearly emerged; first, that there must be some form of ecclesiastical organization; and secondly, that whatever

brought in; now simply to deprive the prelates of secular functions, and again to abolish the whole Episcopal system. It was not until the autumn of 1641 (Oct. 21), that at length a bill excluding the Bishops from secular activities was passed by the Commons to which the assent of the Lords was obtained (Feb. 5, 1642);¹⁵ and not until another year had slipped away that, under Scotch influence (Aug., 1642), a bill was finally passed (Jan. 26, 1643,) abolishing prelacy altogether.

Alongside of these slowly maturing efforts at negative legislation there naturally ran a parallel series of attempts to provide a positive constitution for the church after the Bishops had been minished or done away. It was recognized from the beginning that for this positive legislation the advice of approved divines would be requisite.¹⁶ Preparation for it took, therefore, much the form of proposals for securing such advice. From all sides, within Parliament and without it alike, the suggestion was pressed that a formal Synod of Divines should be convened to which Parliament should statedly appeal for counsel in all questions which should occasionally arise in the process of the settlement of the church. And from the beginning it was at the form might be, its government must be strictly controlled by Parliament." In their Erastianism Falkland and Fiennes were wholly at one.

¹⁵ This bill was also passed by the King by a commission (*Lords' Journal*, iv., 580) and therefore on any ground became a law of the Realm (*Statutes*, v., 138, 16 Car. I., c. 27) taking effect Feb. 13, 1642. It may be read in Gee and Hardy, p. 564.

¹⁶ The most notable early attempt to secure such advice was probably that taken by the Lords March 1, 1641, in the appointment of what has come to be known as Bishop Williams' Committee. See the full account of this Committee in Shaw's *History of the English Church*, etc., I., p. 65 sq.; II., pp. 287-294; cf. Mitchell, Baird Lectures, pp. 100 sq. Similarly, in its discussion of the "Ministers' petition and remonstrance" in February, 1641, the Commons sought the advice of divines in its committee. The desirability of a standing Assembly of Divines for giving stated advice to Parliament was adverted to by more than one speaker in the course of the discussion of the Root and Branch Bill which was introduced on May 27, 1641: on the government to be set up after the abolishing of the prelates the debaters felt the need of advice from such a body.

least hinted that, in framing its advice, such a Synod might well bear in mind wider interests than merely the internal peace of the Church of England; that it might for example, consider the advantage of securing along with that a greater harmony with the other Reformed Churches, particularly the neighboring Church of Scotland. It was accordingly with this wider outlook in mind that the proposition was given explicit shape in "the Grand Remonstrance" which was drawn up in the Commons on Nov. 8, 1641, and, having been passed on Nov. 22, was presented to the King on Dec. 11. This document began by avowing the intention of Parliament to "reduce within bounds that exorbitant power which the prelates had assumed unto themselves", and to set up "a juster discipline and government in the Church". It proceeded thus (§ 186): "And the better to effect the intended reformation, we desire there may be a general synod of the most grave, pious, learned, and judicious divines of this island; assisted with some from foreign parts, professing the same religion with us, who may consider of all things necessary for the peace and good government of the Church, and represent the results of their consultations unto Parliament, to be there allowed of and confirmed, and receive the stamp of authority, thereby to find passage and obedience throughout the kingdom".¹⁷ In pursuance of this design, the Commons engaged themselves desultorily from the ensuing February (1642) in preparations for convening such a synod. The names of suitable ministers to sit in it were canvassed; selection was made of two divines from each English and one from each Welsh county, two from the Channel Islands and from each University, and five from London;¹⁸ and a bill was passed through both Houses (May 9 to June 30, 1642) commanding the Assembly so constituted to convene on July 1st, 1642.¹⁹ The King's assent failing, however, this bill lapsed, and was superceded by another to the same general effect, and that

¹⁷ Rushworth, ed. 1721, iv., p. 438; cf. Gee and Hardy, p. 561.

¹⁸ *Commons' Journal*, ii., pp. 524, 535-564.

¹⁹ *Lords' Journal*, v., p. 84; *Commons' Journal*, ii., p. 287.

by yet another, and yet another, which went the same way, until finally a sixth bill was prepared, read in the Commons as an ordinance on May 13, 1643, and having been agreed to by the Lords on June 12, 1643, was put into effect without the King's assent. By this ordinance,²⁰ the Divines, in number 121, supplemented by ten peers and twenty members of the House of Commons (40 being a quorum) were required "to meet and assemble themselves at Westminster, in the Chapel called King Henry the VII's Chapel, on the first day of July, in the year of our Lord One thousand six hundred and forty three," and thereafter "from time to time to sit, and be removed from place to place" and to "confer and to treat among themselves of such matters and things touching and concerning the Liturgy, Discipline, and Government of the Church of England, or the vindicating and clearing of the doctrine of the same from all false aspersions and misconstructions, as shall be proposed unto them by both or either of the said Houses of Parliament, and no other; and to deliver their opinions and advices of, or touching the matters aforesaid, as shall be most agreeable to the word of God, to both or either of the said Houses, from time to time, in such manner and sort as by both or either of the said Houses of Parliament shall be required; and the same not to divulge by printing, writing, or otherwise, without the consent of both or either House of Parliament".

The prominence given in this ordinance to the reorganization of the government of the Church of England as the primary matter upon which the Assembly thus instituted should be consulted was inherent in the nature of the case, but should not pass without specific notice. And, we should further note, next to the reorganization of the government of the church the reform of its liturgy was, as was natural

²⁰ Rushworth, ed. 1692, II., iii. (Vol. V.), p. 337: it is printed in the preliminary materials gathered at the opening of the Scottish editions of the Confession of Faith; also in the opening pages of A. F. Mitchell, *The Westminster Assembly*, etc. (The Baird Lecture for 1882), ed. 2, 1897, pp. xiii.-xvi.

in the circumstances, to be the Assembly's care. Doctrinal matters lay wholly in the background. In the heading of the ordinance it is described with exactness as an ordinance "for the calling of an Assembly of learned and godly Divines, and others, to be consulted with by the Parliament, for the settling of the Government and Liturgy of the Church of England"; while it is only added as something clearly secondary in importance that its labors may be directed also to "the vindicating and clearing of the doctrine of the said Church from false aspersions and interpretations". In the body of the ordinance the occasion of calling such an Assembly is detailed. It was because "many things remained in the Liturgy, Discipline, and Government of the Church which did necessarily require a farther and more perfect reformation than as yet hath been attained"; and more specifically because Parliament had arrived at the determination that the existing prelatical government should be taken away as evil, "a great impediment to reformation and growth of religion and very prejudicial to the state and government of this kingdom". The prime purpose for calling the Assembly is therefore declared to be "to consult and advise" with Parliament, as it may be required to do, in the Parliament's efforts to substitute for the existing prelatical government of the Church, such a government "as may be most agreeable to God's holy word, and most apt to procure and preserve the peace of the Church at home, and nearer agreement with the Church of Scotland, and other Reformed Churches abroad". It is a clearly secondary duty laid on it also "to vindicate and clear the doctrine of the Church of England from all false calumnies and aspersions". It has already been pointed out, that this emphasis on the reformation first of the government and next of the liturgy of the church, merely reflects the actual situation of affairs. The doctrine of the Church of England was everywhere recognized as in itself soundly Reformed, and needing only to be protected from corrupting misinterpretations; its government and worship, on the other hand, were conceived to be themselves sadly in need of

reformation, in the interests of adjustment to the will of God as declared in Scripture, and of harmonizing with the practice of the sister Reformed Churches. Of these sister Reformed Churches, that of Scotland is particularly singled out for mention as the one into "a nearer agreement" with the government of which it were especially desirable that the new government of the Church of England should be brought. But this appears on the face of the ordinance merely as a measure of general prudence and propriety—there is nothing to indicate that any formal uniformity in religion with Scotland was to be sought. It was with the reorganization of the Church of England alone that Parliament was at this time concerned; and the Assembly called "to consult and advise" with it in this work, had no function beyond the bounds of that Church.

What is of most importance to observe in this ordinance, however, is the care that is taken to withhold all independent powers from the Assembly it convened and to confine it to a purely advisory function. Parliament had no intention whatever of erecting by its own side an ecclesiastical legislature to which might be committed the work of reorganizing the church, leaving Parliament free to give itself to the civil affairs of the nation. What it proposed to do, was simply to create a permanent Committee of Divines which should be continuously accessible to it, and to which it could resort from time to time for counsel in its prosecution of the task of reconstituting the government, discipline and worship of the Church of England.²¹ Parliament was determined to hold the entire power, civil and ecclesiastical alike, in its own hands; and it took the most extreme pains to deny all initiation and all jurisdiction to the Assembly of Divines it was erecting,²² and to limit it strictly to

²¹ "This is no proper Assembly", remarks Baillie (ii., p. 180), meaning that it has no such powers as belonged to the Scottish General Assembly: "but a meeting called by the Parliament to advyse them in all things they are asked." As Dr. Leishman puts it, the Westminster Assembly "in the language of our time was rather a Parliamentary Commission" (*The Westminster Directory*, etc., 1901, p. x).

²² Cf. *e. g.* the explicit action of the Lords to this effect, *Lords' Jour-*

supplying Parliament with advice upon specific propositions occasionally submitted to it. The ordinance is described in its heading as an ordinance for the calling of an Assembly "to be consulted with by the Parliament". And in the body of the ordinance the function of the Divines is described as "to consult and advise of such matters and things, touching the premises"—that is to say, the Liturgy, Discipline and Government of the Church, together with the clearing and vindicating of its doctrine,—“as shall be proposed unto them by both or either of the Houses of Parliament, and to give their advice and counsel therein to both or either of said Houses, when, and as often as, they shall be thereunto required”. And again, with perhaps superfluous but certainly significant emphasis, in the empowering clauses, the assembled Divines are given “power and authority, and are hereby likewise enjoined, from time to time during the present Parliament, or until further order be taken by both the said Houses, to confer and treat among themselves of such matters and things, touching and concerning the Liturgy, Discipline, and Government of the Church of England, or the vindicating and clearing of the doctrine of the same from all false aspersions and misconceptions, as shall be proposed unto them by both or either of the said Houses of Parliament, and no other”; and are further enjoined “to deliver their opinions and advices of, or touching the matters aforesaid, as shall be most agreeable to the word of God, to both or either of the said Houses, from time to time, in such manner and sort as by both or either of the said Houses shall be required; and the same not to divulge, by printing, writing, or otherwise without the consent of both or either House of Parliament”. To make assurance trebly certain the ordinance closes with this blanket clause: “Provided always, That this Ordinance, or anything therein contained, shall not give unto the persons aforesaid, or any of them, nor shall they in this Assembly assume to exercise any jurisdiction, power, or authority ecclesiastical whatsoever,

nal, vi., p. 84, to which the closing words of the Ordinance are conformed.

or any other power than is herein particularly expressed." The effect of these regulations was of course to make the Westminster Assembly merely the creature of Parliament. They reflect the Erastian temper of Parliament, which, intent though it was upon vindicating the civil liberty of the subject, never caught sight of the vision of a free Church in a free State, but not unnaturally identified the cause of freedom with itself and would have felt it a betrayal of liberty not to have retained all authority, civil and ecclesiastical alike, in its own hands as the representatives of the nation. With it, the great conflict in progress was that between King and Parliament; and what it was chiefly concerned with was the establishment of Parliamentary government. In its regulations with respect to the Westminster Assembly, however, it did not go one step beyond what it had been accustomed to see practiced in England with regard to the civil control of ecclesiastical assemblies. The effect of these regulations was, in fact, merely to place this Assembly with respect to its independence of action, in the same position relatively to Parliament, which had been previously occupied by the Convocations of the Church of England relatively to the crown, as regulated by 25 Henry VIII (1533/4), c. 19, revived by 1 Eliz. (1538/9), c. 1. s. z., and expounded by Coke, *Reports*, xiii, p. 72.²³ And it must be borne in mind that stringent as these regulations were, they denied to the Assembly only initiation and au-

²³ Even the Thirty-Nine Articles (Art. xxi.) declare that "General Councils may not be gathered together but by the commandment and will of princes". This was the "law of creeds" in England. Baillie (I., pp. 95-96) even tells us that when the question was mooted in Scotland whether a lawful Assembly might be held without or in opposition to the will of the Crown, he was himself in grave doubt, and could find no example of a National Assembly meeting against the will of the supreme magistrate, rightly professing, either in antiquity or among the Reformed Churches. Scotland soon supplied him with an example. The doubts of Baillie in Scotland, the attitude of Parliament in England, are incident to the principle of establishment, and it would seem can finally be rid of only in free churches. We must bear in mind, however, that from the beginning the Scotch Church claimed and exercised autonomy in *spiritualia*.

thority: they left it perfectly free in its deliberations and conclusions.²⁴ The limitation of its discussions to topics committed to it by Parliament, moreover, proved no grievance, in the face of the very broad commitments which were ultimately made to it; and its incapacity to give legal effect to its determinations—which it could present only as “humble advices” to Parliament—deprived them of none of their intrinsic value, and has in no way lessened their ultimate influence.

In pursuance of this ordinance, and in defiance of an inhibitory proclamation from the King, the Assembly duly met on July 1st, 1643. It was constituted in the chapel of Henry VII after there had been preached to its members in the Abbey by Dr. William Twisse, who had been named by Parliament prolocutor to the Assembly, a sermon which was listened to by a great concourse, including both Houses of Parliament. Sixty-nine members were in attendance on the first day; and that seems to have thereafter been the average daily attendance.²⁵ No business was transacted on this day, however, but adjournment was taken until July 6: and it was not until July 8 that work was begun, after each member had made a solemn protestation “to maintain nothing in point of doctrine but what he believed to be most agreeable to the Word of God, nor in point of discipline but what may make most for God’s glory and the peace and good of His Church”. The first task committed to the Assembly was the revision of the Thirty-Nine Articles, and it was engaged upon this labor intermittently until Oct. 12, at which date it had reached the 16th Article.²⁶ That the

²⁴ The independence of the spirit of the Assembly is illustrated by the conflict which arose between the Assembly and Parliament in the matter of the exclusion of the scandalous from the Lord’s Supper and in the much broader matter of the autonomy of the Church. In these matters, the Assembly exceeded its commission and offered unsought advice to Parliament, much to the distaste of that body; and even declined to act on the determinations of Parliament.

²⁵ Baillie, ii., p. 108: “Ordinarilie there will be present above three-score of their divines.”

²⁶ The House of Commons three years afterwards (Dec. 10, 1646) sent an order to the Assembly asking to have sent up to it “what is

Assembly was thus put for its first work upon the least pressing of the tasks which were expected of it,—“the vindicating and clearing of the doctrine of the Church of England from false aspersions and misconstructions”—may have been due to the concurrence of many causes. It may have been that in its engrossment with far more immediately pressing duties than even the settlement of the future government of the Church of England, Parliament had had no opportunity to prepare work for the Assembly. Beyond question, however, the main cause was the premonition of that change in the posture of affairs by which the work of the Assembly was given a new significance and a much wider range than were contemplated when it was called, and an international rather than a merely national bearing. It was natural that Parliament should hold it back from its more important labors until the arrangements already in progress for this change in the scope of its work were perfected. It is not necessary to suppose that the determinations of the Assembly were essentially altered—or that Parliament supposed they would be—by the change in the bearing of its work to which we allude. It is quite true that in the course of the debates which were subsequently held, sufficient confusion of mind was occasionally exhibited on the part of many in the Assembly to make us thankful that these debates were actually regulated by the firm guidance of men of experience in the matters under discus-

finished upon the Articles of the Church of England”, its purpose being to employ them in its negotiations with the King. After some demurring, and after attaching to them an explanatory preface, the Divines sent them up on April 29, 1647. For its own use Parliament omitted the Preface and Article viii on the Creeds; and they were printed in this form in a tract entitled *The Four Bills, sent to the King to the Isle of Wight to be passed*, which was published March 20, 1648. It is in this Parliamentary form that they have usually been reprinted, e. g. in Hall's *Harmony of the Protestant Confessions*; Neal's *History of the Puritans*, App. vii.; Stoughton's *History of the Church of the Commonwealth*, App. p. 228 sq. The lacking Preface and Art. viii. are printed by Drs. Mitchell and Struthers, *Minutes*, pp. 541-2. The complete text, with all the changes made by the Divines marked, may be found in App. iv., pp. 342, sq., of E. Tyrrell Green's *The Thirty-Nine Articles and the Age of the Reformation*, London, 1896.

sion.²⁷ But the known convictions of the members of the Assembly, evidenced in their printed works no less than in the debates of the Assembly, render it altogether unlikely that had they been called upon, as it was at first contemplated they should be, to advise Parliament unassisted and merely with respect to the settlement of the Church of England, they would have failed to fight their way to conclusions quite similar to those they actually reached.²⁸ Nevertheless the alteration of the bearing of their work from a merely national to international significance, obviously not only gave it a far wider compass than was at first contemplated, but quite revolutionized its spirit and threw it into such changed relations as to give it a totally different character.

This great change in the function which the Assembly was to serve, was brought about by the stage reached by the civil conflict in the summer of 1643. The Parliamentary cause had sunk to its lowest ebb; and it had become imperative to obtain the assistance of the Scots. But the assistance

²⁷ Cf. Baillie, ii., p. 177 (May 9, 1644), who, after remarking on the wide differences of opinion which emerged in the course of debate, cries out: "Had not God sent Mr. Henderson, Mr. Rutherford and Mr. Gillespie among them, I see not that ever they could have agreed to any settled government." The task of establishing a Presbyterian government in a church without any experience of it, in the face of violent Independent and Erastian opposition, was no light one: and it was altogether natural that the English divines whose Presbyterianism was purely theoretical, illuminated by no practice, should have been much disabled by varying views among themselves as to the best methods of procedure.

²⁸ Even Dr. Shaw allows (*A History of the English Church during . . . 1640-1660*, p. 3) that "it is probable that, without the necessity of calling in Scotland, and of adopting the Solemn League and Covenant, the Long Parliament would have resolved upon a system of church government that might be called Presbyterian". And when he adds "though in a sense very different from that usually conveyed by the term", this caution need not be objected to: it is clear enough that the English, even in the Assembly and much more in Parliament, had much to learn as to what the Presbyterianism which they were intent on setting up was and what it carried with it. Scotch influence was necessary, however, not to make them Presbyterians, but to make them intelligent Presbyterians.

of the Scots could be had only at the price of a distinctively ecclesiastical alliance. The Scotch had been far greater sufferers than even the English from the absolutism which had been practiced by the Stuart Kings in ecclesiastical matters. Not content with asserting and exercising original authority in the ecclesiastical affairs of England, these monarchs had asserted and were ever increasingly exercising the same absolutism in the ecclesiastical affairs of Scotland also; and had freely employed the ecclesiastical instruments at their service in England in order to secure their ends in Scotland. But the relations of church and state in Scotland were not quite the same as those which obtained in England.²⁹ In the northern kingdom from the beginning of the Reformation, the ideal of a free church in a free state had been sedulously cherished and repeatedly given effect; and the government of the church was in representative courts which asserted and exercised their own independent spiritual jurisdiction. The interference of the king with the working of this ecclesiastical machinery was, therefore, widely resented as mere tyranny. And as it was employed precisely for the purpose of destroying the ecclesiastical organization which had been established in the Church of Scotland, and of assimilating the Scottish Church in government and mode of worship (doctrine was not in question³⁰) to the model

²⁹ Cf. the *Information from the Estates of the Kingdom of Scotland to the Kingdom of England*, 1640: "The second error ariseth from not knowing our laws and so measuring us with your line. . . . We neither know nor will examine if according to your laws these may be accounted derogatory to royal authority. But it is most sure and evident by all the registers and records of our laws . . . that we have proceeded at this time upon no other ground than on laws and practice of this kingdom never before questioned, but inviolably observed as the only rule of our government." The whole matter is judiciously stated by Dr. A. F. Mitchell in his Baird Lectures on *The Westminster Assembly*, Ed. 2, pp. 289-91; cf. W. Beveridge, *A Short History of the Westminster Assembly*, pp. 116-122, Note on "Spiritual Independence"; also Thomas Brown, *Church and State in Scotland*, 1891; J. Macpherson, *The Doctrine of the Church in Scottish Theology*, 1903, Lectures 5 and 6.

³⁰ Cf. the Aberdeen Articles of 1616, which the Westminster Divines did not disdain to use in perfecting their own symbol. On these articles,

of the Church of England, which was considered by the Scots far less pure and scriptural than their own, it took the form also of religious persecution. No claim could be put in here, as was put in in England, that the royal prerogative was exercised only for conserving the ancient settlement of the church. It was employed precisely for pulling down what had been built up, and was, therefore, not only tyrannical in form but revolutionary in its entire effect. Add that it was understood that the instrument, if not the instigator, of this persecuting tyranny had come in late years to be a foreign prelate aggressively bent even in England on a violently reactionary policy, to which that nation was unalterably averse, and in Scotland balking apparently at nothing which promised to reduce the church there to the same Catholicizing model which he had set himself to establish and perpetuate in England, and it will be apparent how galling the situation had become. Chafing under such wrongs, Scotland needed only a spark to be set on fire. The spark was provided in the spring of 1637, by the imposition upon the Church of Scotland by the mere proclamation of the King—"without warrant from our Kirk", as say the Scottish Commissioners—of a complete new service-book designed to assimilate the worship of the Scottish Church as closely as possible to that of England, or, as Milton expresses it from the English Puritan point of sight, "to force on their fellow-subjects, that which themselves were weary of, the skeleton of a mass-book".³¹ When the book was read in the Cathedral Church of St. Giles, Edinburgh, July 23d, 1637, however, "incontinent", says Baillie,³² "the

cf. C. G. McCrie, *The Confessions of the Church of Scotland*, 1907, pp. 27-35. The Articles may be read in the *Booke of the Universall Kirk of Scotland*, pp. 1132-39.

³¹ "Ar we so modest spirits, and so towardly handlit in this matter", exclaims Baillie, when the imposition of the service book was in progress, "that there in apeirance we will imbrace in a day such a masse of novelties?" (*Letters*, i., i.).

³² i., p. 18. James Gordon's account is as follows: "A number of the meaner sorte of the people, most of them waiting maides and women, who use in that towne for to keepe places for the better sorte, with clapping of their handes, cursings, and outcrys, raised such an uncouth

serving-maids began such a tumult, as was never heard of since the Reformation of our nation"; and thus "the serving-maids of Edinburgh"—symbolized in the picturesque legend of Jennie Geddes and her stool, which has almost attained the dignity of history—"began to draw down the Bishop's pride when it was at the highest".³³ The movement thus inaugurated ran rapidly forward: as Archbishop Spottiswoode is said to have exclaimed, "all that they had been doing these thirty years past was thrown down at once". The Scots immediately reclaimed their ecclesiastical, and, in doing that, also their civil liberties; eradicated at once every trace of the prelacy which had been imposed on them, and restored their Presbyterian government; secured the simplicity of their worship and reinstated the strictness of their discipline; and withal bound themselves by a great oath—"the National Covenant"³⁴—to the perpetual preservation of their religious settlement in its purity.

The Scots to whom the English Parliament made its appeal for aid in the summer of 1643, were, then, "a covenanted nation". They were profoundly convinced that the root of all the ills they had been made to suffer through two reigns, culminating in the insufferable tyranny of the Laudian domination, was to be found in the restless ambition of the English prelates; and they had once for all determined to make it their primary end to secure themselves in the permanent peaceful possession of their own religious estab-

noyse and hubbub in the church, that not any one could either heare or be hearde" (*History of Scots Affairs from 1637 to 1641*. 3 vols. Spalding Club. Aberdeen. 1841. Vol. i., p. 7). Cf. [Balcanquhal], *A Large Declaration concerning the late Tumults in Scotland from their first Original, etc.* London, 1639, p. 23. To understand this scene we must bear in mind the division which obtained in Scotland of the Sabbath service into the Reader's and the Minister's Service. The Minister often entered the church only when his own part of the service began; and it had become the custom of "the better sorte" also to enter at that time. Meanwhile their places were kept for them by their maids. The congregation for the first half of the service was, therefore, chiefly made up of "waiting maides".

³³ Baillie, i., p. 95.

³⁴ The National Covenant is printed in the current editions of the Scottish "*Confession of Faith*", etc.

lishment. The Parliamentary Commissioners came to them, indeed, seeking aid in their political struggle and with their minds set on a civil compact: they found the Scots, however, equally determined that any bond into which they entered should deal primarily with the ecclesiastical situation and should be fundamentally a religious engagement. "The English", says Baillie,³⁵ "were for a Civill League, we for a religious Covenant." The Scots, indeed, had nothing to gain from the alliance which was offered them, unless they gained security for their church from future English interference; while on the other hand by entering into it they risked everything which they had at such great cost recovered for themselves. Their own liberties were already regained; the cause of Parliament in England, on the contrary, hung in the gravest doubt. It really was an act of high chivalry, to call it by no more sacred name, for them to cast in their lot at this crisis with the Parliament; and more than one Scot must have cried to himself during the ensuing years, "Surely it was a great act of faith in God, and hudge courage and unheard of compassion, that moved our nation to hazard their own peace and venture their lives and all, for to save a people so irrecoverable ruined both in their own and all the world's eyes".³⁶ On the other hand, the Scots demanded nothing more than that the Parliament should explicitly bind itself to the course it was on its own account loudly professing to be following, and had already declared, in the ordinance (for example) by which it had called to its aid an advisory council of Divines,³⁷ to be the object it was setting before itself in the reconstruction of

³⁵ ii., p. 90.

³⁶ So Baillie soliloquizes, *Letters*, ii., pp. 99-100: and so all men at the time judged, as even Mr. J. A. R. Marriot allows. "Baillie is justified", says he (*The Life and Times of Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland*, 1907, p. 303) "in taking credit for the Scots in coming to the assistance of a ruined cause."

³⁷ "Such a government shall be settled in the Church as may be . . . most apt to procure and preserve . . . nearer agreement with the Church of Scotland, and other Reformed Churches abroad." This already promised in effect the establishment of a Presbyterian system in England.

the English Church. All that was asked of the Parliament, in point of fact, was, thus, that it should give greater precision, and binding force under the sanction of a solemn covenant, to its repeatedly declared purpose. That the Parliamentary Commissioners boggled over this demand, especially if it were in the effort "to keep a doore open in England to Independencie",³⁸ was scarcely worthy of them, and boded ill for the future. That they yielded in the end and the Scots had their way may have been, no doubt, the index of their necessities; but it would seem to have been already given in the logic of the situation. To hold out on this issue were to stultify the whole course of the Long Parliament heretofore. The result was, accordingly, "the Solemn League and Covenant."

By this pact, the two nations bound themselves to each other in a solemn league and covenant, the two terms being employed apparently as designating the pact respectively from the civil and the religious sides. This "league and covenant" was sworn to in England by both Houses of Parliament, as also by their servant-body, the Assembly of Divines, and in Scotland by both the civil and religious authorities; and then was sent out into the two countries to be subscribed by the whole population. By the terms of the engagement made in it, the difference in the actual ecclesiastical situations of the contracting parties was clearly recognized, and that in such terms as to make the actual situation in Scotland the model of the establishment agreed upon for both countries. The contracting parties bound themselves to "the *preservation* of the reformed religion in the Church of Scotland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, against our common enemies", on the one hand; and on the other to "the *reformation* of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland,³⁹ in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, according to the Word of

³⁸ So Baillie, ii., p. 90; cf. also Burnet, *Dukes of Hamilton*, p. 307.

³⁹ The inclusion of Ireland in the new church-system is to be observed: so that from the Treaty of Edinburgh, Nov. 19, 1643, we hear always of "the three kingdoms" in this connection.

God, and the example of the best reformed churches"; to the end that thereby "the Churches of God in the three kingdoms" might be brought "to the nearest conjunction and uniformity in religion, confession of faith, form of church government, directory for worship and catechizing."⁴⁰ According to the terms of this engagement, therefore, the Parliament undertook, in the settlement of the Church of England on which it was engaged, to study to bring that Church to the nearest possible "conjunction and uniformity" with the existing settlement of the Church of Scotland, and that in the four items of Confession of Faith, Form of Church Government, Directory for Worship, and Catechizing, and these four items were accordingly currently spoken of thereafter as "the four points or parts of uniformity".⁴¹ By this engagement there was given obvi-

⁴⁰ Rushworth, Ed. 1721, v., p. 478. The "Solemn League and Covenant" is also printed in the ordinary Scotch editions of the *Confession of Faith*; and in Gee and Hardy, p. 569.

⁴¹ No doubt the engagement does not in so many words bind the English to the adoption of "the Presbyterian system", and no doubt it was with a view to preserving to them a certain liberty of action that they insisted on inserting the clause "according to the Word of God", and on defining the variety of prelacy which was condemned; but much too much has been made of these things (cf. Gardiner, *Civil War*, ii., p. 268). After all the engagement bound the contracting nations to the preservation of the ecclesiastical establishment in Scotland, and to the reformation of the ecclesiastical establishment in England according to the Scotch model, so far as the Word of God permitted, and it was fully understood that whatever this saving clause denoted it had reference to details rather than to principles. It must be admitted, however, that there soon developed a disposition to treat this saving-clause as permitting liberty in the settlement of the English Church, so far as the Scriptures allowed it: and to those who were able to persuade themselves that no schedule of church-government was derivable from Scripture, this liberty stretched very far. We may observe how the matter was viewed by the Parliamentary contractors, as clearly as elsewhere, no doubt, from certain words of Browne, when rebuking the Assembly (Ap. 30, 1646) for its attitude with respect to the *jus divinum*. "It is much pressed", said he, "for the point of the Covenant. We all agree that the Word of God is the rule and must be the rule, but say there is no positive rule in the Word. Are we by the Covenant bound to follow the practice of the Reformed Churches in case it be against the fundamental law of the kingdom? You must interpret the Covenant so that all parts may stand. We are bound to maintain the

ously not only a wholly new bearing to the work of the Assembly of Divines which had been convened as a standing body of counsellors to the Parliament in ecclesiastical affairs, and that one of largely increased significance and heightened dignity; but also a wholly new definiteness to the work which should be required of it, with respect both to its compass and its aim. Whatever else Parliament might call on the Assembly to advise it in, it would now necessarily call on it to propose to it a new Form of Church Government, a new Directory for Worship, a new Confession of Faith, and a new Catechetical Manual. And in framing these formularies the aim of the Assembly would now necessarily be to prepare forms which might be acceptable not merely to the Church of England, as promising to secure her internal peace, and efficiency, but also to the Church of Scotland as preserving the doctrines, worship, discipline, government already established in that Church. The significance of the Solemn League and Covenant was, therefore, that it pledged the two nations to uniformity in their religious establishments and pledged them to a uniformity on the model of the establishment already existing in the Church of Scotland.

The taking of the Solemn League and Covenant by the two nations, on the one side marked the completeness of the failure of the ecclesiastical policy of the King, and on the other seemed to promise to the Scots the accomplishment

liberties of Parliament and kingdom. If I do any act against this, I am a breaker of the Covenant." (*Minutes*, p. 448 sq.). That is to say, Browne is so convinced that there is no divine prescription as to the government of the church and that the sole judge in ecclesiastical things is the state, and that, as Rudyard put it on the same occasion, "the civil magistrate is a church officer in every Christian commonwealth" to whom in England all jurisdiction is reserved, that he cannot admit that the Covenant with its "according to the Word of God" imposes any form of government whatever. He has more difficulty with the adjoined phrase, "and the example of the best Reformed Churches", and in point of fact merely repudiates its binding force when inconsistent with English law—as if the very purpose of the Covenant were not to establish a new law in England. That the Covenant bound all parties to preserve the Presbyterian establishment in Scotland, no man doubted. (Cf. Carlyle's *Cromwell's Letters*, ii., p. 172.)

of a dream which had long been cherished by them. The broader ecclesiastical policy consistently pursued by the throne throughout the whole Stuart period had been directed to the reduction of the religion of the three kingdoms to uniformity.⁴² The model of this uniformity, however, was naturally derived from the Prelatical constitution of the Church of England, to which the Stuart monarchs had taken so violent a predilection; and that, in the later years of their administration when the policy of "thorough" was being pushed forward, as interpreted in an extremely reactionary spirit. No one could doubt that important advantages would accrue from uniformity in the religious establishment of the three kingdoms; and the Scots, taking a leaf out of their adversaries book, began early to press for its institution in the reconstructed church, on the basis, however, of their own Presbyterianism. Their motive for this was not merely zeal for the extension of their particular church-order, which they sincerely believed to be *jure divino*; but a conviction that only so could they secure themselves from future interference in their own religious establishment from the side of the stronger sister-nation. They had no sooner recovered their Presbyterian organization, and simplicity of worship, therefore, than they began to urge the reformation of the sister-church on their model. The Scottish peace-commissioners, for example, took up to London with them, in the closing months of 1640,⁴³ a paper drawn up by Alexander Henderson, in which they set forth their "desires concerning unity in Religion", and "uniformity of Church Government as a special mean to preserve peace in his Majesty's dominion".⁴⁴ In this paper they declared that "it is to be wished that there were one

⁴² Cf. the expression given to this policy in the Preface to *The Booke of Common Prayer*, which was thrust upon the Scottish Church in 1637 (Prof. Cooper's Edition, Edinburgh, 1904, pp. 7-8).

⁴³ Cf. the letter of Alexander Balfour, from Newcastle, 29 Dec., 1640, printed in Laing's Ed. of Baillie's *Letters*, ii., p. 473.

⁴⁴ The document is printed in the Appendix to Hetherington's *History of the Westminster Assembly*, Ed. 4, pp. 382 sq. Cf. Mitchell, Baird Lectures on *The Westminster Assembly*, Ed. 2, p. 105 and note.

Confession of Faith, one form of Catechism, one Directory for all parts of the public worship of God, and for prayer, preaching, administration of sacraments, etc., and one form of Church Government in all the churches of his Majesty's dominions". Here we see enumerated the precise schedule of uniformity which was afterwards undertaken under the sanction of the Solemn League and Covenant, the items being arranged climactically in the order of ascending immediate importance. For the Commissioners recognized that it was uniformity of Church Government which was most imperatively required; and equally frankly urged that this uniformity of Church Government should be sought by the common adoption by both nations of the Presbyterian system. The propriety of such a demand they argued on the grounds that the Presbyterian system was the system in use in all other Reformed churches; that the English Prelatical system had been the source of much evil; that the Reformed churches were clear that their system is *jure divino*, while the *jus divinum* was not commonly claimed for Episcopacy; ⁴⁵ and above all, that the Scotch were bound by oath, not lately taken in wilfulness but of ancient obligation, to the Presbyterian system, while the English were free to recast their system, and indeed were already bent on recasting it. This paper was handed in to the Lords of the Treaty on March 10, 1641, with little apparent immediate effect. Indeed, there seems to have been even a disposition to resent its suggestions. The whole matter was put to one side by the Parliament with a somewhat grudging word of thanks to Scotland for wishing uniformity of church government with England, and a somewhat dry intimation that Parliament had already taken into consideration the reformation of church government

⁴⁵ The *jus divinum* seems to have been first claimed for episcopacy by Bancroft in the reign of Elizabeth, but was finding many supporters at the time when Henderson's paper was drawn up, though these supporters still constituted only a party. The difference between the two parties in this matter was urged by Falkland (Marriott, p. 203): only "some bishops pretended to *jure divino*", but this is the essence of "the Scotch Government".

and would proceed in it in due time "as should best conduce to the glory of God and peace of the Church".⁴⁶ This response was accordingly embodied in the treaty of August 7, 1641,⁴⁷ to the effect that the desire expressed for "a uniformity of Church Government between the two nations" was commendable; "and as the Parliament had already taken into consideration the reformation of Church Government, so they would proceed in due time as should seem most conducive to the glory of God and peace of the Church and of both kingdoms".

Nevertheless the suggestion ultimately bore fruit. It was repeated by Henderson to the Scottish Assembly, meeting at the end of July next ensuing, in a proposition that the Scotch Church, by way of holding out the olive branch, should itself draw up a new "Confession of Faith, a Catechism, a Directory for all parts of publick worship, and a Platform of Government, wherein England and we might agree".⁴⁸ This proposal met so far with favor that Henderson was himself appointed to take the labor in hand, with such help as he should choose to call to his side. On further consideration, however, he himself judged it best to await the issue of affairs in England;⁴⁹ fully recognizing that the adoption of purely Scottish forms by both nations was not to be hoped for, but if uniformity was ever to be attained, it must come by "the setting down of a new form for all, prepared by some men set apart for that work".⁵⁰ Accordingly, when, as the outbreak of open war between the Parliament and the King became imminent in the midsummer of 1642, Parliament addressed a letter to the Scottish Assembly declaring "their earnest desire to have their church reformed according to the word of God,"⁵¹ and their well-grounded hope of accomplishing this

⁴⁶ Cf. Shaw, *op. cit.*, pp. 128 sq.

⁴⁷ Cf. Makower, *Constitutional History of the Church of England*. E. T., p. 78, note 37.

⁴⁸ Baillie, *Letters*, i., p. 365; cf. p. 376.

⁴⁹ Baillie, ii., pp. 1, 2, 24.

⁵⁰ Henderson's letter in Baillie, ii., p. 2.

⁵¹ Baillie, ii., p. 45.

task if war could be averted,—all of which was interpreted, and was intended to be interpreted, by an accompanying letter “from a number of English ministers at London” in which it was asserted that “the desire of the most godly and considerable part” among them was for the establishment in England of the Presbyterian Government, “which hath just and evident foundation both in the word of God and religious reason”; and, referring directly to the Scottish proposal, “that (according to your intimation) we may agree in one Confession of Faith, one Directory of Worship, one public Catechism, and form of Government”⁵²—the Assembly naturally responded⁵³ by reiterating its desire for this unifying settlement and renewing “the proposition made by” its commissioners in 1641 “for beginning the work of reformation at the uniformity of Church Government”. “For what hope” the Assembly argues, can there be of unity in religion, of one Confession of Faith, one form of Worship, and one Catechism, till there be one form of ecclesiastical government?” The response of Parliament,⁵⁴ satisfactory if a little reserved, intimated the expected meeting of the reforming synod on Nov. 5, and asked the appointment of some Scottish delegates “to assist at it”;⁵⁵ a request which was immediately complied with, and the Commissioners named, who, a year later, after the adoption of the Solemn League and Covenant, went up in somewhat different circumstances, and with a somewhat different commission.⁵⁶ Meanwhile the Scots assiduously kept their

⁵² Acts of Assembly, 1642.

⁵³ This letter is printed in Rushworth, Ed. 1692, III., ii. (vol. 5), p. 388.

⁵⁴ Rushworth, Ed. 1692, III., ii. (vol. 5), p. 390 sq.

⁵⁵ Baillie, *Letters*, ii., 55.

⁵⁶ These commissioners were eight in number, and were fairly representative of the Church of Scotland, in the two parties into which it was then divided with respect to its sympathies with the old order in Scotland or with “the movement party in the South”, that is, the Puritans. Robert Douglas, Alexander Henderson, Robert Baillie, with the Earl of Cassilis and Lord Maitland, belonged to the one side; Samuel Rutherford, George Gillespie and Archibald Johnston of Warriston to the other (cf. Leishman, *The Westminster Directory*, 1901, p. ix.). Douglas and Cassilis never went up to London on their

proposals for the institution of uniformity of religious constitution in the two nations forward,⁵⁷ and the course of events finally threw the game into their hands, when the commissioners of Parliament appeared in Edinburgh in August, 1643 seeking Scottish aid in their extremity, and swore the Solemn League and Covenant as its price. By this compact the two nations bound themselves precisely to the punctual carrying out of the program proposed by the Scottish Commissioners in 1640 -I.

The Solemn League and Covenant, it must be borne in mind, was no loose agreement between two churches, but a solemnly ratified treaty between two nations. The commissioners who went up to London from Scotland under its provisions, went up not as delegates from the Scottish Church to lend their hand to the work of the Assembly of Divines, but as the accredited representatives of the Scottish people, to treat with the English Parliament in the settlement of the details of that religious uniformity which the two nations had agreed with one another to institute. They might on the invitation of the English Parliament be present at the sessions of the advisory Assembly it had convened, and give it their advice throughout all the processes of its commission, which Dr. Leishman supposes to have been due to the King's veto on the Assembly, as both were strong royalists (as cited p. x.). In the case of Douglas, at least, this seems hardly likely, in view of his position in the Commission of the General Assembly, and his letters recorded in its minutes. Dr. Mitchell rather has the truth, when he writes (Baird Lectures, pp. 129-130): "Robert Douglas, the silent, sagacious, masterful man, could not be spared from the duties of leadership at home, but he assisted and cheered them by his letters, maintained good understanding between them and the Church in Scotland, and in their absence came to occupy a place among his brethren almost as unique as that of Calvin among the presbyters of Geneva." The notices of his colleagues in Baillie's *Letters*, which are always appreciative and affectionate, exhibit a complete harmony among the Commissioners at London; and the *Records of the Commissions of the General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland*, published by Drs. Mitchell and Christie, reveal an equal harmony between the Commissioners in London and the Commission in Edinburgh under the guidance of Douglas.

⁵⁷ Baillie, ii., p. 87; and cf. the correspondence with the King in Rushworth, Ed. 1692, III., ii. (vol. 5), pp. 393 sq.

deliberations. And it is obvious that their presence there would much advance the business in hand, by tending to prevent proposals of a hopelessly one-sided character from being formulated. It would seem obvious also that it was eminently fitting that Scotch counsels should be heard in the deliberations of a body to which, under whatever safeguards, was in point of fact committed the task of preparing the drafts of formularies which it was hoped might prove acceptable to both churches,—especially when thirty members of the English Parliament, the party of the other part to this treaty, were members of the body. But the proper task of the Scotch commissioners lay not in the Assembly of Divines, but outside of it. It was their function, speaking broadly, to see that such formularies were proposed to the two contracting nations for the reducing of their church establishments to uniformity, as would be acceptable to the Church of Scotland which they represented, and would fulfil the provisions of the Solemn League and Covenant under the sanction of which they were acting.⁵⁸ And if the Assembly of Divines were utilized, as it in point of fact was utilized, to draw up these draft formularies, it was the business of the Scottish Commissioners to see that the Divines did their work in full view of the Scottish desires and point of view, and that the documents issued from their hands in a form in which the Church of Scotland could adopt them. In the prosecution of these their functions as treaty commissioners, their immediate relations were not with the Assembly of Divines but with the Parliament or

⁵⁸ The General Assembly (*Acts* for 1643, pp. 89, 90 sq.) addressing the *Parliament of England*, informs it that the Scottish Commissioners have been "nominated and elected" "to repair unto the Assembly of Divines and others of the Church of England, now sitting at Westminster, to propound, consult, treat and conclude with them . . . in all such things. . . ." Here the Assembly of Divines and the Scotch Commissioners are looked upon as the two parties by whose consultings together the contemplated agreements are to be reached. Addressing the *Assembly of Divines*, however, the General Assembly only informs them that commissioners had been appointed "to report to your Assembly" without defining to what ends. It is to *Parliament* that the Assembly speaks as to the other contracting party.

with whatever commissioners the Parliament might appoint to represent it in conference with them. They could treat with or act directly upon the Assembly of Divines only at the request of Parliament, to treat with which they were really commissioned; and only to the extent which Parliament might judge useful for the common end in view. A disposition manifested itself, it is true, on their appearing in London, to look upon them merely as Scotch members of the Assembly of Divines, appointed to sit with the Divines in response to a request from the English Parliament. This view of their functions they vigorously repudiated. They were perfectly willing, they said,⁵⁹ to sit in the Assembly as individuals and to lend the Divines in their deliberations all the aid in their power, if the Parliament invited them to do so. But as commissioners for their National Church, they were Treaty Commissioners, empowered to treat with the Parliament itself. Accordingly a committee of Parliament was appointed (Oct 15, 1643) to meet statedly with them and consult with them, to which was added a committee from the Divines; and it was through this "Grand Committee" that the work of the Assembly on the points of uniformity was directed.⁶⁰ As they were requested by Parliament also

⁵⁹ This "willingness" was not, however, spontaneous. Henderson tells us (Baillie's *Letters*, ii., p. 483) that the Commissioners, "against their former resolution, were, by their friends and for the good of the cause, persuaded to joyne" with the Assembly. Baillie's own very lucid account runs as follows (ii., p. 110): "When our Commissioners came up they were desired to sit as members of the Assembly, but they wisely declined to do so; but since they came up as Commissioners from our national Church to treat for uniformity, they required to be dealt with in that capacity. They were willing as private men to sit in the Assembly, and upon occasion to give their advice on points debated; but for the uniformity they required a committee might be appointed from the Parliament and the Assembly to treat with them thereanent. All of these after some harsh enough debates were granted; so once a week and sometimes oftener there is a committee of some Lords, Commons and Divines which meets with us anent our commission." For this committee see p. 102.

⁶⁰ *Commons' Journal*, iii., p. 278; *Lords' Journal*, v., p. 265; Lightfoot, xiii., p. 27. Cf. Baillie, ii., pp. 102, 110; and for the completeness with which they were from the first recognized and dealt with as treaty com-

"as private men" to sit in the Assembly of Divines they occupied a sort of dual position relatively to the Assembly,⁶¹ and this has been the occasion of some misunderstanding and even criticism of their varied lines of activity. The matter is, however, perfectly simple. In all its work looking to the preparation of a basis for the proposed uniformity, the Assembly really did its work under the direction proximately not of the Parliament but of "the Grand Committee", and the results of its labors were presented, therefore, not merely to Parliament, but, also, through its commissioners, to the Scottish Assembly. The Scotch Commissioners as members of "the Grand Committee" had therefore an important part in preparing the work of the Divines for them in all that concerned the uniformity; and as present at the deliberations of the Divines were naturally concerned to secure for their own proposals favorable consideration, and did their best endeavors to obtain such results as they might as commissioners of the Scotch Church recommend to its approval. Throughout everything they acted consistently as the Commissioners of the Scotch Church, seeking the ends which they were as such charged with securing. They were not members of the Assembly of Divines, were present at its meetings and took part in its deliberations only by express invitation and frankly as the agents of the Scotch missioners apart from the Assembly cf. instances in Rushworth, III., ii. (vol. 5), p. 371, ed. 1692.

⁶¹ Cf. the speech of George Gillespie in the General Assembly, Aug. 6, 1647 (Baillie's *Letters*, III., p. 450): "Ye know we have acted in a double capacity according to our commission: We have gone on in a way of treating with the Committee of Parliament and Divines jointly, and have given in many papers as concerning the officers of the Kirk, excluding scandalous persons from the Kirk Sacrament, the growth of Heresies, and such things as in your judgment and ours was defective among them. We have acted in another capacity, debating with and assisting the Assembly of Divines their debates. . . ." Lord War-riston thus expresses his relation to the Assembly of Divines: "I am a stranger . . . having a commission both from that Church and State, and at the desire of this kingdome assisting in your debates." (Speech to the Assembly of Divines, May 1st, 1646, in *Records of the Commissions of the General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland*, edited by Mitchell and Christie, i., p. 82.)

Church, and possessed and exercised no voice in the determinations of the body.⁶²

By the Solemn League and Covenant, therefore, the work of the Assembly of Divines was revolutionized, and not only directed to a new end but put upon a wholly new basis. Its proceedings up to the arrival of the first of the Scottish Commissioners in London, on Sept. 15, 1643, and the taking of the Covenant on Sept. 22nd, must be regarded simply as "marking time". The Parliament perfectly understood before the first of July, what was before it; and it could never have imagined that the revision of the Thirty-nine Articles upon which it had set the Assembly could prove an acceptable Confession of Faith for the two churches. The employment of the Assembly in that labor was but an expedient to occupy it innocuously until its real work under the new conditions could be begun. With the coming of the Scotch Commissioners, however, the real work of the Assembly became possible, and was at once committed to it. Already on Sept. 18, there was referred to it from the Commons the consideration of a discipline and government apt to procure nearer agreement with the Church of Scotland and of a new liturgical form, and from the 12th of the October following,⁶³ when the Lords had concurred, the Assembly was engaged, with many interruptions, no doubt, but in a true sense continuously, and even strenuously, upon the "four things mentioned in the Covenant, viz.: the Directory for Worship, the Confession of Faith, Form of Church Government, and Catechism".⁶⁴ And when "the debating and perfecting" of these four things were over, the

⁶² The fact that the Scotch Commissioners did not vote in the divisions of the Divines is made evident in various ways, and is confirmed by the absence of their names from all the recorded votes of the Assembly (see, *e. g.*, *Minutes*, p. 252). Cf. in general the note of Dr. Mitchell in his Baird Lectures (2d ed.), pp. 180-1.

⁶³ The order of the Commons was passed Sept. 18 and at once communicated to the Assembly: but the Lords concurred only on Oct. 12. See the facts drawn out by Shaw, *A Hist. of the English Church*, I., pp. 153-4.

⁶⁴ *Minutes*, Session 936, Oct. 15, 1647, p. 484.

real work of the Divines was done, and the last of the Scotch Commissioners accordingly, having caused a formal minute to that effect to be entered on the records of the Assembly, felt able to take leave of the Assembly and return home.⁶⁵ As an advisory committee to the Parliament of England, many other tasks were laid on the Assembly, some of which had their close connection with its work on the points of uniformity, and some of which had no connection with it at all. And the life of the Assembly was prolonged as such a committee for many months after its whole work on "the uniformity" had been completed. But its significant work lies decidedly in its preparation of a complete set of formularies—Confession, Catechisms, Platform of Government, Directory for Worship—which it proposed to the contracting nations as a suitable basis for a uniform church establishment in the three kingdoms.

In the next number of this REVIEW some account will be given of the work of the Divines in the preparation of these formularies.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

⁶⁵ *Minutes*, p. 484.

MARRIAGE AMONG THE EARLY BABYLONIANS AND HEBREWS.*

The discoveries in the realm of Assyriology have been of too wonderful a character for their full significance to be easily and quickly grasped. To have our historical horizon suddenly pushed back several millenniums is in itself startling; but to know that in the third millennium before Christ, and perhaps earlier, there was a highly developed complex civilization, comparable in many respects to our own, in the valley of the Euphrates, and also of the Nile, is to realize that it will be many years before we have adjusted our historical sense to this new knowledge. The first feeling on examining the remains of these ancient peoples—the few fragments of their art that have come down to us, and especially their literature, with what it reveals of an active, virile and cultured people—is that of simple amazement that such things could have been and then have vanished completely. And when in turn we consider, as we are forced to consider, our own much vaunted position as the “heirs of all the ages in the foremost files of time”, we are compelled to ask ourselves whether our civilization, too, may not, after all, go the way of these former ones, and the time come “when London shall be a habitation of bitterns, when St. Paul and Westminster Abbey shall stand shapeless and nameless ruins in the midst of an unpeopled marsh, when the piers of Waterloo Bridge shall become the nuclei of islets of reeds and osiers, and cast the jagged shadows of their broken arches on the solitary stream”.

The latter years of the Assyrian Empire were long considered the Golden Age of Assyrian and Babylonian culture.

* The substance of this article was delivered as a lecture at the Grove City Summer School, August, 1907.

This view, however, has to be given up. The famous library of Ashurbanipal consists largely of duplicates of older Babylonian texts, and the glory of his time is to be regarded, at least as far as culture is concerned, as only a renaissance. Whence this wonderful literature came we do not know, not even whether it was original with the Semites or obtained by them from their predecessors in the valley of the Euphrates, the so-called "Sumerians". But in our search for a period in which were wedded the originality and energy required to produce such works, we are arrested at that of the so-called "First Dynasty" of Babylon. It is with this period that we have to deal more particularly in this article. This dynasty reigned in Babylon for about three centuries at the end of the third millennium before Christ. The best known and most powerful of its number was Hammurabi, the sixth of the eleven kings who are included in it. From it we have a large and rapidly increasing number of documents, both official and private. They picture to us a land intersected with frequent canals, bearing vessels laden with corn, oil, dates, wine, and numerous other products; a fertile and well cultivated country, a well established and efficient administration (at least under Hammurabi), and a complex civilization with different grades in society, trade highly developed, a monetary system (possibly stamped coins), companies of traders, guilds of workmen, agencies, and perhaps even a postal system.

By far the most important single document of this period is the code of laws promulgated by Hammurabi. Rarely, if ever, has such an important "find" been made in the realm of archæology. Published over two thousand years before the Code of Justinian, we find in it the human mind working exactly as to-day, the same sense of justice, responsibility, and back of it the same humanitarian principles. Hammurabi's statement that he was appointed by the gods "to spread abroad justice in the land, to destroy the evil and the wicked, and to prevent the strong from oppressing

the weak" is quite consonant with the terms of his code. The resemblance to modern law is seen chiefly in the sections referring to property. For instance, concerning mortgage it is enacted that if a man borrow money, and promise the lender in return the whole produce of a field, the lender at harvest time shall not be allowed to take more than will cover the original debt with interest and the cost of cultivation (§ 49). Or again, if a widow with children under age wish to marry again, she must first obtain the consent of the authorities, who may then make her and her second husband co-trustees of the first husband's estate in the interest of his children (§ 177). Both laws, it will be seen, sought the protection of the weak and helpless, and both are to be found in modern statute books.

That this code of laws was the first to be given to those peoples is very doubtful. Their form and their grouping would alone suggest that we have here not the first attempt at formulating laws or codifying them. Moreover, there have come down to us fragments of another code, differing in many points from that of Hammurabi and mirroring apparently an earlier stage of development. A characteristic of these fragments is that they are bilingual, one column being written in the language of the pre-Semitic Sumerians, the other in Babylonian. This in itself is strong evidence for their priority. One thing of which Hammurabi boasts is that he has made known his laws "in the language of the country",¹ and for this, perhaps, he deserves more credit than for originality. Whether or not, however, it had codified statutory law before the time of Hammurabi we can by no means regard the country as lawless. Private legal contracts dated centuries before his time show us a system of judges and judicial administration in the individual towns far from primitive, and still earlier literature and remains warrant us in saying that the cities

¹ Accepting Lyon's explanation of *ina pi* (KA) *matim*, J A O S. XXV, p. 269.

of Babylon in the time of Hammurabi may have looked back on a past as old as that of London to-day.

One thing noticeable in the private contracts of earlier and contemporaneous literature is that frequently they are not in accord with the provisions of Hammurabi's code. This has long been noted and commented upon, and recently Professor Meissner has put us all under obligation by collecting and translating (some for the first time) a considerable number of contracts confirmatory of this fact.² The possibility and reason of this is seen when we consider the constitution of Babylonian society and the warring, or at least the un-united elements contained in it.

The unit of society in Babylon was the family, at the head of which stood the father. To what extent the individual family was subordinate to the gens or clan we do not know. Laws and contracts of all times point to a time in the past when the power of the father was absolute. Wives and children, as well as slaves, were his property, to dispose of as he wished. He bought his wife or wives, and he could divorce them by simply saying, "thou art not my wife", or sell them and their children as any other property. In case of their disobedience he could put them to death. All dealings with outsiders were, of course, conducted in his name. He bought what property was needed for the growing family, or slaves or wives for his sons and himself. He also sold and gave his daughters in marriage, sold property or slaves, etc. In short, he was patriarch in the full sense of the word.³ It is not meant that this condition of affairs existed in historical times; it lies long before the period of which we have definite information; but it left its impress upon the customs and laws of the Babylonians even to the latest day. The historical reconstruction of the period lying between that of the absolute

² *Assyriologische Studien*, III. 1905, in the *Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft*.

³ Some would find traces of a still earlier matriarchate, but the discussion of that is not proper to this article. Nor is it our purpose to speak of the religious position of the father.

patriarchate and that of the much later city civilization is not yet possible. This much, however, we may affirm: that when several families were grouped together for geographical reasons, mutual defense, or religious purposes, a new social unit was formed, the common interests of which necessarily encroached upon the absolute power of the father, and in which the customs of the several families would tend to become (if they were not already) very similar, if not identical. And indeed we find that much of the Babylonian legislation, as well as that of other peoples, is concerned with more accurately defining the rights of the father and the members of the family on one hand and that of the town or state on the other. Hand in hand with the progress of such communal or city life went such things as division of labor, freeing of slaves, centralization of cultus, rise of the priesthood as a special class with special rights, change in the position of women, judges, courts of law, etc., all of which would of necessity react upon the authority of the father in his own family. The state of affairs was still further complicated in earlier times by the presence of people who had preceded the Semites in the valley, and who had been either conquered or assimilated, or both, and in later times by the foreigners of different nationalities who sojourned in, or travelled through the land, as well as by the active intercourse between Babylonia and other countries. From very early times there must have been a considerable number of residents unattached to families.

In the third millennium before Christ southern Babylonia was filled with small towns, the inhabitants of which, although of more than one race, had more or less the same customs and language, or rather languages,⁴ and were otherwise united by trade, commerce, travel, and those things which are common to people inhabiting one district and having in the main the same interests. Still, each of these towns had its own organization, its king, judges, and temple,

⁴ The Sumerian was being gradually supplanted by the Semitic Babylonian.

and, we must conclude, differed from the others in customs, at least to some extent. They made war upon each other and occasionally one would subdue several others. This was the state of affairs when Hammurabi succeeded in uniting a large number of them under his own sway. In his historical inscriptions and letters⁵ we can see with what zeal he set about the task of making one united empire out of these, to some extent, heterogeneous elements. He built new canals and cleared out old ones, he was in constant communication with his governors in the various towns, soldiers and officials passed constantly to and fro on the imperial business, he revised the decisions of the judges, and at times called a case to Babylon for trial. It is in the light of this that we must view the code of laws promulgated in his reign. His task was not easy; there were the customs and rights of the individual, the family, the town, and the empire to be considered. If different customs or laws prevailed in different sections of the country they had to be brought into conformity, and, above all else, it is clear that the interests of humanitarianism and mercy were not neglected. The position of the slave, the borrower, the debtor, and all unfortunates was, as far as we can see, essentially bettered by his legislation.

His purpose, of course, could not be accomplished at once; old customs and old recognized rights were too deeply rooted in the consciousness of the people to be lightly set aside, and to this we must doubtless ascribe the peculiarity mentioned before, that many of the contracts of this period do not conform to the requirements of the code. How far the primitive right of the father had been already modified and curtailed by custom or legislation we cannot say, but Hammurabi, even if such a thing had occurred to him, would have been unable to take away his powers entirely. This is well illustrated by one section (129) of the code. It is enacted that if a wife be taken in adultery with a man, the two shall be thrown into the water, "provided that the

⁵ Published by L. W. King, *Letters and Inscriptions of Hammurabi*.

husband may save his wife and the king his servant". In this case the husband stood in the same relation to his wife as the king to his subject. Similarly, the right of a father to sell his wife and children in case of debt is not disputed, but it is enacted that they shall serve only three years (§ 117). A father has the right to disinherit a son, but he must first get the approval of the authorities (§ 168f.), and even then he shall not cut him off until he have twice committed an offense worthy of such punishment. However, the code does not hesitate to fix the penalty for unfilial conduct on the part of a son, or to interfere in other respects in the relations of father and mother to their children, adopted children, and slaves. The family as a self-contained independent unit had already long ceased to exist.

It will not be possible for some time yet to give a satisfactory picture of the social and economic conditions in old Babylon. As yet we have only its main outlines and are attempting here and there to sketch in a few details. In this article we wish to speak more particularly of some of the marriage relations as they are portrayed to us in the literature of the time, and to compare these with the stories of the early Hebrew patriarchs. In the first place, it is to be remembered that we are not dealing with a time when women were mere chattels or confined to a harem. The high position occupied by woman in the days of Hammurabi has astonished everyone. It is true that they do not appear in the contract literature as often as men, but still they seem to have been endowed with as many, or almost as many, rights as their brothers. They could be parties to a suit; could hold, buy and sell land, houses, slaves, etc., adopt children, act as scribes, and in one instance we know of a woman acting as judge.⁶ Indeed, judging by this kind of

⁶ Bu. 91-5-9, 327 C. T. VIII. Translated by Schorr, *Altbabylonische Rechtsurkunden*, No. 5. As, however, the woman was also the scribe, she may be only formally entered among the judges.

literature, it is easier to affirm than to deny that they held equal rights with men.

A man might have concubines. We have no means of knowing whether their number was limited or not. Most probably it was restricted only by the man's wealth or inclination. The concubine was a slave,⁷ as her name (*amtum*) implies. Only in case she bore children to her master (*bêl amtum*) did she acquire additional dignity and rights. The sections of the code dealing with her position are the following:

§ 119. If a man be in debt and he sell for money his maid who has borne him children, the money that the merchant (buyer) paid may (shall)⁸ the owner of the maid repay and so ransom his maid.

§ 170. If a man's wife bear him children and also his maid bear him children (and) the father during his lifetime say to the children that the maid has borne him "my children", reckon them among the children of the wife,⁹—after the father go to (his) fate (*i. e.* die) the children of the wife and the children of the maid shall share equally in the goods of the father's house. The son who is child of the wife shall divide (?) and take (first share) in the division.

§ 171. And if the father in his lifetime have not said "my children" to the children which the maid bore him, after the father go to (his) fate the children of the maid shall not share with the children of the wife in the goods of the father's house; freedom shall be assured¹⁰ to the maid and her children; the children of the wife shall have no right to claim the children of the maid for slavery.

Although these sections seem perfectly clear, too much must not be read into them. The last two deal only with

⁷ The Babylonian, unlike the Hebrew, did not have separate words for concubine and slave.

⁸ Either translation is permissible. In the former case the maid is protected from the buyer, who may not resell her (cf. § 118); in the latter she is protected from her first owner, the father of her children, who must keep her in the family.

⁹ For cases in which the father adopted such children see A. S. III, p. 55f.

¹⁰ Reading *ishshakan*.

the case of a man who has children by *both* his wife and his concubine. What claims the children of the latter would have in case there were no children by the wife is not evident. In other words, these sections do not aim to set forth the legal status and rights of maid and children, but these are only incidentally mentioned in the laws governing inheritance.¹¹ They do show, however, that in case a man had concubines, and children by them and also by the free wife, the former are not legal children of the free father unless he formally adopt them, for that is the meaning of the expression "if he say, my children". But more than this, we see in these three sections evidently an attempt on the part of the lawgiver to ameliorate the condition of such a maid and her children by enacting (1) that the maid who has so borne children may no longer be treated as the other slaves (§ 118)—as a mere chattel—but must be maintained in the house, and (2) that she and her children must be given their freedom on the death of the father-proprietor, even though the children have not been adopted. The phrase "the children of the wife shall have no right to claim them for slavery" can be no empty repetition, but must owe its prominent place to the frequency of attempts on the part of the legal heirs to keep the maid and her children in the position they had occupied before the father's death; or perhaps we should regard the enactment as new. While we have no right to assert positively that in all cases the children took the same rank as the mother, this would seem to have been the case. In favor of this are the sections just quoted and the other enactment that the children of a slave father and free woman are themselves free (§ 179).

But if it is clear in the case of the slave girl that the tendency was to make her position more easy, much more may we affirm it of the married woman. We shall see that both custom and legislation unite in an endeavor to lift her from the position of dependence on her husband, her family

¹¹ Cf. Lyons, J A O S. XXV, p. 251f.

providing for her by dowry, and law and contract limiting the husband's right of divorce. Concerning the relations of a man to his legal wife¹² we have some definite information. When a man wished to take a wife he must bring

¹² According to some scholars the code distinguishes four kinds of wives—the free wife (*chirtum*), the concubine (*shugetum*), the votary wife (SAL + DIS, the Babylonian equivalent is not sure), and the slave wife (*amtum*), see e. g. Lyons, J A O S. XXV, p. 259. Besides these the word *kallatum* denotes the wife between the time of betrothal and marriage (*Braut, fiancée*), and *ashshatum* properly "woman" is used as a general term for wife whether before or after marriage, free or slave (it is used of a slave wife in Bu. 91-5-9, 374, C T. VIII). This fourfold distinction, however, cannot be certainly affirmed as yet. *Chirtum* denotes the legal wife undoubtedly; but "concubine" is not a good rendering of *shugetum*. Her position, as we shall see later, was closer to that of the *chirtum* than that of slave-wife. The etymological meaning of the word is unknown; there seems no satisfactory Babylonian explanation for it. Moreover, it is doubtful if the word describes the woman as a wife only. In § 184 it is used of one who is neither married nor betrothed, but who is looking forward to becoming a married woman. As a married woman the *shugetum* is expected to bear children herself. In § 144f. a man is allowed to take in addition to his wife a *shugetum*, only in case he has no children; and in § 137 she is distinguished from the SAL + DIS in that she is supposed to have borne children herself (*uldushum*), whereas the latter may provide her husband with children some other way (*usharshushu*), of which we shall speak later. Taking all these things into consideration, it seems best to regard *shugetum* as meaning a mature, marriageable woman, and as such to derive it from the Sumerian SHU-GE, a term frequently applied to animals of both sexes and rendered provisionally by "old" (Reisner, *Tempelurkunden aus Telloh*, p. 35; Radau, *Early Bab. History*, p. 370, et al.), of which SHU-GI = *shêbu* is only a variation. The term then has no reference to the legal position of a married woman as secondary wife or concubine, but to her age and the end for which she is brought into the man's house, namely, childbearing.

The ideogram SAL + DIS, which Lyons and Johns would render "votary wife", is by others regarded as equivalent to the general term *ashshatum* (Scheil, Harper, Müller, Kohler und Peiser, Winckler, Davies). In spite, however, of the majority to the contrary, the former view is not to be lightly disregarded. There is another well-known ideogram (DAM) for *ashshatum* (found in the code B III, 57), and that there should be two for the same word is not probable in a document as carefully written and as exact as the code. The ideogram SAL + DIS is used: (1) before the names of gods, and denotes in such passages evidently priestess (e. g. B XV. 93, SAL + DIS (*il*) *Marduk* = priestess of Marduk), and so also in the other literature of the time;

or send to the father of the girl a present (*tirchatum*),¹³ which, for want of a better name, we may call the "bride-money". This present varied in amount, of course, according to the means of the groom's family. In one contract it was ten shekels (MAP. No. 88), in another one shekel (MAP. No. 92); indeed, it might be lacking altogether, and such a case is contemplated by the code of Hammurabi (§ 139); but the custom was a strong one, and it is even provided in the code that, should a father die before his youngest son is married, the brothers shall give their young brother a portion from the goods of the father's house, over and above his regular share, to be used as bride-money in procuring himself a wife (§ 166). Still, that this custom had long lost its primitive significance of buying the bride, and was regarded, sometimes at least, as a mere formality, is evidenced by the fact that the bride-money might be returned with the bride as part of her dowry (Bu. 88-5-12, 10; CT. VIII), and also by the smallness of the sum given. The bride-money paid for a daughter of the king Ammiditana¹⁴ was only four shekels.

(2) without the name of a god, in which case it refers either to a married wife, or to a class of women whose status we cannot with our present knowledge definitely determine, but who were the subject of special legislation, and frequently associated in the laws with women attached to the temples. The word *walâdu*, "to bear children", is never used of the SAL + DIS wife. There is therefore some ground for Lyons' statement that this ideogram, when used of a wife, denotes a "votary wife" "who seems never to bear children". He suggests by way of explanation that "she was perhaps in the service of the temple until she passed the age of child-bearing and was then free to marry. One might compare the vestal virgins at Rome, who were also free to marry after thirty years of service" (J A O S. XXV, p. 259).

With this would agree the account of the marriage of Lamazatim, priestess (SAL + DIS) of Marduk, to Ilushu-bani, on the occasion of which she took with her as part of her dowry her sister Suratum(?) to be *shugetum* (Bu. 88-5-12, 10; C T. VIII; translated in part by Meissner A. S. III, 66).

¹³ Besides the bride-money there were apparently other presents, for it is commanded that in case the groom break the engagement he shall forfeit "*whatever* has been brought" to the father-in-law (§ 159).

¹⁴ Bu. 88-5-12, 193; CT. VIII. The published text reads *Ammiditana*

How far the wishes of the bride were consulted in the engagement cannot be definitely determined. On the one hand it is stated that the father gave the bride to her husband (*e. g.* § 183f. and frequently); on the other it is said of a widow, a divorced woman and a betrothed bride who has been violated by her prospective father-in-law "the man of her choice (heart) may marry her" (§§ 137, 156, 172). As the legal expression "to give a bride" might persist, along with the accompanying formality, long after its original significance (the absolute power of the father in the family and the sale of daughters), had died out, and as it is expressly stated of all except maiden brides that they might marry the man of their choice, and as women in other respects occupied such a free position, we cannot be far wrong in thinking that a considerable degree of freedom was allowed to a girl, in this matter of so much importance to herself. To ascribe to the early Babylonians the marriage customs of modern and mediæval town Arabs and Turks is certainly unwarranted.

The engagement thus formed might be broken by either the groom or the bride's father. In the former case the groom forfeited whatever he had sent to the prospective father-in-law's house (§ 159); in the latter the father of the girl must return double the amount received (§ 160). A still more interesting and very human law is that which provides that if a friend slander the prospective bridegroom, so that the girl's father refuse to give him his daughter, the father-in-law shall return double what has been brought to his house, and the slandering friend may not marry the girl (§ 161).

As soon as the betrothal was completed the girl was called the wife of a man. During the period that elapsed between the giving of the bride-money and the marriage she might live in her father's house (§ 130), or in that of her

sharrum as the father's name; Ranke, however, reads *Ammia*, (*Early Babylonian Personal Names*, p. 65).

prospective father-in-law or husband (§§ 141,¹⁵ 151, 156).

When, however, she came to dwell in the house of her husband, she came also under his authority. If she proved foolish and neglected the house and her husband,¹⁶ he might do either one of two things: he might send her away without giving her anything for her divorce, or retain her in the house as slave and take another wife (§ 141). In case all went well, however, the bride formally "entered the man's house", they were married and set up for themselves.¹⁷ Of the rites and ceremonies connected with the marriage we know little. A marriage contract was required by law (§ 128), several of which have come down to us, with the names of the contracting parties, the conditions attached, of some of which we shall speak later, and the names of the witnesses.

The bride usually brought with her from her father's house a dowry (*sheriqtum*). This, like the bride-money, might be omitted (§ 176), and, of course, its amount varied according to the wealth of her family. The code contemplates a case where the dowry is larger than the bride-money (§ 164), and such was probably usually the case. The inventory¹⁸ of several dowries has come down to us, and from them we learn that the bride received from her father's house such things as real estate, slaves, money in gold and silver, articles of personal adornment, clothing and household utensils.

This dowry was not merged with the property of the

¹⁵ The expression *ashshat awelim sha ina bit awelim washbat*, "the wife of a man who dwells in the house of a man", appears to refer to the period of betrothal. See particularly § 151, where a contrast between the man and wife is referred to, which must have been antenuptial. Only after the woman had formally entered the house of her husband (*ana bit awelim erêbum*) was she fully his wife (§ 152).

¹⁶ This seems to be the meaning of the original.

¹⁷ *Innemdu*.

¹⁸ Bu. 88-5-12, 10; CT. VIII; probably Bu. 88-5-12; 229 in MAP. No. 7; Scheil. *Une Saison de Fouilles à Sippar*, No. 10, p. 98, and others.

husband, but remained distinct. If she died childless it returned to her father's house (§§ 163, 164), but if she had children it belonged to them (§ 162). If a man had two successive wives and each of these had children, after the man died the whole estate was not lumped, but the children received the dowries of their respective mothers, and all shared alike in the estate of the father (§ 167). If a woman had children by two successive husbands, when she died, her children, irrespective of fatherhood, shared her dowry (§ 173).¹⁹ If the husband divorced the wife she received her dowry (§§ 137, 138, 142), likewise if she preferred to leave his house when a second wife was introduced (§ 149).

The regulations concerning the dowry were actuated partly at least by feelings of solicitude for the personal welfare of the bride. Her parents followed her as well as they could into her new home by providing that she should not come to poverty; and they protected her—very much as modern parents—against both her husband and herself, in providing that neither he could get full possession of her dowry nor could she dispose of it. In this way she had a position of independence that she would otherwise have lacked. This same watchful care is evidenced in another way. If a wife make an agreement with her husband before marriage that a debtor may not seize her, she may not be seized for his debts *contracted before marriage*, similarly the man may not be seized for the debts of the wife (§ 151).

What became of her and her dowry in case her husband died leaving her childless is not clear. Did they remain in the husband's family, or return to her father's family, or was the woman free from family control in respect to personal actions or the control of her dowry, or both? There

¹⁹ Presents given to the wife by her husband were governed by the same law. She had the use of them while she lived, but after her death they went to her children (§§ 150, 171). If she preferred to leave her husband's house after his death, she might not take his gift with her, but must leave it with the children (§ 172).

would seem to be no evidence for the first of these. In favor of the second is the law that the dowry of a wife who dies childless shall return to her father's house (§ 163). The enactment that the widow *with children* has a right to live in the house of her husband and have the use of her dowry and what presents her husband may have given her, or failing this, a portion equal to that of one son, as long as she lives (§ 171), may also be regarded as implying that the childless wife had no such claims on the house of her husband. Priestesses, who received dowries also, but had no children, had only the life use of their dowries, unless otherwise specified in the deed of gift. At their death it returned to their brothers (§§ 178-181); an exception to this, however, is the law that the priestess of Marduk may dispose of her dowry and her share of the father's estate as she will (§ 182).

It will be seen, therefore, that the gift of a dowry with a wife had many strings attached to it; but we cannot be sure of the legal status of the wife herself in relation to her father's house and that of her husband up to the time she bore children. We must beware, however, of reading into the code the idea of the perpetual tutelage of women with respect to either personal or proprietary rights. It is true that, strictly speaking, according to the code the wife could not dispose of her dowry or the presents given to her by her husband. Until she had children the former belonged to her father's house; after that both belonged to her children. She had only the life use of them. This looks like tutelage. But we learn also, incidentally, that she could hold and sell property in her own name (§ 147). From this last fact, which is also apparently substantiated by private contracts (though it is difficult to say whether the "wife" there mentioned may not have been a widow), and because a widow at least could be a party to a suit (§ 172), and because of the high position borne by woman in general, it seems best to conclude that, whatever may have been the earlier usage, the woman of the time of Hammurabi, even when married,

as a matter of fact was not necessarily subordinate to her husband in business affairs.

In actual life the husband and wife seem to have worked harmoniously together and to have had almost equal rights and responsibilities. The husband was of course the head of the family and in case of need even his wife and children could be bound over for debt for the space of three years. He seems to have had the control of her dowry judging from the expression "he shall restore her dowry to her" (§ 149 *et al.*). They were however both responsible for debts incurred after marriage (§ 152), and the woman was given equal credit with her husband for all the property acquired during their married life (§ 176). So too in private contracts man and wife act conjointly not only in such family affairs as adopting children or giving presents to children but also in borrowing money or buying a slave.²⁰ They probably acted together in investing the wife's dowry.

It is when we come to the relation of husband and wife in respect to divorce that we see what a subordinate position the woman at one time occupied. But here too we can discern how custom and law were uniting in an endeavor to free the wife from the control of her husband and put her, if not on an equality with him, at least in a freer position than she had heretofore occupied. The husband had the right of divorce, the wife had not. Even the code of Hammurabi did not take this right from the man, but only restricted it. Provision was made, however, for the wife's leaving her husband in certain cases. Of laws earlier than the code of Hammurabi we can say nothing positively. But the bilingual series *ana ittishu* because written in Sumerian and also because of its content may belong to an earlier legislation or at least echo the ideas of an earlier time. In this we have the following provisions concerning divorce "If a wife hate²¹ her husband and say 'thou art not my

²⁰ MAP. Nos. 7, 17, 94, 95, 97, *et al.*; *Leip. Sem. Stud.* I. Daiches, Nos. 23, 26.

²¹ I have retained the ordinary translation of *zâru*, but it is not satis-

husband' they shall throw her into the river. If a man say to his wife 'thou art not my wife' (*i. e.* divorce her) he shall pay one half of a mana". According to this the wife was helpless. The power of divorce was entirely within the hands of the husband and he was restricted in its use only by his ability to pay the half mana divorce-money. When this law was promulgated we do not know. Also there may have been other conditions attached to it which have not come down to us. In any case we have probably to regard the injunction that the man, on divorcing his wife shall pay one half mana, as a restriction on the earlier custom whereby he could send her away at will without any provision whatever. It was therefore a great step in advance. Whether it came originally from the side of the government, or from the bride's parents we cannot be sure. In the time of the First Dynasty, however, we know that it was not in force, and, judging by the contracts we have, would not have been acceptable to many parents of the time. For we find the matter again in the hands of the contracting parties, and the conditions of divorce varying according to their respective position, wealth or influence. In some cases where the bride was a freed woman there is no fine or divorce-money spoken of. The man apparently may act as he will.²² In another the sum for divorce was only ten shekels (one sixth of a mana, M A P. No. 90); in others it was one mana, and in one case the husband was to forfeit

factory. The word is used both of the man's attitude toward the woman (VR. 24d, 54) and of the woman's toward the man (in the passage quoted and Ham. Code, B VII, 60, and CT. VI, 26, 12, quoted by Meissner A. S. III, p. 44). In the former case Meissner translates "*er mochte sie nicht*"; in the latter "*(wenn sie ihn) feindlich behandelt*". This is inconsistent. In the passages cited the word *izîr* seems to imply not only hatred but also a desire for a separation (cf. also Ham. Code B XVII, 18). It seems, therefore, to be used technically in the sense of "desire a separation". In that case the use of *אָשׁ*, "to hate", in the *Assuan Papyri* in the technical sense of "to desire a divorce" is a direct parallel, and there is no need to go to Egypt to find its origin (cf. Z. A. XX, p. 145).

²² See the tablets quoted by Meissner, A. S. III, p. 42.

house and furniture if he divorced his wife.²³ This last provision makes divorce practically impossible. But the duty of the wife remained the same. If she wished a divorce or left her husband there was but one thing possible—she was punished by death.

It was while things were in this condition that the code of Hammurabi was promulgated, and by it the position of the married woman was materially bettered. If she desire a divorce (*išîr*) her case shall be examined by the authorities; if they find that she is without fault and her husband blameworthy, she is to receive her dowry and be free to go back to her father's house (§ 142). If on the contrary she is in fault she is to be thrown into water (§ 143). So strong was ancient custom! Wilful desertion on the part of the man dissolved the marriage tie. The wife was then free to marry another husband and the first husband if he returned had no claim on her (§ 136). If however the husband was captured and so forcibly kept from home, she was allowed to enter another house (i. e. marry again), only on condition that there was not maintenance in that of her first husband; but she must return to him if he come back (§§ 134, 135). The power of divorce, however, was not taken from the man; it was only regulated and restricted in the following manner.²⁴ If he put away a childless wife he must restore her dowry and give her besides a sum equivalent to the bride-money which he had given for her (§ 138); or in case there had been no bride-money the sum of one mana²⁵ (§ 139). In case she had children she should receive her dowry and a portion from the field, garden and goods of the husband; she should rear the children and after they were grown

²³ For this text, see p. 233.

²⁴ One writing of divorcement has come down to us: "Shamash-rabi has divorced Naramtum. She has taken her . . . she has received her divorce money. If another marry Naramtum Shamash-rabi shall make no complaint." M A P. No. 91.

²⁵ Those of a lower rank (MASH-EN-KAK) were required to pay only one-third of a mana.

receive an amount equal to that received by each of the sons, and was then free to marry again (§ 137). But he could not put her away on every cause at will. If he accuse her of adultery and the charge is not proved she may clear herself by oath and return to her house²⁶ (§ 131). If the charge be brought by another man she shall submit to the trial by water²⁷ (§ 132). If the wife of a man be apprehended in lying with another male they (*i. e.* the authorities) shall bind them and throw them into the water; provided that the husband may save his wife and the king save his servant (§ 129). If the wife of a man be ill and so incapacitated,²⁸ he may take another or second wife,²⁹ but he may not divorce the first. She may either be supported by her husband or return with her dowry to her father's house (§§ 148, 149). Naturally after the death of a first wife the man may take another (§ 167).

It is clear therefore that a man was allowed to take a second wife, during the lifetime of his first, only in certain rare instances. In a certain sense then the code was monogamistic. If, however, the first wife did not present her husband with children he was allowed to take a subordinate or secondary wife,³⁰ but it is expressly stated that she shall not rank with the first wife (§ 144). If on the contrary the first wife did present her husband with children the husband might not take a secondary wife (§ 145). This secondary wife was not a concubine. She came to her husband with a dowry from her father's house (§§ 137, 183,

²⁶ Almost undoubtedly the house of her husband; otherwise we would have "to her father's house", as elsewhere.

²⁷ "She shall plunge into the (holy) River for her husband." We do not know the details of the test. It would be an interesting study to ascertain in just what cases oath and trial by water were resorted to. In the Code of Hammurabi, which is remarkably free from superstition, they are allowed only where proof was, in the nature of the case, impossible.

²⁸ A definite illness, *la'abum*, is mentioned; its nature is unknown.

²⁹ *Ashshatam shanûtam*.

³⁰ *Shugetum*. See note, p. 220.

184), and the children she bore were the legal children of her husband (§§ 137, 145).

It will be seen from the foregoing that the possession of children was regarded as very important in ancient Babylon. If a wife did not present them to her husband she was in danger of having another wife introduced into the house—a very disagreeable position for the first wife even though the other was not legally of equal rank. Indeed this very enactment that “the *shugetum* shall not take equal rank with the wife” presupposes an unenviable condition of domestic affairs which this law was endeavoring to improve. If the wife died without children the dowry returned to her father’s house. And as far as we know, it was only when she had had children that she had a right to be supported in her widowhood by her husband’s estate, otherwise she returned to her father’s house or was thrown on her own resources. In a certain sense the marriage may be said not to have been fully consummated until there were children. It was therefore very important for a woman that she have children. Thereby one³¹ ground of divorce would be removed, and she would have a permanent home of her own in case her husband died. Now in connection with this, and evidently to protect the wife there grew up in Babylon a strange custom that was afterwards sanctioned and regulated by the code of Hammurabi. A wife might present her husband with children in either one of two ways: either by bearing them herself or vicariously by giving her

³¹ Meissner (A. S. III, p. 41) thinks that childlessness was the only ground of divorce. This he does by regarding only §§ 138-140 as divorce laws. That is, he excludes all those that deal with legal separation (as §§ 133-136, 142), accusations of infidelity (§§ 131, 132), and also with the divorce (by the man) of the secondary wife (*shugetum*) or votary wife (? SAL + DIS) (§ 137), or of the, apparently as yet, unmarried wife (§ 141). But even were the right to make such distinctions allowed, it is not clear that the phrase (§ 138) “if a man put away his wife (*chirtashu*) who has not borne him children” gives the *ground* of divorce any more than does the expression (§ 137) “if a man has determined to put away (a wife) who has borne him children”.

maid to her husband. In this way she might postpone the evil day of divorce or at least of the secondary wife. The sections of the code that deal with this are the following:

§ 144. If a man take a wife and that wife give a maid to her husband and bring children into existence,³² (if) that man determine to take a secondary wife (*shugetum*) they (i.e. the authorities) shall not agree with that man. He may not take a secondary wife.

§ 145. If a man take a wife and she do not provide³³ children for him, (if) he determine to take a secondary wife he may take a secondary wife. He may bring her into his house. That secondary wife shall not take equal rank with the (first) wife.

§ 146. If a man take a wife³⁴ and she give a maid to her husband and she bear children, (if) afterwards that maid would make herself equal to her mistress, because she has borne children, her mistress may not sell her for money; she may put a fetter upon her and reckon her among the slaves.

§ 147. If she have not borne children her mistress may sell her for money.

It is important that this maid be distinguished from the man's concubine (*amazu*) of whom we have spoken earlier. The former is the property of the mistress and is entirely in her hands to sell or to give to her husband for the purpose of bearing children. The latter is *his* slave. The children of the former are the legal children of the father and of the wife, for she "provides them for him". In the case of

³² *Ushtabshi*. As the verb *walâdu*, "to bear children", is avoided, "wife" is probably the grammatical subject.

³³ *Usharshishu*. That is, either by bearing them herself or by giving him her maid.

³⁴ In this and the preceding sections just quoted the sign representing the word "wife" is SAL + DIS (see note, p. 220). Even though we adopt the view that SAL + DIS = "votary wife", it does not necessarily follow that other wives might not have recourse to this same method of providing their husbands with children. The phrase *mârê usharshu* is used also with *ashshatum* (§ 163). It might, however, mean that votary wives most frequently resorted to this measure.

the wife there must have been some sort of adoption presupposed. The children of the latter became legal children of their father only if he formally adopted them.

According to these sections the maid thus given to the husband by the wife occupied a higher position than the other slaves. To be degraded to their level was a punishment; she might not be sold for money as other slaves were; her position was such that she was tempted to put herself on an equality with her mistress. In spite of this insolence, however, the code protects her, at least to this extent, that if she have borne children for her mistress she has a permanent claim on her, and cannot be separated from her children. This last was an advance on the condition of affairs revealed in the contracts of the time. According to them the maid might be sold whether she bore children or not. One such tablet reads: "Bunini-abi and Belizunu have bought as slave-girl Shamash-nuri from her father Ibi-Shân. She shall be wife of Bunini-abi and maid (slave) to Belizunu. When Shamash-nuri says to her mistress Belizunu 'thou art not my mistress' she may put a mark upon her and sell her for money."³⁵ Apparently she may be sold whether she have borne children or not. In this contract the word "wife" is used in its wide sense. The maid Shamash-nuri is responsible to the wife alone, and consequently there is no mention of her possible rebellion against the husband. In this respect the contract differs markedly from the marriage contracts that have come down to us. It is interesting to note too that here the husband and wife act together in buying the slave-wife. In other cases we have seen that parents included slave-girls in the dowry of their daughters, thus ensuring them as it were against childlessness. Quite as interesting is another contract in which the husband presents his wife with a maid: "Sin-bilanu has presented to Shaddashu his wife³⁶ a slave girl named Mutibashti. The chil-

³⁵ Bu. 91-5-9, 374; CT. VIII. The text is translated and commented upon by Daiches, *Altbabylonische Rechtsurkunden*, No. 26.

³⁶ Meissner, who first translated this text (MAP. No. 5) at first

dren of Sinbilanu shall make no claim against her. . . . All the children that Mutibashti bears shall be Shaddashu's." It is doubtful whether the last clause means that the children of the maid shall be reckoned as the mistress' own children, or merely as her property.³⁷

Among the tablets bearing on this question are two that tell of the marriage of two sisters to one man, and show how the duties and relations of the sisters were regulated in the marriage contract. The first reads: "Warad-Shamash has taken to wifehood and husbandhood Taram-Sagila and Iltani the daughter of Sin-Abushu. If Taram-Sagila and Iltani say to Warad-Shamash their husband 'thou art not my husband' they (*i. e.* the authorities) shall throw them from the pillar (?); and if Warad-Shamash says to Taram-Sagila and Iltani his wife 'thou art not my wife' he shall forfeit house and furnishings. And Iltani shall wash the feet of Taram-Sagila, shall carry her chair to her god's house, if Taram-Sagila be in bad humor Iltani shall be in bad humor, and if she be in good humor she shall be in good humor,³⁸ her seal she may not open, 10 measures of meal (?) she shall grind and bake (?) for her." The other contract reads: "Iltani the sister of Taram-Sagila, from Shamash-tatum their father, Warad-Shamash the son of Ili-ennam has taken them in wifehood."³⁹ Iltani, when her sister is in

read "sister", but now reads "wife", A. S. III, p. 38; similarly Peiser, K. B. IV, p. 46.

³⁷ If the latter, the provision would seem to be superfluous, for the children of a slave belonged also to the slave's owner. However, it is elsewhere expressly stated on the transference of a slave girl to another mistress that the legal title to all the children goes with the gift (Bu. 91-5-9, 280; CT. VIII, translated by Schorr, *Altbabylonische Rechtsurkunden*, No. 18).

³⁸ *Zini Taram-Sagila Iltani i-zi-ni salamisha isalim*. The parallel text (MAP. 89: 7f) has *zinisha i-zi-in salamisha isali[m]*, for which I would suggest *i-zi-ni* (the end of the sign *zi* could easily be confounded with the beginning of the sign *in*) and derive it from *zinû*. The two phrases then give one idea: Iltani shall conform to the humor of her sister. The protasis contains the infinitive without any hypothetical particle.

³⁹ Cf. the other text, "to husbandhood and wifehood". There were

bad humor, shall be in bad humor, when she is in good humor, she shall be in good humor; she shall carry her chair to the house of Marduk. All children that are borne or that they bear shall be their children. If she (*i. e.* Taram-Sagila) say to Iltani her sister 'thou art not my sister' . . . [If Iltani say to Taram-Sagila her sister 'thou art not my sister'] she (Taram-Sagila) may mark her and sell her for money. And if Warad-Shamash say to his wives (wife?) 'not my wives (wife?)' he shall pay one mana of silver. And if they say to Warad-Shamash their husband 'thou art not our husband' they (*i. e.* the authorities) shall strangle (?) them and throw them into the river".

As the interrogation marks show the translation of these texts is not free from difficulty. Apart from purely grammatical questions, however, other difficulties present themselves. The contracting parties are the same in both—the man Warad-Shamash takes in marriage two sisters⁴⁰ Taram-Sagila and Iltani. But throughout both tablets the singular *her, she*, etc., and the plural *they, them*, etc., are used apparently almost without discrimination; moreover, the penalties imposed in case of divorce are not the same in both texts. These difficulties vanish, however, if we recognize that there are two almost irreconcilable interests back of this double contract. There is on the one hand the custom (and law) of the land, which demands that there be but one chief wife in a house, and that any other may not take equal rank

apparently different kinds or degrees of marriage, of which little is as yet known.

⁴⁰ In what sense is not clear. According to the first contract, Sin-abushu is the father of one of the girls; according to the second they are both daughters of Shamash-tatum, and are called sisters. Meissner thinks they became sisters by marriage to one man (A. S. III, 46), but this does not explain *abishina*, "their father". Pinches' suggestion is more likely, viz., that Iltani, the daughter of Sin-abushu, was adopted by Shamash-tatum and so became the adoptive sister of Taram-Sagila (J R A S. XXIX, p. 612), that is to say, they were legal though not own sisters. An even simpler explanation is that either Sin-abushu or Shamash-tatum was the grandfather. (Cf. A. S. III, p. 51n, for a similar case.)

with her; on the other there is the wish of the father and the two sisters that they stand on equal footing with each other and with respect to their husband. In deference to the first of these, Taram-Sagila is made chief wife; her sister Iltani takes the place (though not the name) of maid; she must wait on Taram-Sagila and should she prove rebellious may be sold as a slave. This difference made it advisable that there be two contracts drawn, one looking at the marriage from the standpoint of the husband's relation to his chief wife Taram-Sagila (our first); the other from his relation to Iltani. Accordingly we learn that if the husband break the marriage bond with Taram-Sagila he shall forfeit his house and its furnishings, but if he divorce Iltani he shall be required only to pay one mana. In deference to the wish of the sisters, the words "mistress" and "maid" are avoided, and whenever the marriage or divorce is mentioned both are included. That is to say, they are treated as far as possible as one individual. The husband may legally of course divorce one or the other, but the divorce of either in this case would mean in reality the divorce of both. But there is still another sign of sisterly affection here in the phrase "all children . . . shall be *their* children." In the case of mistress and maid as we have seen all children borne to the husband were reckoned as children of the mistress. In the contract before us Iltani takes the place of maid in several respects but in regard to motherhood she shares equally with her sister.

Let us turn now to the Bible and see how the marriage customs among the patriarchs compare with those of the early Babylonians. No excuse is necessary for making such a comparison. According to the Biblical account Terah came from the town of Ur in southern Babylonia. Abraham grew to manhood and took his wife there (Gen. xi. 28ff.). For this reason alone we should expect the Biblical account, if accurate, to show some resemblances to the Babylonian customs. In addition, however, it is related that Abraham

and his family for some time after him kept up their connection with the old home, or at least with that portion of the family which had remained at Haran. It is true that Abraham felt that he had made a definite break with the old land (Gen. xxiv. 6), but he received news of the welfare of his relatives in Haran (Gen. xxii. 20ff.), and sent for a wife for his son from among them (Gen. xxiv). At the instance of Rebekah, who herself had come from Haran, Isaac sent his son Jacob there to take a wife (Gen. xxvii. 46 ff). As far as we know this was not done again at any later time.

The question of dates need not detain us long. Hammurabi, the author of the code bearing his name, is identified by many scholars with the Amraphel of Gen. xiv. 1. This would make him a contemporary of Abraham. Whether this identification be correct or not, (and it is not so sure as some scholars would have us believe), there can be no doubt that the period of the patriarchs corresponds in a general way at least to the time of the so-called "First Dynasty" of Babylon to which Hammurabi belonged. More than this is not necessary for our present investigation. But before proceeding further it should be remembered that the Babylonian literature which we have quoted is legal, and is worded with that exact precision which characterizes all legal documents; the Hebrew literature on which we are dependent is on the other hand narrative, and instead of the precision of legal documents we have merely the story of events told us as stories usually are.

In the first place, then, the patriarchs gave presents on the occasion of their betrothal. Of Abraham, it is true, we know nothing with regard to this, for he was married before the more detailed story of his life begins. In the case of Isaac and Rebekah, however, we read that Abraham's "servant brought forth jewels of silver and jewels of gold and raiment and gave them to Rebekah; he gave also to her brother and her mother precious things" (Gen. xxiv. 53). The amount or worth of the

presents is not stated, but in kind they correspond to the gifts mentioned in Babylonia. The presents given by the servant to Rebekah at the well were a golden ring for her nose of half a shekel in weight, and two golden bracelets for her hands of ten shekels in weight (Gen. xxiv. 22, 47). In one⁴¹ dowry already mentioned one shekel of gold is allowed for earrings, that is half a shekel for each. In another⁴² half a shekel is given for her "front" or "face" perhaps a nose-ring. In this connection we may appropriately notice that Rebekah's father Bethuel appears in the story only at the time of the actual betrothal (Gen. xxiv. 50), elsewhere Laban her brother and her mother play the leading part. The reason for this is not apparent, though many conjectures might be made. Similar difficulties present themselves in some Babylonian marriage contracts. For instance in one case⁴³ the mother and the brothers arrange the contract and give the bride the dowry that had been set aside for her by her father. It is not stated whether the father was dead or not. In another⁴⁴ a brother and sister give the bride to her husband. In another a sister is to give the bride in marriage.⁴⁵ In others the father acts alone or the father and mother together. The freedom of choice accorded to Rebekah (Gen. xxiv. 57) is quite in keeping with Babylonian custom. Jacob had nothing to offer in the way of gifts or bride-money but he served⁴⁷ seven years for each of his wives. Reckoning his

⁴¹ MAP. No. 7.

⁴² Bu. 88-5-12, 10; CT. VIII., *sha pani napshatisha*.

⁴³ Bu. 88-5-12, 10; CT. VIII.

⁴⁴ Bu. 88-5-12, 193; CT. VIII. If the reading *Ammiditana sharrum* is correct, the father was alive when the contract was drawn, for the tablet is dated in the eleventh year of his reign (see Ungnad, *Die Chronologie der Regierung Ammiditana's und Ammizaduga's*, B. A. VI).

⁴⁵ Bu. 91-5-9, 394; CT. II.

⁴⁷ Apropos of Jacob's complaint that he had been required to make good whatever was either torn or lost, the Code of Hammurabi prescribes that the shepherd is responsible for lost animals, but not for those torn, §§ 263, 266; see also Ex. xxii. 12f.

services at the average wage of a slave (which of course is too little)—six shekels a year—he paid as bride-money a little over two-thirds of a mana for each wife.⁴⁶

Concerning the dowries of the wives of Isaac and Jacob we have only incidental references. With Rebekah went her nurse and her maidens (Gen. xxiv. 59, 61), but what else is not said. Laban also gave a female slave to each of his daughters at their marriage (Gen. xxix. 24, 29) quite in the Babylonian fashion; but what else is not stated here either. Jacob's wives' remark however: "Is there yet any portion or inheritance for us in our father's house" (Gen. xxxi. 14),—implying of course a negative answer—is quite in keeping with the Babylonian law (custom) of inheritance. The married daughter received only her dowry (§ 183),⁴⁸ the son received both bride-money for his marriage and a share in the father's estate (§ 166).

With regard to the position of the childless widow it will be remembered that Judah sent the childless Tamar to her father's house after the death of her husband (Gen. xxxviii. 11), as we have seen was probably the Babylonian custom. But the levirate marriage which is here mentioned for the first time in the Old Testament was unknown to the Babylonians as far as we are aware.

It is in regard to the actual relations between man and wife and the position of children that we find the closest correspondence. And here it may be remarked that Laban put into words the fear that lies back of many Babylonian

⁴⁶ The Hebrew word for bride-money was מִנְהָר, and is found in Gen. xxxiv. 12; Ex. xxii. 16; I Sam. xviii. 25. The custom was common to other Semitic peoples also. A curious instance of the persistence of custom is shown by the fact that the Syrian laws of the early Christian era are almost identical with the Code of Hammurabi in respect to breaking an engagement and the return of the bride-money. Sachau, *Syrische Rechtsbücher*, Vol. I., p. 19, § 33. That other gifts besides the bride-money were usual is seen from Gen. xxxiv. 12. The מִנְהָר is not mentioned in the stories of the patriarchs.

⁴⁸ This section refers only to the *shugetum*. If this means a secondary wife we have no general law concerning daughters. If, on the other hand, it mean 'marriageable woman', there is no such lack.

marriage contracts and laws when he said, "Jehovah watch between me and thee, when we are absent one from another; if thou shalt afflict my daughters and if thou shalt take wives besides my daughters, no man is with us; see God is witness betwixt me and thee" (Gen. xxxi. 49f.).

Abraham had only one legal wife at a time, as far as we know. His first, Sarah, bore him no children for many years and despaired of ever having any. As, however, the possession of children was of prime importance,⁴⁹ she gave her maid Hagar to her husband, saying, "It may be that I shall obtain children⁵⁰ by her" (Gen. xvi. 2). This is, of course, precisely the custom which we read of in Babylon.⁵¹ Sarah, like her sisters in her old home, could hold property in her own name; she owned a maid. Where and how she obtained her is not said, but as Hagar was an Egyptian, it is probable that she did not receive her as a part of her dowry, as Rachel and Leah received their maids, but that she acquired her while in Egypt (Gen. xii.). It would be interesting to know, and it is not at all impossible that Abraham made his wife a present of Hagar, as Sin-bilanu presented his wife Shaddashu with Mutibashti. Sarah gave her maid to Abraham to bear children for her. The Babylonian custom explains how it was possible for her to expect to have children in this way.

"And Hagar conceived, and when she saw that she had conceived her mistress was despised in her eyes" (Gen. xvi. 4). As happened frequently in Babylon, so here Hagar presumed on her being with child to Abraham and was

⁴⁹ How important it was among the Hebrews may be gathered from Rachel's complaint, "give me children or else I die" (Gen. xxx. 1) and the blessing of Rebekah (Gen. xxiv. 60), not to mention many other similar passages.

⁵⁰ אִנְיָה a denominative from the word for son (בֵּן). The word is used only here and in Gen. xxx. 3 in this sense. The translation of the RV does not materially differ from this.

⁵¹ If it should eventually turn out that only "votary wives" had recourse to this method of providing children for their husband, this would suggest the conclusion that Sarah had been in the service of a temple before her marriage to Abraham.

insolent. In Babylon such action on the part of the maid who had borne children was usually punished by her mistress selling her. The code of Hammurabi mitigated this to degradation to the rank of common slave. But in Hagar's case the matter was more complicated, for the child was not yet born. Sarah in her anger blames Abraham for her maid's attitude, and on being reminded that Hagar is her maid, and therefore at her disposal, she treats her harshly, so that Hagar flees (Gen. xvi. 5ff.). Later, however, the maid returns and Ishmael is born. Although the son of a slave, he is legally the firstborn son and heir of Abraham and Sarah according to Babylonian custom, and, as far as we can see, he is regarded as such in the book of Genesis, being frequently called Abraham's son (Gen. xvi. 15; xvii. 23, 25, *et al.*), and regarded as heir by Abraham (xvii. 18) and Sarah (xxi. 10). When Isaac was born there were two legal heirs and Sarah was unwilling to have it so. She now wished Ishmael to be classed as the child of a slave⁵² (Gen. xxi. 10). So she persuaded Abraham, against his wish, to drive out Hagar and Ishmael, and in so doing she caused him to act contrary to the humanitarian principles of the code of Hammurabi, which forbids the sale, (and *a fortiori* the expulsion), of a maid that had borne children to her mistress' husband, and also the disinheriting of a son without good reasons (§ 168f.). The one good thing about the expulsion of Hagar and Ishmael was that mother and son were not separated.

⁵² The use of אִמָּה in this declaration of Sarah's is significant. Hagar in the previous chapters is always called שִׁפְחָה. That the two words could be used almost interchangeably is evident from Chap. xxx. The latter is generally regarded as the lower term (I Sam. xxv. 41, and compare the contrast in Ex. xi. 5), and this may be so. But there is this difference between the words: the former (אִמָּה) is the customary legal term for a female slave, the feminine of אִמָּר (Ex. xx. 10, 17; xxi. 20, 26, 27, 32; Lev. xxv. 44), and the opposite of the hired servant שֹׁכֵר, (Lev. xxv. 6), and would therefore be chosen to describe the legal position of a slave. The latter (שִׁפְחָה), although applied to slaves, did not have the legal connotation of the former, and seems perhaps to point to the woman's position as a laborer (Ex. xi. 5; I Sam. xxv. 27, 41, contrasted with vss. 24, 25, 28, 31, 41).

This same institution of the maid bearing children for her mistress meets us again in the case of Rachel and Bilhah, with the explanatory statement that the offspring shall be the adopted child of Rachel (Gen. xxx. 3),⁵³ and of Leah and Zilpah (vs. 9). In later times we hear nothing of it.

The position of the other children of Abraham known to us is not so clear. On the one hand, the evident contrast between "the sons of the concubines that Abraham had" (Gen. xxv. 6) and "Isaac and Ishmael his sons" (vs. 9) is noteworthy. In the former of these the writer seems purposely to avoid the expression "sons of Abraham". This would be entirely in keeping with the Babylonian custom, whereby the sons of concubines were not reckoned sons of their father unless adopted by him. It is in agreement also with the position of Ishmael elsewhere, who is regularly called the son of Abraham and never the son of a concubine, and also with the fact that Hagar is not called a concubine; nor is Keturah. We would then have to suppose that by "concubines" (vs. 6) are meant a number of female slaves who bore children to Abraham, but of whom we hear nowhere else except in the general lists of his possessions (*e. g.* Gen. xii. 16; xxiv. 35). That would mean simply that Abraham acted as other men of his time in this respect, and the omission of any other reference to his concubines is explained by their unimportance to the narrative. They are mentioned here with propriety in connection with his death and the transference of his estate to Isaac, and have their proper place immediately after the children of the wives.⁵⁴

On the other hand, it has to be said that although Hagar herself is never called a concubine, but rather Sarah's maid (שפחה) or slave (אמה), there seems no good reason for not applying this word to her. Bilhah, who bore the same relation to Rachel that Hagar did to Sarah, is called

⁵³ Following Stade's interpretation, ZAW. 1886, pp. 143ff.

⁵⁴ Compare the arrangement in Gen. xxii. 20-24; I Chron. ii. 42-46; iii. 9, *et al.*

Jacob's concubine (Gen. xxxv. 22). Also, with regard to Keturah; she is called Abraham's wife (אשה Gen. xxv. 1), but the Hebrew word here used may mean also "woman" in the widest sense of the word. I Chron. i. 32 calls her Abraham's concubine, but at that late date the position of concubine, and so the meaning of the word itself, may have been somewhat modified.⁵⁵ If these are the concubines meant, Ishmael was degraded from his position as Abraham's son to the inferior one of son of a concubine.

Whoever these "sons of the concubines that Abraham had" were, however, Abraham gave them "gifts and he sent them away from Isaac his son while he yet lived, eastward, unto the east country". That is to say, he gave them their freedom and sufficient means to begin life. The code of Hammurabi, as we have seen, provides that a man may either adopt the sons of his concubines, in which case they stand on an equal footing with the other sons, or that he may not adopt them, in which case they and their mother shall receive their freedom, but nothing else, upon the death of the father-proprietor. Abraham's action, it will be noted, was midway between these. It is generally thought that this step was taken for Isaac's benefit, but, judged by Babylonian custom, it had also the effect of protecting these sons of concubines from Isaac, who as sole heir of his father might attempt to keep them in slavery.

In Gen. xxv. 5 it is said that "Abraham gave all that he had unto Isaac". If Ishmael and the sons of Keturah were sons of concubines, they had no claim on the estate, and were generously treated for those times in being given their freedom and presents. If, however, we regard them as

⁵⁵ As a rule the sons of a man are distinguished from the sons of his concubine, *e. g.* I Chron. iii. 9: "All these are the sons of David, besides the sons of the concubines." Sometimes, however, the son of the concubine is called the son of the man, *e. g.* Jud. viii. 31. In this case we are left in doubt as to whether the child was adopted and so became the legal son of his father, or whether the legal position of the sons of concubines had changed during the centuries. In some cases we know that the child was adopted, *e. g.* Gen. l. 23, cf. I Chron. vii. 14.

legal sons of Abraham, they were disinherited. This power was in the hands of Babylonian fathers also, but the code of Hammurabi discountenances such action on the part of the father by enacting that he shall submit his reasons to the authorities for their approval, and shall not be permitted to cut off a son unless he has twice committed a grave fault against his father (§§ 168, 169). As a general rule, the sons shared equally in the father's estate (§ 166f.), but one text has come down to us (MAP. No. 107) in which we read of one son receiving the whole estate and afterwards giving portions to his brothers.

Before the birth of Ishmael, when Abraham had no legal son, he is made to say, "One born in my house (בן בית) is mine heir" (Gen. xv. 3). What this means is not clear. We have seen above that, according to Babylonian custom or law, when there were both children of a concubine and children of a wife, the former did not inherit with the latter unless adopted by the father. Whether this can be taken to mean that in the event of there being no legal children the children of the concubine were the heirs, is at best doubtful. In the time of the Judges something like this appears to have been known, for Jephthah, the son of a harlot (זונה), was apparently in possession of part at least of his father's estate until the sons of the wife were grown and drove him out (Jud. xi. 1f.). Whether he was adopted by his father or not we do not know. The "son of my house" in Gen. xv. 3 cannot mean a child of Abraham's, however, on account of the following verse: "This man shall not be thine heir, but he that cometh forth out of thine own bowels shall be thine heir." Another question that rises in this connection is whether the "house-son" (בן בית) and the "house-born" (יליד בית, Gen. xiv. 14; xvii. 12f.) are the same. The latter expression has been found (though partly broken) in a Babylonian contract.⁵⁶ It has the same meaning in both languages, apparently, *i. e.* the

⁵⁶ CT. VIII. 28b 8 *wi-li-[-id bi-t]i-sha*. Translated by Schorr, *Alt-babylonische Rechtsurkunden*, No. 5.

slave born in the house in contrast to the bought slave.

Another thing of which we know nothing from the Babylonian side is the statement of Laban's, "it is not so done in our place to give the younger before the first-born" (Gen. xxix. 26). Jacob apparently knew nothing of such a custom. The code of Hammurabi assumes that the elder brothers will receive their bride-money before the younger (§ 166), but this we cannot press so far as to say that such was always the custom, nor can we apply the same to the dowries of daughters without further evidence.

Whether it was customary among the Babylonians to marry own sisters or half sisters, as Abraham did (Gen. xxi. 12), we do not know. Sections 154-158, which deal with incest, do not mention this relationship. It was forbidden later among the Hebrews (Lev. xviii. 9, 11; Deut. xxvii. 22, and compare 2 Sam. xiii. 11 ff.), but was common among the Egyptians.⁵⁷ The marriage of one man to two sisters did, however, occur, as we have seen above. It was forbidden in the Mosaic law (Lev. xviii. 18). The story of Leah and Rachel has new interest for us when read in the light of the marriage contracts of Taram-Sagila and Iltani. Whether Leah had any superior rights over the younger Rachel is not stated; but the story of Gen. xxx. and the mutual jealousy of the two sisters stands in sad contrast to the agreement that the children of Taram-Sagila and Iltani should be *their* children. The story in Genesis is to be viewed rather as an example of the unhappy state of many polygamous homes of that time which the humanitarian code of Hammurabi was combatting.

From this brief comparison it is evident that the account of family relations in Babylon and among the early patriarchs are in substantial agreement, which at times extends even to details. The fragmentary nature of the stories in Genesis, with only incidental allusions to family affairs, leaves us at times in doubt as to the proper interpretation. In some matters Abraham did not act exactly as the Baby-

⁵⁷ Breasted, *Hist. of Egypt*, p. 85.

lonians did in the same circumstances (*e. g.* the treatment of Hagar and the sons of his concubines); but he never acted contrary to Babylonian principles, nor did his conduct differ from that of his Babylonian kinsmen any more than did theirs among themselves. On the other hand, both accounts are in agreement with regard to the general state of affairs presupposed, and also in details, whether specifically mentioned or only incidentally alluded to. Abraham in particular, in all his family affairs, appears to us as a normal Babylonian gentleman of wealth, neither in advance of nor yet behind his times, but actuated in the main by that same humanitarianism that we find in the code of Hammurabi. Of the other patriarchs the picture is not so clear.

The east is very conservative, and the customs which prevailed at the time of Hammurabi and Abraham may have continued for many centuries. Indeed, many of them are still to be found there. Unfortunately, we are not yet in a position to write the story of the later development of marriage laws and customs in Babylon. It should not go unnoticed, however, that the strange institution of the maid bearing children for her mistress is not met with in the Bible after the time of the patriarchs, nor has it yet been found in Babylonian literature of a later date, as far as we know. It is, of course, too soon to draw conclusions, but the fact just mentioned, and, indeed, our whole comparison,—the similarity of customs in Genesis and the Babylonian records from the end of the third millennium before Christ, and the non-appearance of some of these customs in later times,—favor that view of Hebrew history which holds that the Hebrews were in touch with and influenced by the Babylonians in the infancy of the race, as well as in the period of its decay, and that their literature faithfully reflects the conditions of these early times.

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THE FUTURE LIFE IN HEBREW THOUGHT DURING THE PRE-PERSIAN PERIOD.

The abode of departed spirits, as it was pictured by the imagination of the early Semites is finely described in the story of the descent of the goddess Ishtar into the nether world, her forcible detention there, and her eventual release. The tale is a nature-myth. The goddess is a planet, commonly identified with the planet Venus, which blazes in the sky for a season, then disappears below the horizon, and after a time returns. The story is well known; it is repeated here only for the purpose of comparison. The goddess Ishtar, daughter of the moon-god, determined to visit

The land whence none returns,
The house of darkness, the dwelling of the goddess Irkigal,¹
The house from which he who enters comes not forth,
The pathway whose course returns not,
The house where he who enters is deprived of the light,
 where dust is their nourishment, mud their food,
 where they see no light, but sit in darkness,
 where they are clothed like birds in raiment of feathers,
 where dust is spread over door and bar.

On arriving at the gate, she called to the porter, saying imperiously:

"Keeper of the waters, open thy gate!
Open thy gate . . .
Else will I crush the door, break the bar,
 crush the sill, tear open the doors;
 will bring up the dead that they eat and live,
 and take their places among them that live."

The gatekeeper persuaded the impetuous goddess to re-

¹ The habitation of the dead; and, personified, one of the deities of the place.

strain her violence until he should announce her name to the queen of the place. From his mistress he received command to admit the new comer and subject her to the ancient custom. Thereupon he opened the gate, saying:

"Enter, my lady, and let Cuthah rejoice;
Let the palace of the land whence none returns exult in thine arrival."

On passing the first gate, the noble crown was lifted from the head of the goddess; after the second gate her earrings were taken away; after the third gate the chain was unbound from her neck; after the fourth gate the ornaments were stripped from her breast; after the fifth gate the jeweled girdle was loosed from her loins; after the sixth gate the bracelets and anklets were removed from her hands and feet; and on passing the seventh gate her only garment was stripped from her body. She had descended to the land whence none returns, and according to custom had entered it naked and divested of the insignia of rank. She was filled with wrath. On seeing Allatu, the queen of the place, she unluckily forgot herself so far as to revile the mistress of the realm. She soon learned her mistake. Allatu gave the word, and Ishtar was smitten with disease in the eyes, the loins, the feet, in heart and head, and throughout the body.

In consequence, however, of the absence of Ishtar from the earth, the processes of nature which are dependent on her agency ceased. Love languished, the impulse to fruitfulness was no longer obeyed. In this distress Ea, the god of wisdom, bethought him of a plan. He created a being to act as a messenger, and sent him to the nether world to placate the queen, put her into a good humor, and then conjure her by the name of the great gods and force her to let him have the use of certain water. The messenger followed his instructions, and finally proffered his request for the water. It met with a stern refusal from Allatu the queen. "Thou hast made a request that cannot be granted," said she.

"Away with thee: I will cast thee into the great prison;
The slime of the city shall be thy food,
The gutters of the city thy drink,
The shadow of the wall thine abode,
The threshold thy dwelling place.
Imprisonment and restraint shall break thy strength."

But she had been exorcised, and must release Ishtar. So she bade her servant sprinkle the goddess with the water of life, which seems to have been vigilantly guarded beneath the palace by the sprites. The servant shattered the door-posts of the palace, led the sprites forth and set them on golden thrones. Then he sprinkled Ishtar with the water of life, conducted her back through the seven gates, and restored to her her raiment and her ornaments.

The tablet on which this story is written bears the name of Ashurbanipal, king of Assyria. It belonged to the library which he gathered about the year 650 before Christ. The story itself is unquestionably older; exactly how much older it is impossible at present to determine. It doubtless dates from the myth-making age of the Babylonians. At any rate its descriptions are largely derived from old conceptions of the place of the dead.

Besides this myth of the descent of Ishtar to the nether world there are occasional allusions in the native literature to the abode of the dead and to the conditions that prevail there. From these several sources it is learned that

1. The abode of the dead was thought of as situated under the earth. "Ishtar has descended into the earth and has not come up again" (Rev. 5, 6). If men are in distress, they speak of "going down into Aralu". The earth opened and Eabani ascended from sheol. The scorpion men, those fabulous monsters that guard the pathway that leads to the island of the blessed and keep it closed to mortal man, are described as being so immense that their back touches heaven while their breast reaches beneath to sheol. Sheol is called "wide". It is spoken of as a land; "the land whence none returns". And so too Gilgamesh speaks of it

as a country, but it was as readily conceived of as "the great city;" walled and entered through gates, seven in number, or, according to another tradition, fourteen, and having its palace and its prison, its queen and her servant and a gatekeeper.

2. The existence of this place of itself implies the continuance of the soul after death; otherwise "the great city" would be tenantless. The separate existence of soul and body after death was the current belief. If the corpse remained unburied, the soul wandered restlessly on earth; conversely when the body was interred, the soul went down to sheol. All men without distinction descend thither. No class or condition is exempt. "In the land whence none returns, in the house of darkness, the abode of the goddess Irkalla, in that house, my friend, crowns lie on the ground whose wearers of old ruled the land; there dwell the priest and his fellow, the exorcist and the conjuror". And accordingly to venerable custom, those who enter are stripped of all earthly insignia of rank and wealth, and are ushered naked into their lasting home. Even a goddess who lived there, none else than the mother of a husband of Ereshkigal, was like others unclothed; her shining hips were not covered by any garments. The multitude who inhabit "the great city" dwell in darkness and feed upon dust.

3. Yet they possess the power of perception; for Eabani's spirit, which had descended to the region of the dead and returned to the upper world, had seen the country and had a tale which he could tell if he would, but which he hesitated to tell. The soul after death is capable of experiencing distress; for the provisions in sheol for imprisonment and bodily torments imply the consciousness of the soul and its capacity for degrees of suffering. The soul of the deceased is capable of some measure of comfort also. The fallen warrior possesses it. "Upon a couch doth rest and pure water drink he who hath been slain in battle". "Thou sawest it?" asks Gilgamesh. "Yes"; replies Eabani,

"I saw it. His father and his mother support his head, and his wife is at his side".

4. Thus varying degrees of happiness and misery are remotely alluded to, based on civic virtues practised during the earthly life and on behavior in sheol. Warriors who lose their life in battle are rewarded in the other world with a place for rest and water to drink, with the presence of parents and wife. Insubordination to authority in the nether world is punished by disease, by imprisonment, by water from the gutters of the city to drink and the city's slime for food. The tradition of the flood as reported by Berossus, himself a Babylonian, states that the principal survivors because of their piety were translated to dwell with the gods. This may possibly be an ancient feature of the story.

5. While sheol is characteristically a land whence none returns, yet a return to the regions of light and life is not unthinkable. The gods devised and carried out a plan for the release of Ishtar. This goddess herself threatened to lead forth the dead and restore them to life. The queen of the place has water of life which she can dispense at pleasure.

The Hebrews were a branch of the same Semitic stock as the Babylonians and Assyrians, and in the earliest ages they naturally had the same general conception of the future state. In a casual remark the patriarch Jacob gives utterance apparently to the common belief. When his heartless sons laid the bloody coat of Joseph before him, he said: "It is my son's coat; an evil beast hath devoured him; Joseph is without doubt torn in pieces." And the bereaved father refused to be comforted, saying: "I will go down to sheol to my son mourning." (Gen. xxxvii. 33, 35). In these words Jacob doubtless expressed his belief that Joseph's body had been devoured by a beast, but that Joseph was in sheol; and that one day he himself would descend

thither to his son. It is safe to say that here are three fundamental points of the early Hebrew belief concerning the dead: 1. There is a distinction between the body and the person or soul. 2. The body may be destroyed by violence of may moulder to dust, but the person survives the destruction of the body. 3. The soul or person dwells in sheol. These three articles belonged to the common Semitic belief concerning the dead. They are found in the creed of the Christian also. He confesses them to be truths. But respecting the dwelling place of the dead, he regards it naive to locate sheol, even in imagination, underneath the world.

ABRAHAM DECLARING THAT HE WOULD RETURN WITH
THE LAD.

Abraham was accustomed to reason. He had long been promised an heir; but no child had been born to him, and he and Sarah were both old, well stricken in years. He had pondered the question how the promise was to be fulfilled; and he and Sarah had decided that he might become the father of a son, but by the young Egyptian maid. Now, however, Isaac has been born to Abraham and Sarah, and God has promised a numerous posterity to Abraham through this son. But the command comes to him to offer the lad for a burnt offering. What becomes, then, of the promise that "in Isaac shall thy seed be called"? Abraham reasoned. He knew of only one way by which the promise could be fulfilled in case Isaac was sacrificed on the altar. He believed in the omnipotence of God. He had faith that the Almighty, the creator and possessor of heaven and earth, who had given a son to him when his wife was past age and he himself as good as dead, had power to bring that child back to life, to restore him even from sheol. And as he went forward with his son to the appointed place of sacrifice, he calmly said to his servants: "Abide ye here, and I and the lad will go yonder; and we will worship, and come again to you."

And thus the inspired author of the Epistle to the Hebrews traces the secret workings of Abraham's mind. "He that had gladly received the promises was offering up his only begotten son; even he to whom it was said, In Isaac shall thy seed be called: accounting that God is able to raise up, even from the dead". (Heb. xi. 17-19).

Such reasoning was within the bounds of even the heathen thought of the day. In the traditions of the race to which Abraham belonged the restoration of the dead to life, release from sheol, a return to the abodes of men, were conceivable. The story of Tammuz was, indeed, a myth concerning a natural phenomenon, but even so it spoke of the release of dead vegetation from the power of death. The story of Gilgamesh told of the faith of a man that his companion might be brought back even from the land whence there is no return. And in the fancies of men about that dread place was not the water of life there, although carefully guarded? The thought of the possible restoration of the dead to life was present to the mind of the Semite; and Abraham, with his higher doctrine of God and under the pressure of God's promise concerning Isaac, passed from careless fancy to lively hope and sure conviction. "I and the lad will come again to you."

ABRAHAM LOOKING FOR THE CITY THAT HATH THE FOUNDATIONS.

Abraham waited for a country that was not yet his. He believed that in and through him God was laying the foundations of a heavenly kingdom among men. He indeed should go to his fathers in peace, but in and with him his descendants should have the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession (Gen. xiii. 15; xvii.8), and, expanding (xii. 2, 3; xiii. 16; xv. 18; xxii. 17), constitute God's kingdom of righteousness on earth (xvii. 1, 7; xviii. 19), and form an integral part of God's universal realm (xiv. 22; xxiv. 3, 7). Actuated by this hope and to obtain this reward he willingly left kindred and native land and became a pil-

grim in a country not his own. For God rules in righteousness (xviii. 25); and his kingdom in heaven and, coming down thence, on earth also is the city that alone hath the foundations, whose builder and maker is God (Heb. xi. 10, 16; xii. 22; xiii. 14; Rev. xxi. 2). The kingdom is one and indivisible. To this kingdom Abraham belonged, although in this earthly life he was sojourning in a part of God's earthly dominion still unpossessed by the people of God. The Canaanite was still in the land. He had reason to cherish the hope of a continuance of blessed association with God in the life beyond (see remarks on "the God of Abraham").

ACQUAINTANCE WITH CONTEMPORARY EGYPTIAN THOUGHT.

A new era dawned. During the centuries from the close of the patriarchal period to the exile the Hebrews and the Egyptians were in almost uninterrupted contact. The relation was sometimes that of master and slave, or at least of ruling race and oppressed people, to the sorrow of the Hebrews; but more often the association was friendly and close, that of husband and wife, parent and child, teacher and pupil. There was also intercourse with travelers, resident business men, and proselytes; and there were alliances between the two nations for the purpose of waging war against the common foe. It is necessary, therefore, to inquire what notions the Egyptians entertained regarding the future state. Without entering upon an elaborate discussion, it is sufficient to recall the consensus of opinion among modern Egyptologists. Briefly stated, the Egyptians believed: 1. In a distinction between soul and body. 2. In the continued conscious existence of the soul after death. Belief in an after-existence can be traced back into the time of the second dynasty, some four thousand years before Christ. 3. That final happiness in the world to come is conditioned upon a righteous life on earth. The idea of a future judgment was entertained as early as the fourth dynasty at least, or about three thousand years before

Christ. And in the New Empire, which began shortly after the exodus of the Hebrews and continued until the Persian conquest of Egypt, there is everywhere evidence of the thought of judgment, and of the belief that the awards of the future world are distributed according to the moral character of the life on earth. In the presence of the forty-two gods the heart of the deceased is weighed over against righteousness, and the soul must make specific confession that it has practised the moral virtues and fulfilled religious duties during life. 4. That they who successfully pass through this ordeal attain to an active existence, recover bodily and mental powers, and devote themselves to the service of the gods.

And among the Israelites during this period, as in former days, it was the general belief that the soul continues its conscious existence after death.²

² Did any of the Israelites believe in the dissolution of conscious existence at death? Perhaps there were skeptics who did. But no basis for such a belief on their part is found in the psychology of the Hebrews which is involved in the account of man's creation given in the second chapter of Genesis.

The logical foundation for a doctrine declaring the cessation of man's conscious existence at death has been discovered, it is alleged, in the account of man's nature as given in Gen. ii. 7, "God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul". It is true that the asserted psychology of that account, or a kindred psychology, is an essential postulate of the doctrine of annihilation; but the converse is, of course, not true. The doctrine of annihilation is not the necessary corollary of the hypothetical psychology. But what is the asserted teaching of the second chapter of Genesis concerning the constitution of man? In his book on Eschatology, Hebrew, Jewish, and Christian, Professor Charles of Trinity College, Dublin, says:

The "later view, which practically denies knowledge and life to the inhabitants of Sheol, follows logically from the account in Gen. ii. 4—iii, according to which the material form when animated by the spirit became a living soul. . . . The soul is the result of the indwelling of the spirit in the material body, and has no independent existence of its own. It is really a function of the material body when quickened by the spirit. . . . When the spirit is withdrawn, the vitality of the soul is destroyed, and it becomes a dead soul (נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּת), or corpse (Num.

The worship of ancestors, if it existed in Israel, would reveal such faith. But proof of this practice among the Hebrews, even sporadically, either as a relic of past heathenism or as a recent importation from contemporary paganism, is entirely wanting. Schwally, it is true, after an exhaustive investigation concludes that ancestor-worship did have vogue among the Israelites, but he admits that conclusive evidence is lacking (Zandstra, Princeton Theological Review, April, 1907, p. 282). The popular belief in the continued conscious existence of the soul after death man-
vi. 6; Lev. xxi. 11). . . . The annihilation of the soul ensues inevitably at death, that is, when the spirit is withdrawn." Pp. 41-43.

By way of general comment, it is proper to remark first, that Professor Charles identifies "the breath of life" in Gen. ii. 7 (J) with "the spirit of life" in Gen. vi. 17; vii. 15, passages attributed to P, and in vii. 22, where the asserted "conflation" involves the admission that "spirit" comes from P or some other source foreign to J. Yet surely when J's doctrine is under discussion, the investigation should be rigidly restricted to the document assigned to him. The introduction of P is legitimate for purposes of comparison only, not as an essential part of the argument. Second, Professor Charles understands, and expressly states, that the teaching of the writer who penned Gen. ii. 7 clearly involves the doctrine of trichotomy; but if so, this ancient Hebrew conceived of the spirit, and not of the soul, as the animating principle, and in this respect he differs from the current modern trichotomistic exposition of the Scriptures. Third, biblical writers do not make the sharp distinction between soul and spirit which J observes according to Professor Charles' interpretation of him. In general what the teachers of Israel predicate of the soul, they predicate of the spirit also. But notwithstanding these strictures, it may be well to assume the correctness of Professor Charles' exposition of the psychology that underlies Gen. ii. 7, and to devote inquiry merely to ascertaining, first, whether the Hebrew writer entertained the views regarding the nature and fate of the spirit which Professor Charles holds to be involved in this account of man's origin; and second, whether these opinions were actually confessed by a biblical writer of later date, as Professor Charles asserts.

And, first, the nature and fate of man's spirit. "Since 'the breath of life' (J), or 'the spirit of life' (P), is common to man and the rest of the animal creation (Gen. vi. 17; vii. 15, both P), the spirit of life conceived of as thus existing in all living things is life in an impersonal sense. The spirit, therefore, in man can never in this sense be the bearer of the personality."

This argument for the impersonality of the spirit has no validity. For
1. The soul also is common to man and the rest of the animal crea-

ifests itself, however, in another heathenish custom. The attempt was made to consult familiar spirits. During the entire period of Hebrew national history professional necromancers kept appearing in Israel, who pretended to exorcise the dead and obtain revelations from the spirits of the departed. The people were warned against them by Moses; but they were plying their nefarious trade in Saul's day, they were in great request in Isaiah's time (Is. viii. 19), and they were still making profit of credulity in the reign of Josiah (2 Ki. xxiii. 24). The prophets strenuously opposed

tion, according to the document J (Gen. ii. 7, 19); and hence, by parity of reasoning, the soul should be impersonal. But it is not. In man it has all the elements of personality, as Professor Charles rightly insists. According to J the soul has life (Gen. xii. 13; xix. 19; xxxvii. 21), and feelings (Gen. xxxiv. 3; xlv. 30; Judg. xviii. 25); and it represents the *ego* (Gen. xxvii. 4, 25; xlix. 6). In beasts it was doubtless considered to be, as in man, a center of life and feeling.

2. Moreover, contrary to the hypothesis of Professor Charles, according to J the spirit is itself a bearer of the personality. The human spirit is referred to perhaps three times only in passages that may be assigned to the school of J; yet from one of these it appears that disposition and character were attributed to the spirit (Nnm. xiv. 24, see Charles' citation on p. 46). In this respect J's statement agrees with the references to the matter which are found elsewhere in the Scriptures. The spirit feels emotions, according to E (Gen. xli. 8; Judg. viii. 3, cited by Charles on p. 45); and according to P it suffers emotions and possesses intelligence (Gen. xxvi. 33; Ex. vi. 9; xxviii. 3; xxxv. 21; Num. v. 14).

3. It is natural to understand J to mean that the person, the *ego*, goes down to sheol, the abode of the departed (Gen. xxxvii. 35).

The conclusion, therefore, seems to be warranted that in the conception of the school of J the spirit, which according to Professor Charles was thought of as existing in man "a thing apart by itself," could bear personality, and bore it even when separated from the body at death.

Second, the views of that later biblical writer to whom Professor Charles ascribes belief in the impersonality of the spirit.

"This dissolution of the personality at death is frankly recognized in Eccl. xii. 7, and the impersonal breath of life returns to the Supreme Fount of Life: 'the spirit shall return to God, who gave it' . . . And thus all personal existence ceases at death", pp. 43, 44.

The writer of Ecc. xii. 7 does not, however, speak of God as "the Fount of Life"; and there is no allusion in the divine title which he employs to suggest that the spirit returns like a drop of water to a reservoir, to lose its identity in the great body of water. The verse is

necromancy, but not the belief in the continued conscious existence of the soul in sheol. And of this belief there is evidence in the writings of the accredited teachers of Israel. It does not appear as formulated doctrine, for that was unnecessary, but in allusions to the accepted faith. Yet although there was known to be a continuance of conscious existence after death, the future life had no attractions. For some, indeed, this state, so different from that on earth, held out the only hope of relief; for "there the wicked cease from troubling, and the weary are at rest". But to most men it loomed up cheerless, dreary, forbidding, the end of pomp and power, the end of opportunity and achievement, the end of all service for one's family, for the nation, for the kingdom of God. It was a cessation of activity: a sleep, as it were; "the night when no man can work".

The place of the departed spirits was thought to lie beneath the earth. This location was not doctrinally assigned to sheol; it was not a tenet of religion, and no teaching was based upon it. It was due to a naive conception of the universe, and apparently undisputed. The uniform term employed to describe the going to sheol is "go down or

couched in the words of plain, unfigurative speech; and the idea of absorption, if sought in this verse, must be imported from the figurative language of the preceding verse. But there is no necessity for so interpreting the words. The spirit of man can dwell in the presence of God without absorption into the divine Spirit. Compare Luke xxiii. 46, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit".

And Professor Charles should quote the entire conception of the spirit as entertained by the Preacher. To him the spirit is more than Professor Charles' impersonal existence, which cannot be the bearer of personality; for it is distinctly a bearer of the emotions. Patience or hastiness, pride or anger, may belong to it, as in vii. 8, 9. It may experience displeasure, according to x. 4.

What becomes of the spirit after its departure from the body? Certain statements in the book about the conditions which prevail in sheol have sometimes startled the readers (ix. 5, 10). They must not be exaggerated. Beware of ascribing absolute universality to the Hebrew negative. Beware of excluding from the Preacher's words the belief of his age that the dead in sheol possess a certain degree of consciousness. Beware of ignoring the Preacher's own allusions to the human spirit as the seat of the emotions.

descend". When great contrasts are sought, heaven above is set over against, not the earth, but sheol beneath. The prophet Amos places the earth between sheol and heaven (ix. 2). There is no escape for the wicked from God, he declares. "Though they dig into sheol, thence shall my hand take them; and though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down". Ezekiel, using trees as symbols, says: "The trees of Eden . . . were comforted in the nether parts of the earth. They also went down into sheol" (xxx. 17). As a sign that Korah and his crew were rebels against divinely constituted authority, Moses said: "If the Lord make a new thing — something unprecedented — and the ground open her mouth and swallow them up, and they go down alive into sheol, then ye shall understand that these men have despised the Lord. . . . So they went down alive into sheol, and the earth closed upon them" (Num. xvi. 30, 33). Thought of either as a region or as a pit, sheol has boundaries, outermost and inmost parts, and depths (Deut. xxxii. 22; Ps. lxxxvi. 13; Prov. ix. 18; Is. xiv. 15; Ezek. xxxii. 23). When it is said that the enemies of God and his kingdom are thrust into the deepest depths or inmost parts of sheol, the meaning is that they are imprisoned there beyond the hope of escape.

Into this nether world all men without distinction, righteous and wicked, go down at death. Pharoah was "cast down to sheol with them that descend into the pit" (Ezek. xxxi. 16). The young Joseph, the good king Hezekiah in the noontide of his days, and the aged Jacob, might descend into sheol. The wicked go down to sheol (Job xxi. 13, comp. 7; xxiv. 9, comp. Ps. xxxi. 17; ix. 17; lxiii. 9). Their beauty is for sheol to consume (Ps. xlix. 14). Such a sheol needs illumination.

THE GOD OF ABRAHAM, THE GOD OF ISAAC, AND THE GOD OF JACOB.

It was the common belief of men in the age in which Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob lived that the life of man con-

tinues beyond the grave. It was also an accepted truism in those days that the place of departed souls is under divine government. Deity is there, and in full control. According to the Scriptures Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob acknowledged the existence of one God only; and therefore, without question, they thought of Him as their Lord both for this life and for that which is to come. They could have said with the later psalmist: "Though I make my bed in sheol, thou art there".

The same belief was shared by Moses, and the same conclusion was involved. This particular aspect of the truth was not, however, most prominently before his mind when at the bush God appeared to him and announced Himself as the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob (Ex. iii. 6; Mark xii. 26; Luke xx. 37). Precious though this title was when viewed in relation to the future life, it was of cardinal interest just then in its bearing on the sore distress of the descendants of Abraham in Egypt. It reminded them of the everlasting covenant, of the promise of redemption, of intimate fellowship with God, and of an almighty friend.

The truths of continued conscious existence in sheol and the authority of God there were truths of God; and it was He who chose for Himself the title "God of Abraham". To God there lay in His own chosen designation the fact that He was the God of the patriarchs both for this life and for that which is to come.

THE JURISDICTION OF JEHOVAH OVER SHEOL.

There is but one God; He is everywhere, and is everlasting. Monotheism and the doctrines of the omnipresence and eternity of God at once introduced the thought of Jehovah's presence and authority into any conception that man forms of the place of departed spirits. It is not strange, therefore, that in Israel the openness of sheol to the gaze of Jehovah early became proverbial (Prov. xv. 11, a section of the book expressly ascribed to Solomon; Job xxvi. 6), nor that poet

and prophet taught that God is present there (Ps. cxxxix. 8) and that His power there is irresistible (Amos ix. 2). And lo! so far as known, it is theology alone that has brought these truths concerning the other world to the apprehension of men. The doctrine concerning God illumined the darkness of the grave with a ray of blessed light. For the believer in Jehovah its gloom had already begun to pass away. And further, as will be observed on noting the last citation at least, the dawn had risen centuries before the exile.

FELLOWSHIP WITH GOD BEYOND THE GRAVE.

In three psalms particularly a great hope finds expression. In the Davidic Psalter, Ps. xvi. 10:

Thou wilt not abandon my soul to sheol,
Neither wilt thou suffer thy holy one[s] to see the pit.

In the hymnary of the Sons of Korah, Ps. xlix. 15:

But God will redeem my soul
From the power of sheol, for he will take me.

And among the Songs of Asaph, in Ps. lxxiii. 24:

Thou wilt guide me with thy counsel,
And afterward take me to glory.

In the 16th Psalm the expression "abandon to" is peculiarly strong, as is shown by every passage where it occurs.³ In the 49th Psalm the order of words in the second clause, and the gender and historical expressiveness of the verb "he will take me" (Gen. v. 24), naturally yield for the meaning a reference to the future life.⁴ In its tone the

³ "Thou shalt leave them (the vineyard and its fruit) for (to) the poor;" hand the gleanings over to the poor, for them to take and use at will (Lev. xix. 10). It was commonly supposed that the ostrich, having laid her eggs on the ground, abandons them; "leaveth her eggs on (to) the earth, and warmeth them in the dust" (Job xxxix. 14). Men "perish and leave their wealth to others" (Ps. xlix. 11 [10]). In view of these passages the words "abandon my soul to sheol" appear to be equivalent to saying "have nothing further to do with it, hand it over to sheol to be used by sheol at will".

⁴ The phrase of two rhythmical beats, "from the power of sheol," belongs rhythmically to the second member of the verse, while it limits

psalm is distinctively the voice of a preacher. Wisdom is crying aloud in the streets, a prophet is instructing the peoples on "the folly of trusting in riches" (vs. 1-4; comp. Mic. i. 2; Num. xxiii. 18; Prov. i. 20). In the 73d Psalm, whether the first word of the second member be regarded as an adverb, according to the accentuation, or be construed as a preposition governing "glory",⁵ the reference is to the future life, especially in view of the verb "thou wilt take me".

Certain expositors, particularly Graetz, Wellhausen, and latterly Cheyne (Book of Psalms), construe Psalm 49 harshly or ignore its text, and alter the text of Psalm 73, although it is not in any wise suspicious from the standpoint of textual criticism.⁶ Among biblical scholars who interpret the text as it is, whether they regard the verses under consideration as original or interpolated, a reference in some one or in all these passages cited from the Psalms at least to the future life with God is discerned, for example, by Hupfeld, Alexander, Delitzsch, Klostermann, Oehler, Dillmann, Schultz, Cheyne (Origin of the Psalter), Baethgen, Duhm, Briggs. And these exegetes, as will be noticed, are representative men of the three schools of higher criticism.

How early did it fall within the range of Hebrew thought the meaning of the first member. The same phenomenon appears elsewhere, as Ps. l. 4; xcvi. 8, 9; Lam. v. 6.

⁵ So Hitzig, Ewald, Hengstenberg, Schultz, neglecting the accents. Comp. "after glory" (Zech. ii. 12 [Eng. 8]), and "before glory" (Prov. xv. 33). The verse may then perhaps be best interpreted in this wise: "By thy counsel thou wilt guide me to glory," *i. e.* to good success and the esteem of men (Josh. i. 8; Prov. iv. 8) in contrast to his present shame and suffering (vs. 14, 20), "and after having attained honor thou wilt take me". The word rendered "glory" often denotes honor as opposed to contempt; esteem (1 Sam. ix. 6; 2 Sam. vi. 20); that respect from men and true success in life which result from humbly heeding instruction and walking in the fear of the Lord (Prov. xiii. 18; xv. 33; xviii. 12). Humble submission to God's guidance comes before honor, and after honor comes reception into God's presence.

⁶ The text is attested by LXX (translated by *meta* with the genitive, as in Ex. xxiii. 2), Symmachus, Jerome, Targum, Syriac.

confidently to expect fellowship with God in the future world? Could the hope of a blessed communion with God after death have been attained by any of his children before the exile; as early, for example, as the eighth century before Christ? The Israelites believed, and had believed from time immemorial, in the continuance of personal existence after death, and their teachers were publishing the doctrine of Jehovah's presence and power in sheol. The world of departed souls lies within his dominion. His eye is still upon its inhabitants, his power reaches unto them. At death his people do not remove from his knowledge and his might. From this truth, which has its foundations laid firmly and securely in monotheism, it was but a short step to the further truth that death does not deprive his people of communion with him. Being a spiritual function, it is quite as possible in the world to come as in this life.

Not only was the truth of continued fellowship with God beyond the grave within their easy grasp, but the stimulus to lay hold on it was present. To every one who prized fellowship with God above earthly treasure, and had more joy in it than others have when their corn and wine are increased; to him who could sing the song of Habakkuk (iii. 18), and to those who could say: "One thing have I desired of the Lord, that will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, to behold the beauty of the Lord, and to inquire in his temple", who "had rather be a door-keeper in the courts of the Lord than to dwell in the tents of wickedness"; to those to whom fellowship with God had become a passion of the soul;—for such yearners after God, possessors of such a theology, it was natural both to see and to seize the truth of continued blessed fellowship with God in the world to come.

If more stimulus was needed, it was furnished by the hard pressure of long and grievous suffering and reproach entailed by fidelity to God, or by enforced thought upon the moral problem presented by the life-long suffering of the righteous, and the frequent exemption of the wicked

from trouble and their uninterrupted and unexampled prosperity. It only required these things to thrust the hope of fellowship with God in the future life into the forefront.

And these psalmists found themselves in such circumstances. In the 16th Psalm the solace of communion with God is mentioned side by side with confidence of deliverance from the domination of sheol. In the 49th and 73d psalms the singer is driven by the thought of his own hardships and troubles in contrast with the unbroken prosperity and the pomp of the wicked to find the solution for the moral problem that vexes and perplexes his soul in the hope that is held out to the righteous of companionship with God. "God will take me." The problem has been argued and the solution found. God will take the righteous. The godly man has herein his compensation for the earthly loss and reproach caused by his fidelity to God. Theology and experience made it possible for the people of God even in the centuries before the exile to grasp the hope of their continued fellowship with God in the future life; and the intellectual and spiritual impulse to do so was there.

The Hebrews might well be independent of the thought of the world in the development of this doctrine, for they had all the elements of it in their own noble theology, and the impelling forces thereto emerged in their individual and national experiences. It is, however, interesting to observe that the apprehension of this truth was due in the period before the exile, when viewed in the light of contemporary gentile thought. The race to which Abraham belonged were telling in story the translation of the hero of the flood to dwell with the gods, and the Egyptians were teaching that the reward of righteous living on earth is life with the gods hereafter, engaged in their service, with renewed faculties and bodily powers.

THE VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTEOUS AFTER DEATH.

In Job xix. 25-27 there may perhaps be a reference to the resurrection of the body; but that question of exegesis

does not demand attention now. Common to the divergent translations represented in the text and on the margin of the revised version is the assurance: "I know that my Redeemer liveth; and that he will at last (or as the last and final participant) arise to vindicate me: and after my death and the decomposition of my skin I shall see God."

The doctrine of the moral government of God, which was a part of Israel's creed centuries before the exile (Gen. vi. 5; xviii. 25), underlies this triumphant declaration of Job. A perversion of this doctrine formed the premise in the exhaustive argument that was carried on between Job and his friends. They based their entire reasoning on the assumption that all human suffering is a punishment for personal sin. Job's friends insisted that his grievous afflictions were clear proof of guilt. He protested his innocence; but he could not answer the argument, for his premise was at first the same as theirs. Still he knew that their accusation was untrue. He was conscious of his integrity; and he could at length only declare that, although God was thrusting him down to the grave (xiii. 15, 16; xvii. 1; xix. 6), yet he was innocent of crime (xvi. 16, 17); and his innocence was known to God (xvi. 19-21), and would eventually be made manifest by the Lord and he himself would know of his vindication (xix. 25-27).

Job's faith, though it was not formulated in his words, was contained in all its essentials in the Egyptian teaching that at death the soul of man passed into the presence of the forty-two gods and the heart of the deceased was weighed before them in the scales over against righteousness. The earthly life was brought into judgment and its morality determined. The result of the inquiry was the condemnation of the guilty and the justification of the righteous. It was practically a vindication of the righteous after death. Job's discovery of the truth, in whatever age of the world he lived, was not in advance of contemporary thought. But whether it was suggested by Egyptian teaching or not, it had its own doctrinal foundation; it rested definitely on the

truth that God is just, and it was wrought out of that truth under the stress of suffering while conscious of innocence.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE RIGHTEOUS.

"Thy dead [O Jehovah] shall live", exclaims the remnant of Israel, "my dead bodies shall arise; . . . for thy dew shall be as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast forth the dead" (Is. xxvi. 19).

These words of the godly remnant of Israel have been understood (1) Figuratively: God will raise his people from the dust of degradation and oppression, and restore them from exile as from a grave, where they had long seemed dead (Alexander, Reuss, Delitzsch). (2) Literally; and this either as a hope or prayer (Gesenius, Ewald, Oehler, Dillmann, Driver) or as an assurance (Delitzsch, Cheyne) that God will call the dead members of the nation to life again, to increase the population of the kingdom and share in its duties and privileges.

The literal interpretation yields a doctrine of the resurrection of the righteous. Such a doctrine, whether expressed by the prophet in this passage or not, was not inopportune as early as the eighth century before Christ. For the resurrection is thought of by the prophet as effected by the creative power of God, comparable to the influence of the reviving dew, and thus the conception is akin to the faith of Abraham, recorded in Gen. xxii. 5, that though he obeyed the divine command to offer up Isaac as a burnt offering, yet God would enable him to return with the lad. At the end of the eighth century the Israelites could also point to the history of Elijah and Elisha and tell of the dead brought to life again, of corpses reanimated. Furthermore, the Semites did not hesitate to speak of release from sheol. To be sure, it was sometimes a myth, in which the processes of nature were described under the guise of persons; but even so it was talk of the potent influence of the gods to secure deliverance from sheol, and it kept the thought suggestively before the minds of men. So, too,

was the possibility of a return dreamt of when men spoke of the water of life that was kept in sheol, and which, sprinkled upon the deceased, enabled them to go back to the land of the living. And the thought of the possible return of the dead, and of divine power as the effective means, found clear expression when the goddess of the nether world is made in the story to threaten to bring the dead from the grave. The prophet does not go beyond this thought when, strong in his faith in Jehovah's omnipotence, his jurisdiction over sheol, his loving kindness to his people, and his ultimate vindication of their cause, he declares: "Thy dead, O Jehovah, shall live; my dead bodies shall arise."

THE DOOM OF THE UNGODLY.

"And they shall go forth, and look upon the dead bodies of the men that have transgressed against me: for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh."

This scene, described in Is. lxvi. 24, is not located in the underworld, but in the environs of Jerusalem in the new world of the future (vs. 6, 20; comp. "worship before me", vs. 23). The corpses of the enemies of Jehovah are lying unburied round about Jerusalem, being continually eaten by worms and burning forever in the fires of the scavengers; an enduring and terrible spectacle to the godly, which bears witness day and night that the wicked have been completely overthrown and that their destruction is everlasting. The prophet speaks of eternal doom. He says nothing of torment; and that he had penal pains in mind cannot be affirmed. He exhibits pictorially the complete triumph of the cause of truth and holiness and the eternal overthrow of its foes; and he also sets forth by his picture that these things are not hidden from the inhabitants of Zion, but come under their observation. It is a grand, though ghastly, picture; and the portrayal retains its aptness to delineate the doom of the ungodly even after the particulars of their punishment become apprehended.

GLOOMY THOUGHTS OF SHEOL.

There is no evidence of a retrogression of doctrine after these advances. The creed was standard. It bore the stamp of prophetic authority and was imbedded in irrefutable logic. But the creed did not dispel the gloom of sheol from the mind of every man. It was not the creed, however, that was at fault; the hindrance lay in the man. For the wicked the future world still had its terrors. They knew that they would still be under the searching gaze of God, that his eye would be fixed upon their guilt, and that his power would reach to them. The stories of the Semites might, perhaps, also cause them anxiety, which told of a prison in sheol and disease and degradation for those who offended the ruler of the place. They had, too, the moral teaching of the Egyptians that character in this life determines destiny in the world to come. It would not be surprising were the voice of despair heard in Israel when the conscience was ill at ease.

But the wicked were not alone in failing to derive comfort from Israel's doctrine of the future life. There were skeptics in Israel, and in some of the literature it is intended to let the voice of skepticism be heard. Then there were godly men who were spiritually dull. Their experience in life had not forced them to throw themselves for succor on God alone, had not compelled them to find their solace in the truths of religion, had not brought the unseen world into the foreground of their hopes. Their need to obtain strength for the present from the truth concerning the future world was not pressing, and consequently their thought had not been directed to the world to come and their view of it was not clear. And there were men of keen spiritual vision who yet felt dismay at the approach of death. There is here no denial of the ultimate bliss that awaits the people of God. But the gloom of sheol was still lying like a pall over the hearts of men, with its check upon human activity and its blasting of earthly hopes. The pious Israelite might have believed that he would be with God and

be the recipient of divine loving-kindness in the future life, and yet have dreaded sheol. Does the true Christian man of to-day amidst the full light of the gospel, when like Hezekiah he is brought to the verge of the grave in the noontide of his days, with a family dependent upon him, with grave national affairs resting upon his shoulders, or the determination of the religious life of his people for years to come in his hands, never think of the inability of men in sheol? Do Christians never earnestly plead with God for a further lease of life and opportunity to labor? We know that they do. The saints of the Old Testament often mean just what Christ meant when he said: "The night cometh when no man can work."

These different classes of men, and these various causes for dismay at the approach of death, must be duly considered in connection with every utterance concerning the future world, else the would-be interpreter will surely go astray; and also the period in the creedal history of Israel when the cry of despair arose. The expositor and the critic must discriminate. Does the cry come from the time before these higher stages of teaching had been reached by psalmists and prophets? In point of fact, the cry may be a mark of the early date of the literature in which it is heard. Does the complaint proceed from the wicked, or from a skeptic, or from a man of little knowledge of doctrine, or from one whose work in the world is of great moment and is yet undone? For the apprehension of all the truths regarding sheol which have been mentioned there was adequate opportunity in the period of Israel's creedal growth before the advent of the Persians. Notwithstanding the creed, there was faltering faith on the part of some and a reluctance to die. But this is explicable.

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AUTONOMY IN ETHICS.

Objection is frequently raised on philosophical grounds, to the idea of a specifically Christian ethics. As an eminent professor once put it: "I do not recognize a distinction between Christian ethics and philosophical ethics. There can in the nature of things be only one true science of ethics. I teach, I hope, in my class-room Christian ethics. At all events Christianity has no claim to set up a system of ethics of its own, outside of and distinct from philosophical ethics."

The question here raised is only a branch of a wider question, viz.: Can there be a satisfactory treatment of ethics which bases on reason only and separates morality from religion?

Philosophy not infrequently, indeed commonly, has attempted to set up an autonomous ethical system based on reason, which dispenses with religion, and, of course, with aid from the Christian religion, altogether. As Martensen says: "While religion without morality cannot in our day count upon many advocates, morality without religion finds no lack of such."¹ This lays the foundation for a broad distinction between philosophical ethics and Christian ethics which may be stated at the outset.

The first and all important element in this distinction is connected with the relation of the moral subject to God. It is the reference to God which, first of all, differentiates philosophical ethics—the ethics of the moral philosophy class-room—from the ethics of religion in their respective judgments upon conduct. Moral science like religion works with the ideas of law and duty, of right and wrong; but its standard is the law of reason or conscience, and, so far as it keeps within its sphere as philosophy it does not go outside

¹ *Christian Ethics*, p. 15. The same writer observes that history everywhere corroborates the assertion that abstract autonomic morality only appears at those seasons when there is also religious decay (p. 17).

of that law. Kant, *e. g.*, finds in humanity what he calls a morally legislating reason. Reason on its practical side as distinct from its theoretical activity prescribes laws to conduct which carry with them their own authority. The categorical imperative of the practical reason is the final word on the question of duty. Reason, on this view of Kant's, legislates within the soul by its own right. The human mind gives law to itself. The will of God has nothing to do with it. To act from any other motive than that of simple reverence for the law as revealed in reason would be to introduce a foreign or heterogeneous element which would vitiate the purity of the moral act.

But just here is the broad distinction from the ethics of religion. What philosophical ethics does not do, or refuses to do, is to bring deeds into the light of God's judgment or regard them, if evil, as offenses against Him.

Religion, on the other hand, has its starting point in the thought of God. It views the world and man as part of it in the relation of dependence on God; it contemplates everything in that light. The effect on the ethical side is obvious. Moral science grounds ethics in the law of reason; religion on the other hand views moral law itself as emanating from God, and having its ground in His essential Being. It brings conduct, and behind conduct the state of the heart into the light of the divine holiness. It judges of the quality of the wrong deed by its contrariety to the divine purity, and its enormity as disobedience to the divine will. Every term in the ethical vocabulary now assumes a new meaning. Duty is no longer obedience to an abstract law, but is obedience to God whose moral will the law expresses. Obligation and responsibility become obligation to do God's will and accountability to Him. Sin is not simply violation of moral law but violation of duty towards God, offence against Him. "Against Thee, Thee only have I sinned." (Ps. li. 4.) We cannot indeed properly speak of sin except in the sphere of religion; and only that religion can yield an adequate idea of sin which, like the Christian, is based

on a right conception of God as the All-holy and the All-good. There is one word of which philosophical ethics does not know the meaning—the word holiness. Religion gives that word its significance by interpreting it to mean ethical purity like to God's.

With this first distinction between philosophical and Christian ethics there necessarily go others. For instance philosophical ethics does not in the nature of the case reach beyond the duties which man owes to himself and to his fellow-men. The ethics of religion on the other hand discloses a new set of duties, those which man owes to God. Take up any text-book on ordinary ethics: you find the sphere of duties divided into duties to self and duties to one another. God being left out of account, there is no special class of duties which relate directly to God. Duty is completed when we have discharged our obligations in the two above-named directions. But religion, starting from the standpoint of dependence upon God, goes far beyond this. If we stand in relations with our fellow-men, far more fundamentally do we stand in relation to God, and owe to Him our love, trust and obedience. Nay, our duties to our fellow-men will not, from the religious point of view be rightly discharged unless this higher duty to God is fulfilled. To love God with all our heart and soul and strength and mind—this, Jesus says, is the first and great commandment; and the second is like unto it, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," (Matt. xxii. 39.). In brief, philosophical ethics takes no account of such duties as love to God, reverence to God, worship of God, prayer, while this relation to God is the vital breath of Christian ethics. What would the ethics of Jesus be, if cut off from the life He lived in the Father?

To note only one other distinction between the ethics of the schools and Christian ethics; the former treats human nature in light of its essential constitution, not of its actual condition; it treats man as if he were in a normal state; regards him as a being constituted for the practice of virtue

nd able to realize his destiny in the exercise of his freedom. But the fundamental proposition of the Christian religion is, that man is not in this normal state. He is a being in the state of sin. He has broken with his dependence upon God. His nature is in a wrong moral condition, and cannot be put right save by a supernatural work of God's Spirit. There is need of renewal, of regeneration. Here, then, is a further profound distinction between philosophical and Christian ethics. Who ever hears a philosophical teacher in his class-room hinting at the need of regeneration? But Christian ethics is meaningless without that supernatural presupposition.

With these fundamental distinctions before us between philosophical ethics and the ethics of religion, we are now in a position to deal more intelligently with the question of the possibility of an autonomous morality, and of the adequacy of such, assuming it to be in any degree possible. The attempt as already said has often been made to lay down the lines of an autonomous morality—the whole history of philosophy, nearly, is an illustration of that attempt. It is seen in its various forms in Socrates, with his grounding of morality in right knowledge, in Aristotle, in the later Stoical and Epicurean schools; and the whole course of modern ethical philosophy, with slight exceptions, is governed by the same attempt. We need not do more than refer to the various forms of the intellectual, sentimental, utilitarian, evolutionary, and idealistic schools. The view here taken is that an adequate ground for morality being discovered in man's own nature, there is no need for going higher or deeper, and religion may be dispensed with as something superfluous to a true morality, if indeed not a hindrance to the realization of the highest form of it. At first sight also there seems a good deal of plausibility in this view, and various reasons may be alleged in support of it. For—

1. It is admitted by all schools and specially in the higher schools, that the ideas of duty and obligation in man have

a relative independence of religion. They have their ground in the constitution of human nature itself and are as inseparable from man as reason itself. This is sometimes expressed by speaking of the indestructibility of conscience. A man may continue to possess these ideas even though he lose his faith in, or deny God Himself. We speak sometimes of a moral proof of God's existence. This is a proof drawn from the consciousness of moral law within ourselves. But the very foundation of such a proof is our consciousness of this moral law, which therefore antecedes the idea of God we derive from it. Why then, it may be urged, if such a substratum of moral knowledge exists in human nature, should it not be the basis of a morality which is independent of relation to God?

2. It will be granted that even if we think of moral laws as deriving their sanction from divine command, it is still not God's will which makes an act right or wrong, but rather the rightness or wrongness of the act which causes God to will it. This brings us back to the old scholastic question—Is a thing right because God wills it? Or does God will it because it is right? Most will be agreed that the latter is the correct view. This also is the Bible standpoint. "The righteous Lord loveth righteousness" (Ps. xi. 7). Righteousness is here regarded as something that has a being of its own: which is not made by God, but is loved by Him. What then is the foundation of this right which is recognized but not created by God? And may philosophy not say, If reason can get at that foundation, will it not afford an adequate basis for morality, without taking account of the will of God?

3. Yet another fact may be pointed to, viz: that the moral idea within certain limits, does exist as a natural possession of men apart from religion. We see this both in the Greek and in the modern philosophies. We see it also in the case of many who have high ethical ideals—who are upright, truthful, affectionate, loyal, patriotic, in whom there is a high sense of honor—but whom we cannot

call religious. It is indeed possible to say of many such persons that they live in a Christian environment, have received an early Christian training, are unconsciously moulded by Christian ideas and influences, and in any case are controlled and restrained by the customs and opinions of a Christian society. This is true, but, if we turn to religions outside the Bible, we find very remarkable developments of the same thing. This is what the study of ethnic religions is constantly teaching us. In early Egypt for example, we have the Precepts of Ptah-hotep and the Negative Confession of the Book of the Dead. In Zoroastrianism we have the ideas of the conflict of a good and evil principle, and of a final victory for the good. In Confucian ethics we have many excellent moral precepts. So in Buddhism with its remarkably high ethical code, and yet in this system there is no God. Here then is a testimony beyond dispute to the reality of morality, and its ground in human nature; but may it not be argued that it shows also the possibility of an autonomous morality—a morality independent of religion. May not an Ethical Society suffice instead of a Church?

All this which has been advanced is in itself true and may be granted unreservedly. But the matter may be looked at from another point of view, and then it may come to be perceived that this conception of an autonomous morality is, when closely regarded, manifoldly defective and inadequate, needs imperatively to be vitalized from a higher source, and only when taken up into a higher relation, that of religion, obtains the power needed to sustain it, to give it the breadth adequate to man's need and to make it a living reality in human hearts. This may be briefly illustrated in light of what was formerly advanced on the relations of religion and morality.

1. Such a view of morality as is now indicated is defective because it goes on the assumption—a false one to begin with—that man's nature is something rounded off and complete in itself: that man is a self-sufficing, self-de-

pendent being, and can wisely, or successfully live his life on a basis of self-sufficiency. But against this view of human nature every consideration of reason and religion cries aloud. Man has only to be studied as he appears in history to show that he is not a self-sufficing being. He is a being who in the deepest ground of his consciousness feels himself to be dependent on a higher power or powers. On this consciousness of man's dependence on a higher power, all religion rests. The question then arises—What is the nature of this power on which man feels himself dependent? Here theism—not to speak of the Christian revelation—comes in with its assertion that this power is the Living, Personal God. Of course the grounds of this theistic interpretation of the Universe may be challenged; but at least it is evident that for him who accepts this theistic position, the problem of ethics must undergo a complete transformation. It is not open any longer to treat man, or for man to treat himself, as if he had no relation of dependence on God, as if he were sufficient for himself. That relation of dependence must now be devoutly acknowledged. More still, a certain attitude of soul is now a duty of the being towards God. The God on whom he depends ought plainly to be the center of his life, the object of his reverence, trust, love and worship. The powers derived from God must now be used as given for God's ends and not for man's own, are to be used, as we say, for God's glory. Morality in the nature of the case has already become merged in religion.

2. There is another and yet deeper consideration in which philosophy comes to our aid. The old Stoics already took a great step in rising from reason in man to the thought of a universal world-reason, and the best philosophy of our own time agrees with this in recognizing that reason in man both on its theoretical and practical sides is only construable on the assumption of a rational basis of the universe as a whole. This means that the ethical ideal in man with its unconditional claim on man's obedience, rests ultimately on

the fact of an ethical power at the basis of the universe. One starts no doubt from the ethical ideal in conscience, but the ethical ideal in conscience is not its own explanation. It drives us back as before on the power on which our whole being depends, and is itself one of the surest grounds of our assurance, that this power is Personal, and ethically good. An impersonal reason may as an abstraction be thought of, but an impersonal ethical power is a contradiction in terms. Ethical quality is an attribute only of personality. Combined with the theism formerly reached, we have now the idea of dependence on God as a Being, ethically good or holy. This still further transforms the conception of morality, and indissolubly binds it together with religion.

3. Suppose now it be replied, All this is transcendental metaphysic in which the educated mind has no interest; if we reject it and prefer to walk on our own feet as moral beings, what worse are we off? It might be replied (1), that if God exists it is hardly in one's option to decline to take up his due relation to Him, and great responsibility rests on the man who does this. But the further reply is, (2), that the result is not the same. Revert for a moment to the former assumption that there is a Personal Living God and that it is our duty to live in daily, hourly dependence on Him. The question is—Is it the same to a man's moral life whether he does this or not? That question has only to be asked to be answered. Take it first, generally. Is it possible to suppose a being like man living in true dependence on God without the result being new light to his mind, new power to his will, new support in temptation, new elevation of his feelings and purification of his affections. Or take it, next, on grounds of actual experience. Here everyone must speak for himself, but at least those who claim the higher blessing from religion, have the experience of all the ages—of psalmists, of prophets, of apostles, of saints in all ages and generations—to back them up in their assertion. The question in short returns to this, was man as created ever intended to be a self-sufficing unit, living for

himself, and to himself? Or was he intended to live his life in dependence on God, drawing daily his supplies of grace and strength from Him. According to the answer given to that question will one judge of the possibilities of a right human life apart from religion.

4. The subject need not be pursued much further, but the final remark may be made that the fatal weakness of every morality divorced from religion has shewn itself to lie in a lack of power. Individuals here and there may maintain a relatively high level of thought and inspiration, but even they will confess how little inward power they are conscious of possessing; and the ideals they cherish have no power over the masses of mankind. A purely preceptive morality has always this weakness. Law alone could not save Israel even with faith in Jehovah behind it. Paul found that when he would do good, evil was present with him. (Rom. vii. 21.). In Chinese Confucianism, in Buddhism, in the ethics of ancient religions, it is the same. Only through the supernatural reinforcement furnished by religion and peculiarly by the religion of Jesus can the moral commandment be made a living reality. Only through His Spirit is the righteousness of the law fulfilled in those who walk not after the flesh but after the spirit. (Rom. viii. 4).

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THE BEGINNINGS OF SAINT WORSHIP.

The point of view of the present student of the early Christian Church is quite different from that of fifty years ago. For one thing, he is more wary in accepting the statements of the fathers on church usages, having found that ingenious citation from their writings may be made to prove the wildest theory. It is realized now that the church fathers, particularly in the early period, are rarely completely unprejudiced in their allusions to Christian belief and practice, and that they are frequently contradictory in their statements. The dictionaries of Christian antiquities, once of the type of Bingham's *Origines* (which is still represented by Smith) and based on the evidence afforded by patristic literature, must now conform to the high standard set by that latest product of Benedictine learning, Cabrol's *Dictionnaire de l'archéologie Chretienne et de la liturgie*, whose profuse illustrations testify to the predominant part played by the archæologist in the composition of the articles. Christian archaeology has in fact lately come into its own, and the catacombs are nearly as often appealed to now, to prove a point in ecclesiastical origins, as Tertullian or Clement of Alexandria.

The reason for this is of course the immense extension which our knowledge of early Christian monuments has received in recent years. It is no reflection on the work of the great De Rossi to say that the thirteen years that have elapsed since the death of the author of *Roma Sotteranea* have more than quadrupled the monumental material which he collected in the course of his laborious life. For instance, although much has been written on early Christian painting, there were no accurate copies of the frescoes in the Roman catacombs until Mgr. Wilpert brought out the magnificent plates of his *Pitture delle Catacombe romane*

(Rome, 1903). Delattre, Monceaux and others have recently made us acquainted with the antiquities of the African church, and expeditions like that sent by Princeton to Syria have thrown a flood of light on early Christianity in the country where the Christian name was first spoken. The French School at Athens has promised a complete Corpus of Greek Christian Inscriptions, while we already have a special collection of the Christian inscriptions of Africa by Monceaux. The "Acta Sanctorum," a fruitful source of information about early Christianity which was long neglected because these Acts were supposed to be generally corrupt, have been put through a sifting process, chiefly by the Jesuit successors of Bollandus and the scholars of the French School in Rome. The result has been a vindication of some of the Lives of the Saints in their entirety, while a framework of fact can be traced in nearly every one. All this vast material is contained in the Bollandist edition of the *Acta Sanctorum*, now approaching completion, and is supplemented by volumes of scholarly commentary in the *Analecta Bollandiana*.

Historians of the early church, being now able to control the statements of the fathers by comparing them with the unequivocal expressions of Christian belief and practice contained in monuments like the catacomb paintings, sarcophagi and inscriptions, may generalize to some purpose. Two conclusions of far-reaching importance have been added to their data by the entrance of archaeology into the field. One was elicited by Le Blant from the sculptured reliefs of the sarcophagi of Southern Gaul, which prove that the ideas of the early Christian, so far as we can judge from the way in which they expressed them on their tombs, were formed by the every-day ritual of the church and do not always coincide with the doctrinal utterances of the fathers. The other conclusion may not be altogether new, but has only recently been completely demonstrated, and has reference to the different character which distinguishes the Christianity of the fourth from that of the

first three centuries. We find, for instance, that the spiritual symbolism which animated Christian art in the first three centuries and reduced it to a kind of pictorial alphabet with which to write a very limited number of conceptions—principally two, the fulfillment of the Old Testament by the New, and the future life—was replaced in the fourth century paintings and reliefs by didactic motifs and a preference for historical and dogmatic subjects. So too, the efforts of half a dozen students of architecture to show a continuity in the development of the basilica form of the Christian church have amounted to nothing, and, as no one has been able to find a real basilica which antedates Constantine, the old assumption that the form was first produced in his reign has now become practically a certainty. Such facts point to a thorough transformation of Christianity, at least in its outward manifestations, after the accession of Constantine, and should warn us against insisting too much on the modern principle of historical unity in tracing the development of the Christian church.

The effect on the church of the momentous events of Constantine's reign brings me to the subject of this paper, for I hope to show, by a brief review of the present archaeological evidence on the antiquity of saint-worship, that the essential features of the cult were all developed in the fourth century and are directly traceable to forces released by Constantine's recognition of Christianity.

The features of saint-worship may be said to be five in number: (1) the commemoration of the saint, or the celebration of his day, (2) the invocation of the saint for spiritual or material aid, (3) the representation of the saint in art as an object of worship, (4) the attribution to the saint of superhuman qualities such as ubiquity and power over nature, and (5) the worship of relics. The first, which is not an essential feature of saint-worship, is a custom as old as the persecutions; but while some traces of the invocation of saints may be detected in the third century, it can be demonstrated that the usage became fixed in the

fourth, and that the same period witnessed the addition of the other features, images, superhuman attributes, and relic worship.

The great body of Christian saints is made up of the martyrs who fell in the persecution of the first three centuries. It is obvious that the lives and heroic deaths of these early witnesses were the source of keenest interest and inspiration to the faithful. Thus, as early as the end of the first century, we are told by the *Liber Pontificalis* that Clement, Bishop of Rome, charged his notaries in each of the seven ecclesiastical regions of the city to collect the histories of the martyrs.¹ Duchesne doubts whether the *Liber Pontificalis* is correct in assigning such functions to these notaries, in view of other facts which seem to show that the *Gesta Martyrorum* were not looked after as carefully in Rome as elsewhere. But early collections of the "Acta" are well attested for Africa and to some extent in the East. The Christian community at Lyons in Gaul, which suffered terribly under Marcus Aurelius, wrote a letter to the churches of Asia and Phrygia, which Eusebius has preserved for us, in which they describe their trials and losses during the persecution.² Such letters were no doubt read in the course of the service, like the New Testament Epistles, and possibly received like them a place in the early liturgy. When Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, was cited for the first time before the proconsul during the persecution of Valerian in 257 A. D., he sent a letter describing his examination to the Christian confessors in the mines of Sigus in Numidia and we have the epistle which they wrote in reply thanking him for telling them "like a good and true master, how we, your disciples, should answer the governor".

The final trial and death of Cyprian are described in his "Acta", which are reckoned among the most authentic of the Lives of the Martrys. There is in fact abundant evidence to prove that the account of his trial which is given in his

¹ *Liber Pontificalis*, ed. Duchesne I, p. 123.

² *H. e.* V. 1.

Acta was taken verbatim from the short-hand minutes of the court in which it took place. Much of this literature was destroyed when Diocletian ordered the burning of all Christian books, but enough remained to form the nucleus of the immense collection of the *Acta Sanctorum* which we have today.

The piety which preserved the record of the martyr's trial and death was also the motive in the commemoration of his "day". This day was always the day of his death, and its significance to the Christians is exhibited by the name they invariably gave to it, *dies natalis*, "birth-day", the day of release from earthly bondage and of re-birth into heavenly blessedness. The commemoration seems to have taken the form of a solemn banquet at the martyr's grave. This was no innovation on ancient custom, for the funeral feast held on the anniversary of the death of a friend or relative was a common observance in the later pagan world and is mentioned on epitaphs. Christians also held this feast in memory of their friends, as is shown by several frescoes found in the catacombs of Rome in which the actual banquet is represented.³ But the sentiment which animated the Christian feast was diametrically opposed to that of the pagan. The pagans called the day of death *dies atra*, the "black day", and many epitaphs show that their attitude toward the power which robbed them of life was one of revolt. The most curious example is the famous "blaspheming epitaph" in the Vatican which bears upon it the carved imprint of two uplifted hands, with the inscription: "I lift my hands against the god who took me away, having done no wrong". The Christian feeling on the other hand is indicated by the term they gave to the day of death, *dies natalis*, but more especially by the importance which the day of the month on which the deceased passed away gradually assumes in their epitaphs. They begin in the third century to note the day of death, and in the fourth

³ Wilpert, *Op. cit.*, Plates 62.2; 65.3; 167.

century this element is the distinguishing mark of the Christian epitaph as opposed to the pagan.

The martyr's "day" then was probably nothing more than an extension of the old funeral feast, and a doctrinal significance can scarcely be ascribed to such celebrations during the first three centuries. They were only expressions of love and reverence for those whom the faithful delighted to honor, whose memory was kept green for the sake of the support it afforded in the trying times of persecution. "The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church" says Tertullian, and the day that their blood was shed or, more often, the day of burial was the one naturally selected for commemoration, as well as that which ancient custom recommended. But the commemoration of martyrs is not the worship of saints.

The invocation of saints, which is the second feature of saint-worship to be considered, involves the belief in their intercession on behalf of the faithful on earth, and consequently in their immediate translation to heaven after death. It is true that the early fathers differ in their opinion as to the fate of the ordinary Christian, but fortunately for the strength of our premises, they all agree, from the first century on, that the martyrs were received into heaven immediately upon their departure from this life. Thus Clement of Rome asserts the assumption of Peter and Paul;⁴ and Irenaeus, in the second century, says that "the church sends to the Father, in all places and at all times, a great number of martyrs".⁵ In the writers of the third century we find that the martyrs are even described as the assessors of God. Origen (*Exhort. martyrii*. 27) tells us not only that "he who drinks the cup that Jesus drank (referring to martyrdom) shall sit upon the throne", but also that he "shall judge with the king of kings". Hippolytus, too,⁶ says that "they are not judged but judge". With only these

⁴ 1. *Ep.* ed. Funk p. 66.

⁵ *Adv. haeres.* IV. 33. 9.

⁶ *In Daniele*, 2, 37, ed. Bonnetsch 112, 23.

quotations to guide us, we might conclude that by the third century the martyrs were held to share the judgment seat with God and to decide the fate of departed souls. If this belief was prevalent, the martyrs at this time must have been objects of prayer and the doctrine of the intercession of the saints was full grown.

It has been proved, however, again and again, that the testimony of the fathers is not final with reference to the actual usages of the church in the first three centuries. In the third century particularly Christianity was on the defensive, attacked within by heresy and without by an aroused paganism, with the consequences that the fathers one and all were writing in the spirit of apologists and exhorters. We may therefore doubt whether their exaltation of the martyrs may not be due to the necessity of spurring the fainting Christian hope against the prospect of persecution. Again, we are not seeking the doctrinal theories of Origen and Hippolytus, both of them schismatics, but the current beliefs of the Christian body in general, and as has been pointed out above, Le Blant has proved that our safest guide in such a case is the evidence of contemporary Christian art and epigraphy.

So far as we can date the monuments, the evidence of Christian paintings and inscriptions indicate that the ordinary Christian of the first three centuries did not invoke the saints either for spiritual or material aid. It is true that the praying figures (*orantes*) found in such numbers on Christian tombs and tombstones have been interpreted by Wilpert as representing the souls of the dead praying for the remission of the sins of their friends below.⁷ We also find early epitaphs containing phrases like "pray for us", "pray for thy sister", addressed to the departed. Ignatius expresses the hope that his spirit may hallow the faithful, "not only now but when I come to God".⁸ Cyprian⁹

⁷ *Ein Cyklus Christologischer Gemälde*, pp. 30ff.

⁸ *Trall.*, xiii.

⁹ *Epist.* lvii.

writes, "whosoever of us shall go before by the swiftness of divine selection, let our love continue before the Lord, and our prayers for our brothers and sisters be unceasing in the presence of the mercy of the Father". But neither such utterances nor the *orantes* imply more than the custom of imploring the intercession of departed friends, while the formulæ on the epitaphs which I have mentioned were undoubtedly substituted by Christian piety for the old pagan acclamations so common on tomb-stones, such as *Sit tibi terra levis*, and *Ossa tua bene quiescant*. The usage current in the first three centuries with reference to prayers both to and for the dead is well expressed by an early liturgical fragment that has come down to us: "May the souls of the faithful dead who enjoy beatitude help us, and those who are without consolation be absolved by the prayers of the church". There is a considerable difference between requests for intercession addressed to departed friends and prayers addressed to martyrs, and no dated epitaph before Constantine nor for some time after him, shows any trace of the invocation of saints.

Certain catacomb frescoes of the third century, published by Wilpert,¹⁰ depict Christ in judgment with several figures seated beside him, which Wilpert interprets as apostles or saints. It is possible that the conception of the artist was similar to that expressed by Origen and Hippolytus in which the martyrs are regarded as co-judges with God. But the figures are given no names, and it is hard to tell whether the painter had such a notion or merely introduced the accessory figures by way of localizing the scene in heaven. These vague compositions and the words of Origen and Hippolytus may be taken to indicate that the idea of the intercession of the saints was in the air as early as the third century, and certainly the invocations of departed friends offered an easy precedent by which it could enter into Christian usage; but the archæological evidence shows

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 36off.

that it had not yet been generally incorporated into the practice of the church.

There is absolutely no evidence in the third century for the representation of saints as objects of worship, of supernatural attributes, or of relic worship.

It appears, then, that the only element of saint-worship which developed in the first three centuries was the commemoration of the martyrs, and that to find the really essential features we must look beyond 300 A. D. And as a matter of fact, once past the accession of Constantine and the series of edicts in support of Christianity which was inaugurated by the toleration proclaimed at Milan in 313, the evidence for the cult of the saints comes thick and fast. The limits of this paper make it impossible to give more than a small part of this evidence, and it is only necessary to cite examples drawn at random from Christian epigraphy, art and literature.

Beginning with the fourth century, we find a number of epitaphs showing that burial near the body of a martyr was a distinction eagerly sought. One inscription tells us that the deceased was buried *ad domnum Hippolytum*, "near St. Hippolytus". *Domnus* and *Domna* were the current titles for saints replaced later by *Sanctus*. Another epitaph reads: "Serpentius bought this sepulchre near Saint Cornelius", and still another records an interment "in the new crypt behind the Saints". These formulæ seem to be explained by the belief that burial near the martyr put the departed within the penumbra of sanctity which surrounded his tomb, although another theory has lately been proposed by Leclercq in his article "Ad Sanctos" in Cabrol's *Dictionnaire*, to the effect that such locations were chosen to prevent the violation of the grave. Either explanation points to a heightened conception of the martyr. Actual invocations are not rare, as "Saint Basilla, we Crescentinus and Micina commend to thee our daughter Crescentina, who lived ten months and so many days". The saints were regarded as second only to God and Christ by the Christian who composed the following phrase, from a fourth cen-

ture epitaph: "Nourished (*nutricatus*) by God, Christ and the martyrs". The doctrine of intercession could scarcely be better expressed than on the tombstone of a Christian in the cemetery of Cyriaca: "For whom", says the epitaph, "by virtue of the testimony of his life, the holy martyrs shall be advocates before God and Christ." We even find votive offerings to the saints, one being referred to by an inscription found in the catacomb of St. Felicitas, reading: "Peter and Pancara have made this offering to the martyr Felicitas", while another records the fact that "Caucasius has paid the gift he vowed to the holy martyrs Saints Papias and Maurus".

The catacomb paintings tell a similar story. The vague conceptions expressed by the third century frescoes above referred to, which depict Christ, and possibly saints, in judgment, have developed into compositions wherein the saint is actually represented introducing the defunct Christian into heaven. One of the best examples of this kind of scene is the fresco in the catacomb of Domitilla, in which we see the Christian Veneranda conducted to heaven by her patroness St. Petronilla. Both figures are carefully labelled with their names. Near the crypt where this fresco was discovered, De Rossi excavated a basilica which was built in the fourth century in honor of Saints Nereus and Achilleus. A fragment of a column belonging to this basilica bears a sculptured relief representing a soldier in the act of decapitating St. Achilleus. This and a fourth century fresco found in the house of the martyrs John and Paul on the Caelian hill are doubtless the earliest representations of martyrdom. But the best illustration of the change in the attitude of the believers of the fourth century is afforded by the series of representations of the Virgin in the frescoes of the catacombs. The Virgin, of course, appears early in Christian art, by reason of her inseparable connection with her infant Son. Thus we find her with her Son as early as the second century in a fresco of the catacomb of Priscilla, forming the pendant to the figure of Isaiah and symbolizing

the fulfilment of his prophecy, "Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel" (Isa. vii. 14). Throughout the third century she appears with the Child as a necessary accessory in the scenes of the "Adoration of the Magi", and once with a symbolical meaning in a curious representation of the veiling of a nun. But not once does she appear with her Son as an isolated group until the fourth century, when we find her represented in an extremely hieratic attitude, in full face, with hands uplifted in prayer, and her Son upon her lap.¹¹ There is an evident feeling for the sanctity of the Virgin in this picture, she is plainly the important figure, and there is no essential difference between her representation here and in the Byzantine *Cultusbilder*. This Madonna then denotes a cult of the Virgin antedating by nearly a hundred years the formal recognition of her dignity by the church, for it was at the Council of Ephesus in 431 A. D. that the unity of the divine and human natures of Christ was affirmed, and the opponents of Nestorius vindicated for Mary the title of Mother of God. Thus did popular piety outstrip the theologians!

The evidence of the fathers offers some contradictions, as usual. Augustine, after indignantly denying¹² that worship was offered to apostles or saints, asserts, nine chapters farther on, that miracles were performed at their tombs. His attitude is probably that of many of his contemporaries who recognized the cult of the Saints but insisted on ascribing to the popular mind the purer conception which prompted their own reverence for the martyrs. Yet in the East, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa preached sermons in praise of the martyrs and recommended their potent aid to the sick and distressed. Belief in the ubiquity of saints and of the Virgin is betrayed by some passages in fourth and fifth century literature. Prudentius, the Christian poet of the fourth century, celebrated the sanctity of

¹¹ Wilpert, *Op. cit.*, Plate 163.

¹² *Civ. Dei*. VIII, 27.

Hippolytus and described the troops of pilgrims which visited his tomb. Lastly, a startling commentary on the rapidity of the growth of relic-worship is afforded by a law of Theodosius the Great, in 386 A. D., to the effect that "no one shall dismember the martyrs nor sell them".

The impulse which Constantine himself gave to saint-worship, by the building of the great basilicas over the tombs of Peter and Paul and other martyrs, does not need discussion. Damasus (366-384 A. D.), the greatest of the Roman bishops of the fourth century, gave an additional stimulus to the cult by restoring and decorating the tombs of martyrs in the catacombs, notably the crypt of St. Cecilia and of the bishops of the third century, and providing stairways by which pilgrims could descend to their shrines. The innumerable invocations scribbled on the walls of these crypts are the best evidence of the ardent worship which rewarded Damasus' efforts. In fact, burial in the catacombs, which had fallen into disuse in the earlier half of the century, was revived in his time, and most of the epitaphs cited above as containing references to burial near the tombs of saints are contemporary with his activity in the catacombs.

We see that the four really essential features of saint-worship, invocation, pictorial representation, superhuman attributes, and relic worship, are products of the fourth century, and that Constantine and Damasus both aided the development of the cult. But its rapid rise must be assigned to another and more general cause than the influence of these two men, and this cause is not far to seek, nor has it been overlooked by the historians of the church. It was the influx of paganism into Christianity which followed the recognition of Christianity by the state and the consequent peace of the church. The edicts of Constantine put the stamp of imperial approval on the Christian religion, and multitudes flocked to the new faith who brought with them neither the ability nor the desire to assimilate the truths of Christianity. It was the fashionable fad of the day, and

no doubt the detractors of Damasus, who called him the "ear-tickler of the ladies of Rome", viewed him quite in the light in which the uninitiated of the present day look upon those exponents of "isms" who minister to the spiritual aspirations of fashionable people in our large cities. Christianity spread faster than the understanding of its meaning, and curious mixtures of Christian and pagan habits of mind resulted. An interesting instance may be seen in the reliefs on a sarcophagus of Constantine's time, which was found during the excavations in the Roman Forum in 1901. One of the scenes represents Jonah reclining under the gourd-vine which as usual takes the form of an arbor. The figure of Jonah is copied after the similar type of the shepherd Endymion asleep on Latmos, and this too is the regular practice of the Christian artists. But this sculptor's Christianity was apparently too recent to obliterate the stories of old mythology, and he has been to some pains to insert Endymion's sheep above Jonah's gourd.

The pagan influx in the fourth century had at least two results. It brought to bear on the pure reverence for the martyrs, which had survived three centuries almost untainted, the tendency of the polytheistic pagan mind to obscure the deity by innumerable lesser and nearer recipients of vows, and second, it lowered the spiritual intelligence of the church body and made the abstract truths of Christianity still harder to grasp. One of the products of the mixture was saint-worship, the polytheistic Christianity of the masses, which succeeded in perpetuating itself along with the loftier dogmas of our faith.

Princeton University.

CHARLES R. MOREY.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

THE STOIC CREED. By WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Aberdeen, Author of "*The Logic of Definition*," "*Theism as Grounded in Human Nature*," "*Christian Ethics*," etc., etc. T. & T. Clark: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 8vo; pp. xxiii., 274. \$1.75 net.

This volume is issued as one of the series bearing the general title "*Religion in Literature and Life*." It presents to us what is not only a very interesting exposition but also a fine appreciation of Stoicism. It is quite common to think of Stoicism as a frame of mind rather than as a body of principles, nor do we conceive this way of regarding it as wholly wrong. It is a nice question, if this be so, which is the antecedent and which the consequent; whether the principles follow the psychological attitude or the state of mind, the acceptance of this view of things. The history, the teachings and the life-products of Stoicism furnish a fascinating study. The subject has its speculative and its practical side.

This volume traces the development of Stoicism, founded as it was by a Cypriote, born in Greece and transplanted to Rome. Metaphysically it was *a priori* as shown in the maxim of Chrysippus, "Give me the principles and I will find the proofs for myself." Epistemologically, it was a Spencer-like franchise for Agnosticism. It differed from Epicureanism in that it was fatalistic rather than libertarian and in that it made virtue and not pleasure its *summum bonum*. It differed from Cynicism in that it was positive and not negative. It differed from Calvinism in that it saw no degrees in the heinousness of sin. The Stoic's physis was geocentric, his ethic was homocentric, his psychology had no place for the emotions, and if Epicurianism made too much of pleasure, he made too little of pain. Renan said that the "*Meditations*" of M. Aurelius were the gospel of those who do not believe in the Supernatural. Our author is able to make a long list of English writers who have been influenced by Stoicism (p. 176); but with all its merits, it has the dread entail of a pagan faith. It is the reign of Fate; *irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit*. (*Seneca De Pro.* v6.)

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. New Series, Volume VII. Containing the papers read before the Society during the Twenty-eighth session, 1906-7. WILLIAMS AND NORGATE. 14 Henrietta street. Covent Gardens, London, W. C. 1907. 8vo., pp. 244. Price 10 shillings and sixpence nett.

This attractive volume presents some strong literature to readers philosophically inclined. In the "Rules" of the Society, we find that its full name is "*The Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy*"; and that the object of this study shall be, first, the historic development and, secondly, the method and problems of philosophy. The president of the Society is the Rev. Hastings Rashdell and the list of members includes the names of some of the strong philosophical minds in England of the younger generation.

The papers here presented show great scholarship and careful thinking. Of course, there are differences among them in interest and ability. The first paper, read by the president, on *Nicholas De Ultricuria, A Medieval Hume*, is very informing; the one *On the Nature of Truth*, by the Hon. Bertrand Russell, is exceedingly suggestive; that on *Fact, Idea and Emotion* by Shadworth H. Hodgson is interesting because of its nearness to the border line between Metaphysics and Philosophy; and that on *Philosophy and Education*, by Benjamin Dumville, is an able and fine discussion of a very live question.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

MONOGRAPH SUPPLEMENTS. VOL. VIII. No 3, June, 1907. Whole No. 34. *The Psychological Review*; Yale Psychological Studies. Edited by CHARLES H. JUDD, Professor of Psychology and Director of the Psychological Laboratory, Yale University. The Review Publishing Company, 41 North Queen street., Lancaster Pa., and Baltimore, Md. Paper, 8vo., pp. 227-423.

This issue of the *Yale Psychological Studies* completes the first volume of the new series and presents five papers upon subjects of technical psychological interest. The nice analyses and distinctions that are characteristic of modern psychological research are in evidence in the very subjects of the papers here presented. The new psychology is largely a scientific study of objective phenomena and the wonderful fact in it all is that the human soul is thus able to be at the same time the subject at one end of the glass and the object at the other. The subjects discussed in the first three of these papers are related, namely: "Tonal Reactions", "Preliminary Experiments on Writing Reactions" and "Reactions to Equal Weights of Unequal Size". The entire collection is a valuable contribution to the literature of the subject.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

A PLAIN MAN'S WORKING VIEW OF BIBLICAL INSPIRATION. By ALBERT J. LYMANN, D.D., Brooklyn, N. Y. 8vo, pp. 47. New York: Eaton & Mains. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 1907.

This booklet is in answer to the inquiry: "Can you tell me in what sense, if any, I can reasonably regard the Bible as an inspired and trustworthy guide in life, without waiting to settle all the critical questions?" It is, we think, a real answer, in addition to being a very bright and readable one. Indeed, we do not see why the author does not go further and on the basis of his argument boldly affirm, at least as "a working view," the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures. Certainly the book, which "in many of its writings exhibits a very high degree of the inspiration of genius," which "in most of its writings exhibits a supreme degree of moral or ethical inspiration," which "here and there exhibits marks of a special and spiritual inspiration, that is to say, gleams of insight so profound and wonderful, into the depths of religious truth and the spiritual life of man as to be apparently beyond any natural power of production possessed by the plain men who, on any theory of the Bible, originated those writings in a rude land and age;" the book which contains "so many of these special flashes or headland lights so distributed in the texture of the writings that they become *interpretative and corrective of all the remainder of the Biblical record* and thus the Bible as a whole becomes *self-adjusting, self-explaining, self-correcting*"—certainly the book which is so evidently supernatural must, as it itself declares, have been composed by "men who spoke from God, being moved by the Holy Spirit" (ii Peter 1:21), and who, therefore, 'spoke, not in words which man's wisdom taught, but which the Spirit taught' (1 Cor. ii. 13). In short, the Bible would be a lie or a mistake if it were not, since it so claims, inspired even to its words; and a supernatural book, as our author shows the Bible to be, simply could not be a lie or a mistake. To suppose this would deny our necessary conception of God as perfect.

Nor is this all. Our author's argument has other defects than that it does not go far enough; and just because it is so practical that, if corrected, it might well become "a plain man's working view of Biblical inspiration", we hope that it will not be deemed ungracious to point them out.

I. Is it quite true that the "argument lies beneath the critical discussion as to the precise date or the authorship of the documents"? Undoubtedly it does not depend for its force on who wrote Genesis; but would it not lose its force, if we knew that Moses did not write or compile it? In that case, how could we have "the supreme Christ" up to whom our author claims that his argument "leads without a break." The Christ that we should then have would be, as regards knowledge of the Old Testament at least, so far from supreme as to be inferior to the Destructive critics. In a word, it may be an easy proposition, but it is

not a tenable one, that faith has nothing to do with criticism. No amount of criticism can make faith; but if the destructive criticism were right, there could not be faith. How could we honestly continue to believe a book that had been proved to be on its face, as to its origin, either a lie or a mistake? To suppose that such a book could be "self-adjusting, self-explaining, self-correcting" would be to suppose that, in the sphere of religion, the human mind contradicted itself.

2. Is not such a statement as the following incorrect, not to say uncalled for? "Verbal infallibility, in the sense of the literal mechanical inerrancy of every separate text and phrase, taken by itself, is an irrational and impossible dream in regard to a book which is to be translated into a hundred different languages, and re-translated from age to age." We must confess that we do not see what the translation or the re-translation of the Scriptures has to do with the question. No intelligent person ever claimed inerrancy for the translation of the Bible or even for the present text of it. Nor can we see why the inerrancy of the original autograph carries with it a "mechanical" theory of inspiration. To hold that it must is to deny the divine omniscience and omnipotence. Surely He who can "work in us both to will and to work for His good pleasure" and yet leave us so free that we "work out our own salvation with fear and trembling" is not and can not be shut up to merely mechanical methods.

But enough. *A Plain Man's Working View of Biblical Inspiration* in itself is fitted to do great good. Its arguments should constrain one "to regard the Bible as an inspired and trustworthy guide in life, without waiting to settle all the critical questions." It should do more. It should lead him, as his "working view" of the Bible, to allow to it that plenary inspiration which it claims for itself. It should do even more. It should raise a very strong antecedent presumption against the conclusions of the destructive criticism. But the argument will do much harm if it even insinuates, as our author seems to do, that the religious worth of the Bible can be disconnected from rational considerations and its infallibility be maintained though its inerrancy be denied. In this case, as in many others, a way may be made so short and easy as to miss the truth.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, Jr.

ISLAM A CHALLENGE TO FAITH. STUDIES OF THE MOHAMMEDAN RELIGION AND THE NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE MOHAMMEDAN WORLD FROM THE STANDPOINT OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS. By SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, F.R.G.S., Secretary, Student Volunteer Movement, Missionary in Arabia. 8vo.; pp. xx, 295. New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions. 1907.

This is a powerful plea for missions to Mohammedans and it will take its place with the best of our abundant and admirable missionary literature. By heredity, by training, by long observation and experience

in the home and stronghold of Islam, by intensity of conviction, by intelligence and strength of faith, the writer may, without exaggeration, be pronounced uniquely qualified for his great work. He has not, however, relied on this, but has undertaken his task as if he had every thing to learn and limitations of many kinds to overcome. Hence, he has spared no pains in the investigation of authorities, in the verification of statements, in the massing of facts, in the weighing of evidence, in the perfecting of his style. The result is that he has given us, not only an interesting as well as unanswerable argument for the immediate and more vigorous prosecution of missions to Mohammedans, but also a thoroughly scientific study of their religion. Indeed, were one to enter on this study, he could not do better than to take this book for his point of departure. He will find in it, not only inspiration, but the wisest guidance with regard to the literature of the subject.

The headings of the chapters clearly indicate the course of Mr. Zwemer's argument. These are: "The Origin and Sources of Islam"; "Mohammed, the Prophet of Islam"; "The Spread of Islam"; "The Faith of Islam"; "The Practice of Islam"; "The Ethics of Islam"; "Division, Disintegration and Reform"; "The Present Condition of the Moslem World"; "Missions to Moslems"; "Methods and Results"; "The Problem and the Peril"; "A Challenge to Faith". The presentation of these subjects is much aided by five maps and twenty-eight illustrations. It is also facilitated by tables giving "Mohammed's Genealogy", an "Analysis of the Borrowed Elements of Islam", an "Analysis of Islam as a System Developed from its Creed", "Some Arabic Controversial Literature", and a "General Statistical Survey of Mohammedan Lands". Appendices are added as follows: "Chronological Table of Important Events in History of Islam and of Missions to Moslems", "William Gifford Palgrave's Characterization of Allah", "Thomas Patrick Hughes' Characterization of Mohammed", "List of Missionary Societies Working Among Moslems", "Select Bibliography for Further Reference and Study". The book closes with a clear and minute Index.

The excellencies of this work are so many and so striking that it is well nigh impossible to distinguish among them. Perhaps, the deepest impression that it will make will be with regard to the missionary activity of Islam, the danger that this presents, politically as well as spiritually, and the demand that it lays on the church for immediate and enormously increased missionary effort in all Moslem lands.

At but a single point would the reviewer take exception. It is with regard to the statement of the doctrine of Predestination on page 95, which doctrine the author correctly pronounces "the keystone in the arch of Moslem faith." Nevertheless, he gives but little over a page to it. Nor are we compensated for this extreme brevity by the general lucidity of the passage. No attempt is made to distinguish between the Moslem and the Scriptural doctrine of predestination. On the contrary, we are told that "the terminology of Moslem teaching is Calvinistic, but its practical effect is pure fatalism". Now Calvinism, and even

"ultra Calvinism", claims nothing so much as that it is Scriptural, and not least so in its doctrine of the decree. Calvinism, moreover, is still the creed of a large and an important branch of the church. It is the confession, too, of that most honorable communion to which we believe that the author himself belongs. He ought not, therefore, to leave us with the impression that Calvinism and Islam with regard to predestination are alike in terms. Or if such be the case, then he ought to go on and show how the terms differ in meaning, and why it is that Calvinism, though in terms "pure fatalism", is "in effect" the very reverse. To say the least that may be said, the teachings of the greatest of the reformers ought not thus to be confounded with the doctrine of the False Prophet, and a slip of this kind—for this is all that we are willing to regard it—ought not to mar a book which in its influence on the missionary activity of the church may well be epoch-making.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, Jr.

THE BIBLE UNDER TRIAL in View of Present-Day Assaults on Holy Scripture. By the REV. JAMES ORR, D.D., Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology in the United Free Church College, Glasgow. (Second edition.) 8vo.; pp. vii, 323. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 3 and 5 West Eighteenth Street: 1907.

As the author states in his preface, "the papers composing this volume were prepared in response to urgent request as a popular apologetic series in defense of the Bible from the attacks made on it from different quarters. They are now published in the hope that they may do something to steady the minds of those who are in perplexity, owing to the multitude and confusion of the opinions that prevail in these times regarding the Sacred Book. The papers are written from the standpoint of faith in the Bible as the inspired and authoritative record for us of God's revealed will. The author has no sympathy with the view which depreciates the authority of Scripture in order to exalt over it the authority of Christ. He does not acknowledge that there is any collision between the two things or that they can really be severed, the one from the other, He finds the word of God and of Christ in the Scriptures, and knows no other source of acquaintance with it".

The Papers thus described are on the following topics: "The Present-Day Trial of the Bible," "An Instructive Object Lesson," "Presuppositions in Old Testament Criticism," "Settled Results in Criticism," "Israel's God and Worship", "Archaeology as Searchlight," "The Citadel-Christ," "The Bulwark of the Gospels," "Oppositions of Science," "The Bible and Ethics: God and My Neighbor", "Discrepancies and Difficulties," "The Bible the Hope of the World." In an Appendix there is a brief discussion of an article on *Recent Developments of Old Testament Criticism* in the January number of the *Quarterly Review*, from the pen of Dr. G. A. Smith, and the volume closes with an Index.

"As designed for the general Christian reader, these papers make no pretence to exhaustive treatment." Those who would have that may

well be referred to the more scientific apologetic works of the author, viz.: *The Christian View of God and the World* (8th edition), *The Problem of the Old Testament* (4th edition), and *God's Image in Man and its Defacement* (3d edition). And yet it should be said in passing—and higher praise could scarcely be given—that these papers are as remarkable for “tracing broad outlines of defence and vindication” as the treatises just named are for profound and illuminating discussion.

The Bible Under Trial should prove a great boon to three distinct classes. To the rank and file of our church membership, who must read and study just such a book as this, and particularly its treatment of the critical attacks on the Bible, if they would obey the apostolic injunction and be ‘ready always to give answer to every man that asketh of them a reason concerning the hope that is in them.’ To our hard working pastors, who can find presented in this book with unique clearness and brevity the material for such preaching as will tend directly to enlighten and confirm the faith of their congregations and who will catch from the author's calm and invincible because Scriptural optimism that rational and holy confidence and boldness which are stronger than any mere argument. And, finally, to the professional apologist, who may wish to turn from the special combat in which he himself is engaged and inquire how the battle goes all along the line. May the profound and genial scholar who in *The Bible Under Trial* has given us a book as popular as it is scholarly and as scholarly as it is popular, be long spared “to contend earnestly for the faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints”!

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, Jr.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION IN JAPAN. American Lectures on The History of Religions. Sixth series. 1905-1906. By GEORGE WILLIAM KNOX, D.D., LL. D., Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion in Union Theological Seminary, New York, and Sometime Professor of Philosophy and Ethics in the Imperial University, Tokyo. 8vo.; pp. xxi, 204. G. P. Putnam's Sons: New York and London. The Knickerbocker Press. 1907.

This is a small volume; but it is so instructive and suggestive, so philosophic in spirit and so fascinating in style, as to be remarkable. It does not give us a scientific description of Shinto, the state religion of Japan, or of Buddhism, the religion of the people, or of Confucianism, the religion of the literati: but within its few pages it does make us acquainted with the genius of each one of these as does no formal treatise of which the reviewer is aware. It does more. It describes the characteristic beliefs and rites, the natural religion of primitive Japan, before the beginning of the Empire. It shows how Shinto is “the natural religion of the people reorganized and completed as myth” in order to ‘support the new Imperial house and power’. It sets forth the subsequent introduction of Buddhism, or “supernatural religion”, from

China, how it modified the existing religion and was itself modified by it. It dwells next on the coming of Confucianism or "ethical religion", its influence, and the many and important transformations which it sustained. It closes with a singularly clear, comprehensive, and just "Review and Outlook".

One of the rules governing this lectureship is that "Polemical subjects, as well as polemics in the treatment of subjects, shall be positively excluded". This, doubtless, explains why it is that some questions of absorbing interest to many are studiously ignored. Such, for example, is the relation of the powerful Shin Sect of Buddhists to Christianity: Did they borrow from our religion? Could they have approached it so closely, if they had not?

With our author's conception of religious development and of historical progress in general as due to "contact with foreign peoples and civilizations" rather than "to resident forces"; and with his doctrine that natural religion has its origin, not in anything external or accidental to man, but in his nature as man, his instinctive response to his environment, we are in heartiest accord. To his doctrine of the nature of religion, that it "essentially has to do with the feelings," we cannot assent. Religion essentially has to do with "the whole man," intellect and feelings and will. Indeed, man is an indivisible unit; and, as Prof. Francis Bowen well said, "Feeling is a state of mind consequent on the reception of some idea". This error of our author appears frequently throughout his discussion and causes him to under rate the importance of theology and to misstate its relation to religion.

On page 190 we have "the St. James version" where the King James version is meant.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, Jr.

MATTER AND INTELLECT. A Reconciliation of Science and the Bible.

By ANDREW ALLAN. London. A. Owen & Co., 38 Regent Street. 8vo., p. 224.

This book is not a reconciliation, but rather a reconstruction of some parts of Science and some parts of Scripture, after a pantheistic pattern. According to it, God is not a definite personality, and the human soul is not God-created: and instead of a Gospel dealing with sin, and sacrifice, and Christ, the Apostle Paul is censured for misleading the world; and by help of errors of science and an extraordinary handling of a few parts of Scripture, a Gospel of Pantheism is presented.

The author refers much to Evolution, and the survival of the fittest; but he is ignorant of the scientific meaning of these terms, and he is astray in nearly everything which he writes as to science. He errs in declaring that high-type animals exterminate low-type animals, and in calling this (if it were correct) an exception to the struggle for existence. He is astray in declaring the germ of an acorn to be identical with that of an animal, and in making environment and nutrition the only

difference. He is astray in alleging that the Coal Age, or any other geological age was rainless. (The Bible refers to a rainless district, but shows that it had rivers which proved rainy regions in other parts, and the Coal Age is proved by its swamps and lakes and rivers to have been rainy). He errs when he derives birds from pterodactyles, and serpents from dinosaurs. If he were a zoologist he should have known that birds and serpents were certainly not derived from the sources which he assigns to them. His most extraordinary error is his discovery of "a remarkable agreement between Genesis and Science" in deriving the man and the woman, both of them from the jelly fishes, away back in the oldest geological times. By this hypothesis the starfishes, which are closely related to the jellyfishes, and hosts of other humble forms, should be closer relations to both man and woman, than either of them have been of the other. It is ignorant guessing of this sort that bewilders the laity, and drives men of science mad with the "reconcilers".

The point where he first goes astray in handling the Bible is in assuming that the second chapter of Genesis (that is, from its 4th verse) is a second account of creation. Many eminent men hold this view, but it is counter to the evidence, as the late Prof. W. H. Green, of Princeton, has shown, and it is always misleading. After the account of the creation in chapter I (continued for three verses of the second chapter), that subject is dropped, and we have the settlement of man in his appointed home and his experiences through some generations until the end of chapter four. The expressions, "these are the generations" (ii. 4) and "the book of the generations" (v. 1) mark new stages as distinctly as the second and third books of Xenophon's *Anabasis* are marked; and just as Xenophon begins the new books with a sentence as to the topics of their predecessors, so the Genesiac record starts with referring to the creation of man as previously recorded. Man, male and female, had both been mentioned as created by God in his own image; and there is no repetition.

The narrative in Gen. ii. 21, about the deep sleep of the man and the formation of the woman from his side, is not a historical report of her origin, but a dream sent to prepare the man for the helpmeet who was nigh at hand. The graphic language is precisely parallel with that used for Pharaoh's dream, in Gen. xli. 1, "Pharaoh dreamed, and behold he stood by the river", etc., as if his standing, and the coming of the kine were external occurrences; but nobody has ever been misled by the style as to Pharaoh; it is only about the early chapters of Genesis, like the later chapters of the Apocalypse, the unknown past, and the unknown future, that we find ourselves free to blunder as we like.

Correcting these errors, we have no ground left either for harmonizing or antagonizing the parts of the narrative. It is odd to find Allan attempting to harmonize by assigning the rib-incident away back to something derived from jelly fishes, or some other remote ancestors; and seeming to think that "inspiration" enabled the writer

to contemplate these scientific mysteries ages in advance of Mr. Darwin.

We may now leave the subject, with the remark, that by making the fall an ascent of man to a higher stage, so that man is able respectably to sin, and by arguing that evil is after all a blessing, goodness in disguise, and then by showing that in a future life good people are happy, not being tempted any more, and bad people are happy, because they are free to torment each other, the author naturally proceeds to reject the doctrine of vicarious atonement, deploring the fact that it has wormed its way into Christian doctrines.

We observe that there is a clergyman located near Glasgow bearing the author's name; but it is difficult to understand why a man holding such views should be a preacher in any place where Christians worship. He deplores as gross and superstitious the faith which most of us Christians hold to be the charm and solace of our present life, and the foundation of our hopes for hereafter.

Princeton University,

G. MACLOSKE.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

The International Critical Commentary. A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF PSALMS. By CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS, D.D., D.Litt., Professor of Theological Encyclopædia and Symbolics, Union Theological Seminary, New York, and EMILIE GRACE BRIGGS, B.D. Vols. I and II. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906 and 1907. 8vo.; pp. cx, 422, and viii, 572. Price \$3.00 net each.

These two volumes from the pen of an American biblical scholar form the most elaborate commentary on the Psalms that scholarship of the modern type has produced, not excepting Hupfeld's work of fifty years ago or Delitzsch's later production. These eleven hundred pages contain a general introduction to the Psalter, covering one hundred and ten pages, and for each psalm a special introduction, a criticism of the text and a formal exegetical discussion, and the resulting exposition.

Dr. Briggs believes it to be a legitimate critical procedure to alter the Hebrew text of a psalm in order to conform it to his theory of the rhythm of that psalm, and to employ the rhythm of a particular passage as evidence for or against its genuineness. He reforms the text quite frequently for these subjective reasons. Professor Cheyne also adjusts the text to a theory, but his theory lacks sanity and he does not apply his method with moderation. Dr. Briggs understands scholarly restraint. Nor does he modify the text after the manner of Professor Grätz. He is too careful a scholar to do so. Nor does he follow

Wellhausen in this matter. Dr. Briggs has, indeed, accepted Wellhausen's theory of the development of Israel's religious life and institutions; but like Professor Duhm, another prominent adherent of the same school of criticism, Dr. Briggs is quite independent of Wellhausen in textual criticism. Dr. Briggs' emendations on the ground of rhythm are numerous, more so probably than Baethgen's. There is one matter in this connection which seems to us to be an incongruity. We believe that there is a place for the limited use of even subjective textual criticism, although it is extremely elusive. But this perplexes us. Dr. Briggs assigns the composition of about one-half of the psalms in the psalter to late Persian, Greek, and Maccabean days. Yet numerous verses that are pronounced unrhythmical are attested by the LXX as in the psalter during approximately the same period. At any rate they were an integral part of these poems when they were used in the musical service of the sanctuary. It would seem that their lack of rhythm, if it really existed to the Hebrew ear, should have sadly interfered with their use as hymns by the temple choir.

Dr. Briggs explains the reference to David in the title of many psalms as meaning that these psalms were taken from a psalter of David. The theory formulated in broad terms is good. It may be held and explained thus: In the service of Solomon's temple a hymn book was used known as "The Prayers of David" (Ps. lxxi. 20). The kernel of this collection consisted of psalms which David composed and of other sacred odes, perhaps, which he collected. Not unlikely as the centuries passed hymns by poets of a later date were added, without changing the name of the collection. Such a procedure has its analogies in all periods of the history of literature. But of course, the admission that there are psalms in the psalter dating from the time of David cannot be made by the adherents of the school of Wellhausen, or at most in the case of three or four that are colorless; for they cannot grant that deep spirituality of worship existed so early in the history of Israel, nor can they tolerate the evidence, which such psalms would afford, of an elaborate ritual and of the recognition of but one legitimate altar at that early date. The advocates of the Wellhausian hypothesis are under pressure to assign the psalms to as late an age as possible. Cheyne in his Bampton Lectures asserts that no psalm in the psalter, except perhaps a portion of the eighteenth, is pre-exilic. Wellhausen in his commentary disallows the eighteenth, and does not expressly allow any other, to be pre-exilic. Dr. Briggs holds that "it is evident from the internal character of these Pss., with a few possible exceptions, that David could not have written them". He grants that five, namely vii. and xiii. and xviii. and xxiv. 7-10 and lx. 6-9, were composed in the time of David and only twenty-seven others in the days before the exile. Ewald held a different theory from Wellhausen respecting the origin and growth of Israel's religion. His likewise is not the teaching of the Bible; nevertheless, Ewald on his theory can and does admit the Davidic authorship of psalms like viii. and xv. and

xxix. and lxviii. 13-18, and the pre-exilic date of psalms like xix. 8-15 and lv. 9-24 and lxv.; but Dr. Briggs, because he holds the Wellhausen theory of the development of Israel's religion, must and does deny both the Davidic authorship and the pre-exilic date of these psalms. A glance at his argument makes it evident that investigation is largely controlled by the tenets of the school.

It is difficult to speak generally of a matter of such detail as exegesis. The writer of this brief review desires to express the satisfaction he has found in Dr. Briggs exposition. It is careful and candid. He finds great thoughts and lofty religious teaching. He exegetes even those passages which he regards as interpolations. Of course, his exegesis will meet with dissent at countless points, and that, too, from scholarly men who cordially acknowledge the great merits of the work (compare, e. g., on "the Pit," Zandstra, *Princeton Theological Review*, October, 1907, pp. 631-641).

We cannot close without expressing our joy at beholding the beautiful spectacle of a daughter sharing in the learned literary labors of the father. "O the happiness" of the father who has such a daughter!

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

STUDIES ON THE BOOK OF GENESIS. By H. B. PRATT, Spanish Translator of Seymour's *"Evenings with the Romanists"* (Noches con los Romanistas) and author of the *"Modern Version"* of the Bible in Spanish, and also of *"Estudios sobre el libro del Genesis,"* and of *"Estudios sobre el libro del Exodo"*. Translated from the Spanish. "God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but to save the world" (Gk. "in order that the world be saved through Him"). John 3, 17. Sold by the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street, New York. 1906.

The title of this book rightly represents its contents. It is not strictly speaking and in the ordinary use of the term a commentary. For common readers of the Bible, perhaps for all readers of the Bible, it is all the better, it may be, for that. It does not confuse with a multitude of details, so that the main purpose and trend of the passages are lost. It is readable, interesting, and instructive from beginning to end. It is refreshing and novel, nowadays, to find a writer treating a book of the Bible as inspired and authoritative in its teachings, as it stands, without continuous references to supposed documents, and endless discussions of assumed and unproved origins. We feel sure, that the primary design of the Spanish original, to provide the Spanish speaking people with a protestant work upon the book of Genesis, has been fully carried out. We are sure, also, that, in its English dress, it will benefit all its readers,—not merely by calling their attention to many subjects, which may well have escaped their notice; but in answering the questions, and in elucidating the dark places, which must loom up in the

mind of every reader of a book, treating, as Genesis does, of the origins of things.

The notes containing dissertations on such subjects as marriage and divorce, the origin and binding character of the Sabbath, the sins of the Old Testament saints, the obligation and nature of tithes, and the position of the cities of the plain, are quite thorough and generally convincing. Even so dry a matter as the discussion of the meaning of a technical term, such as "to know" (in the phrase, where God says; *I know him*, i. e. Abraham), becomes vivid and interesting, as the author treats it. Every one can see what the author means, and what the verse means.

One of the attractive features of the book are the glaring side-lights, which are cast upon the life and beliefs of the South American people. This alone will make it worth the purchase and perusal by those who want to know how others think and live, and also, a valuable book for the missionary library, and for the instruction of the student volunteers.

Princeton.

R. D. WILSON.

BIBLE SIDE LIGHTS FROM THE MOUND OF GEZER. A record of Excavation and Discovery in Palestine. By R. A. STEWART MACALISTER, M.A., F.S.A., Director of Excavations, Palestine Excavation Fund. With illustrations. "Thou has made of a city an heap; of a defenced city a heap of ruins."—Isaiah xxv. 2. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 153-157 Fifth Avenue. 1906.

This volume is designed especially to answer the objection to the work of the Palestine Exploration Fund, that the plain bible student, who is not concerned with the science of geography or anthropology, derives little benefit from the work of excavation; and to show, that the Society and its officers are not blind to the claims of the bible student. Mr. Macalister, the author, has been the efficient agent of the Society in the work of excavation; a work for which he was specially prepared at Cambridge, England, by a thorough course in archaeology under the supervision and stimulus of his father, Prof. David Macalister, the eminent anthropologist. The son of a Scotch-Irish Presbyterian elder, he has been fittingly prepared on the biblical side to produce an essay on the light thrown by his scientific discoveries upon the Scriptures of the Old Testament. While we cannot accept all of his conclusions, yet we are thankful for the suggestiveness of his remarks. It is a book that one will read through at a sitting, and sit until one has read through. The style is attractive, the print good, the illustrations superbly fine. We know of nothing that has been written that will better demonstrate the beneficent results to be derived from the work of the Society which he so ably represents.

Princeton.

R. D. WILSON.

A DEVOTIONAL COMMENTARY. Edited by the REV. A. R. BUCKLAND, M.A. Genesis I-XXV. 10, by the Rev. W. H. Griffith Thomas, D.D., Principal of Wycliffe Hall, Oxford. London: The Religious Tract Society. 1907. Pp. viii, 299.

It is refreshing to find a work on Genesis that is not only willing to see, but anxious to show to others, the unity of plan that pervades this book. Dr. Thomas has sought to convey to his readers the spirit and purpose of Genesis, the composition of which is inconceivable as a bit of redaction, but demands a real author, whether we can or cannot discern the written sources that lie back of his product. The method of this "devotional commentary" is simple. A portion of Genesis complete in itself is printed at the beginning of each section, and is then followed by a free and suggestive discussion of just those questions that rise in the reader's mind and demand an answer. References are given to literature that handles the same questions, preference being always given to literature dealing with subject-matter rather than the form of the text. Finally, "suggestions for meditation" introduce to the reader those religious bearings of the passage by which he may be led to a deeper appreciation of its significance for Christianity in general and for his own spiritual life in particular. The author's simple but luminous treatment of Gen. xxii. is especially to be commended. The book is most attractively gotten up, and is worthy of large use by Christians to whom as to Christ and His Apostles Genesis is as much the word of God as any part of the canon.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

THE BOOK OF THE PROPHET JEREMIAH, a Revised Translation with Introductions and Short Explanations. By the REV. S. R. DRIVER, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906. Pp. lvi, 382.

THE BOOK OF THE PROPHET JEREMIAH. By PROF. CHARLES RUFUS BROWN, D.D., of the Newton Theological Institution. The American Baptist Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1907. Pp. xxxvi, 256. Also, THE BOOK OF THE PROPHET JEREMIAH, a New and Critical Translation. Same author and publishers. Philadelphia. 1906. Pp. 48.

These two new helps for the student of Jeremiah are arranged on different plans. Prof. Brown's larger book, which is one number of the American Commentary on the Old Testament, follows closely the usual type of commentary. There is an elaborate introduction, followed by the text with the commentator's notes below. For the text he has placed in parallel columns the authorized version, and a special translation made by himself, into which he introduces various typographical devices to indicate his departures from, or rectifications of, the massoretic text. It is this special translation that has been brought out in separate and attractive form by the same publishers, as indicated

above; introduction and notes are omitted, but the critical devices are retained, together with an explanation of them.

Dr. Driver's book, on the other hand, departs from the usual make-up of a modern commentary, in limiting the material treated in his introduction to a brief outline of the prophet's life and times, and an exceedingly succinct statement of the peculiarities of Jeremiah's style and the problems of his text. The author's translation occupies the great bulk of the book (pp. 1-335), the explanatory notes or comments being so subordinated and abbreviated that many pages of text have few or no notes, and but few, if any, pages are half notes, half text. At the end of the book are gathered such longer explanations of renderings adopted, as are unsuited for the English reader because discussion of the Hebrew original is involved. Dr. Driver appended a glossary of the archaisms in the Revised Version, with some interesting comments on these English terms. An index renders the book the more useful for reference purposes.

Of these two works, Dr. Driver's is the more moderate in tone. Dr. Brown has built largely upon Duhm's Jeremiah, of which Driver himself remarks: "Duhm is original and brilliant, but arbitrary; and the principle task of the future commentator on Jeremiah will be to discover the right mean" between Duhm and Keil. Driver's work here as elsewhere is essentially mediating. It represents practically the position assumed by Graf in his commentary on Jeremiah published nearly a half century ago. It is difficult to see what advance is represented in either of these recent works over the comprehensive and temperate commentary of Orelli, the English translation of which appeared in 1889.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

HANDBOOKS FOR BIBLE CLASSES AND PRIVATE STUDENTS. Edited by PROF. MARCUS DODS, D.D., and REV. ALEXANDER WHYTE, D.D. THE BOOK OF JOB. By REV. JAMES AITKEN, M.A., Minister of Onslow Presbyterian Church, Wellington, New Zealand. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons: New York. Pp. 114.

What Mr. Aitken has done in this little handbook for students of the Book of Job, is to put in compact form, admirably suited for the class-room, the essence of Dr. Davidson's views on Job as presented in his volume in the Cambridge Bible Series. In a brief introduction the author discusses the usual introductory topics, the authorship, date, classification, source, argument, purpose and integrity of the book, and attempts also a comparison of its teachings on suffering with what Christianity has to say on the same subject. He makes the same mistake as may be observed in many other treatises, both long and short, on this Old Testament composition,—the mistake of underestimating the importance of the question, "Doth Job serve God for naught?" Unless a commentator on Job is prepared to put this problem, is there

such a thing as disinterested piety? side by side with the problem of sin and suffering in his estimate of the book, he will inevitably be led to a one-sided view of its purpose, and from this again to a false conclusion on a number of subordinate questions in the detailed treatment of the text. Apart from this, the little volume is worthy of all praise, especially for its luminous paraphrasing abbreviations of the argument at the beginning of each new section. The low price (45 cents) puts it within the reach of all classes of students.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

DE FILISTIJNEN, HUN AFKOMST EN GESCHIEDENIS. By DR. A. NOORDTJIZ. Kampen: J. H. Kok. 1905. Pp. 247.

This important work on the origin and history of the Philistines should have been reviewed two years since in these columns, but the following review has been delayed till a time when European scholars have already pronounced a favorable opinion on the book. In joining heartily in this encomium the reviewer desires also to present in brief the result which Dr. Noordtjiz reaches on the vexed question of the origin of this nation.

After a minute examination of the evidence, epigraphic, industrial and pictorial, including all the light that both the older and the more recent discoveries in Egypt and Crete are able to shed, the author reaches a conclusion nearer to that of Hitzig in 1845 than to that of Movers and Stark and most of the recent writers on the Philistines. We cannot do better than translate the paragraph in which Noordtjiz sums up, at the close of his chapter on name and origin. "The Philistines, as they appear in history, were originally no really unified nation. Like the Hittites, they were a complex of tribes brought together by a common interest, and belonged to the Indo-Germanic group. The principal people, into whom the others were finally absorbed, the Purasati, who gave their name to the whole, dwelt anciently in Crete (and the islands of the Aegean Sea?); from there they carried on an extensive trade with Egypt and apparently also with the Palestinian coast, but at the same time practised piracy. For reasons that are obscure to us a small portion of this tribe migrated at an early period to the Palestinian coast, where it made itself master of the neighborhood of Gerar. These would, however, have disappeared among the surrounding Canaanites, if they had not been from time to time reinforced by new emigrants from the mother-country, though of this no account has come down to us. Thereby it even became possible for them to absorb into themselves completely the Hivites and the Rephaites. From the days of the 18th dynasty onward they, like the Canaanites, were in subjection to Egypt. In conjunction, however, with the movement of the "sea-folk" that after the reign of Menepthah II became steadily greater, they too contrived to recover their independence from Egypt by force of arms. As soon now as they were strengthened by new detachments

of the Purasati, united with the Takkara, Shakrusha, Dano and Vashasha, they began to make predatory incursions directed principally towards the north. But when with the 20th dynasty there arose stronger princes in Egypt, Rameses III marched against them and succeeded in subjecting them again and obliging them to pay tribute. It must not, however, be concealed that in this sketch much still remains obscure. Our sources do not always give us the needful light, and sometimes they are quite silent. But in view of the astonishing liberality of Egypt's soil the reasonable hope may be cherished, that with continued search many a point still obscure will be illuminated, and among others this history of the origin of the Philistines."

In his second chapter Dr. Noordtzij collects and discusses the allusions to the five cities, and thus presents a picture of the territory which the Philistines occupied. In chapters three and four are grouped the interesting topics of their language and religion, and their civil and social life. Finally, the last two chapters trace their history from the earliest times to Alexander, and from Alexander to the Moslem conquest. Little can be affirmed of their language, inasmuch as our knowledge of it is confined to proper names and the one word *seren*, "lord". If they were of Cretan origin, as the author believes, their original language was, doubtless, the same as that represented by the odd linear inscriptions found on Cretan pottery in the Egyptian, Cretan and Palestinian excavations of recent years. But whatever the original tongue, it is plain that, as in the case of many another invading and conquering nation, the Philistines soon took over the language of the land in which they settled, and by the time of Samson already spoke a dialect so nearly akin to that of the Hebrews as to be practically the same language. A similar experience tells the story of their religion, for with the ancient language they said farewell to their ancient gods. "Not in this sense, however," the author cautions us, "as if all remains of their original worship had been lost. . . . The Canaanitish gods felt the influence of the old Philistine gods, even to the extent that they acquired thereby a peculiar type that differentiated them from other gods."

The peculiar organization of the Pentapolis politically, the relation the tyrants bore to their respective cities and to one another, and the varying fortunes of Philistine democracy, make an instructive introduction to the history; but not more so than the interesting notices of their customs in war, and their wide and varied trade-relations. It is in the former of the two strictly historical chapters that the author reveals his sympathy with the Old Testament narratives. Dr. Noordtzij takes his stand plainly on the side of those who respect the Biblical data as worthy of a primary place among the historian's sources. In connection with his discerning treatment of the Philistine-Israelitish wars of the time of Saul, we venture to refer to the admirable discussion of the battles of Michmash, the Vale of Elah, and Mount Gilboa, in Principal Miller's "Least of All Lands," which embodies in a way that no purely historical work does, the evidence afforded by a minute local survey of

the sites in question. The history of Philistia falls naturally into three periods: first, the period of the struggle for supremacy over Canaan; second, the period of the struggle for independence against the great empires, generally in alliance with Egypt and Phenicia, but rarely with Israel or Judah; and third, the period of Hellenism, when these Philistine cities were the centers of the struggle, first against Judaism, then against Christianity.

The close relation of all this course of Philistine history to the course of biblical and ecclesiastical history makes the career of this region and people a matter of the keenest interest to Christian students of antiquity. And the thorough, masterly way in which Dr. Noordtzijs has treated this his fascinating subject not only supersedes earlier works and articles on the same topic, but also renders it highly desirable that a translation of his book into English may soon see the light, for the benefit of English and American scholars and Bible-students who are not at home in the Dutch.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, herausgegeben von Prof. D. A. Schlatter, Tübingen, und Prof. D. W. Lütgert, Halle a. S. (1). DAS GEHEIMNIS DER FRÖMMIGKEIT UND DIE GOTTMENSCHHEIT CHRISTI, von Lic. W. BLEIBTREU. (1) TEXTKRITISCHES ZU DEN KORINTHERBRIEFEN, von D. F. BLASS. (3) REICHGOTTESSPUREN IN DER VÖLKERWELT, von Lic. Dr. J. BOEHMER. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann. 1906. 8vo. Pp. 124.

The central one of the three dissertations which make up this part of the well-known "Contributions to Theology," founded by Drs. Schlatter and Cremer—the first part for the year 1906—is a brief discussion by Dr. Blass of two textual points in the Epistles to the Corinthians. The former concerns the well-known section, 2 Cor. vi. 14-vii. 1, so frequently treated as an interpolation. Blass assumes the likelihood of this opinion and attempts to show that nothing in the rhetorical form of the section stands in the way of it. Here he is dealing with the niceties of rhythm, in accordance with the rules governing the artistic prose of the ancient Asiatic school. The mark of the New Testament writers, according to Norden (*Das antike Kunstprosa*, vol. II) was, from the rhetorical point of sight, just their formlessness. But in a work published in 1905, Blass sought to exhibit the use of the rules of the prevalent rhetorical school in the New Testament books. Applying these rules here, while he finds that there is no need arising from the rhythm of the passage in question for removing it from its present place, he yet finds that the removal raises no difficulty on the score of broken rhythm. Nor would any difficulty result on this score from inserting it between verses 22 and 23 of 1 Corinthians x. Thither he would, accordingly, transport it, arguing that the section may have occupied just one page in some papyrus exemplar which might have

got misplaced. The second passage with which he deals is 1 Cor. v. 9. The difficulties of taking this verse, as is so commonly done, as an allusion to a previous (lost) letter of Paul's to the Corinthians are well summarized. The words ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ, Blass remarks, supply the sole occasion for favoring an allusion to such a letter. Are they genuine? According to the findings of Seth R. Gifford, in a dissertation on "Paul's Epistles as read by John Chrysostom", 1902, they were not in Chrysostom's text. "If, however", says Blass, "Chrysostom did not have the words in a ms., of at least the 4th century, they must either justify themselves as necessary or at least good, or else must be condemned." They give difficulty, however, in any interpretation. They must therefore be stricken out, and the rhythm permits this. Such textual criticism seems to us too facile to be convincing; the secondary considerations appear to be depended on to the neglect of the primary.

Licentiate Bleibtreu's "contribution", with which the part opens, is a careful study of 1 Tim. iii. 16, upon the details of which we shall not enter.

The closing "contribution", Dr. Böhmer's, "Traces of the Kingdom of God in the heathen world", is intended, as he tells us, as a continuation of studies begun in his work on *Der alttestamentliche Unterbau des Reiches Gottes* (1902) and prosecuted in a series of articles *Zum Verständnis des Reiches Gottes* published in *Die Studierstube* from July to November 1905. Here, he points out that the conception of God as King is very widespread, and hardly less so the idea that a king, and that an earthly, empirical king, shall usher in the time of consummation, the new world, the perfected glory. Throughout the whole Orient, from a very early age, there was current the conception of a βασιλεὺς σωτήρ: and we need only point to the famous fourth Eclogue of Virgil to show that the West was no stranger to the notion. In the prophecies of the Old Testament the two lines of expectation,—of the future Kingdom of God and of the ideal Son of David,—scarcely unite. But in the Gentile expectation we may rather say the earthly king and the Divine King are never quite kept separate. In any event, we cannot deny that we have in Gentile records ideas parallel to what we call in Israel the Kingdom of God and even its Messianic expectations. If now we start from these parallels and ask how far we find traces in extra-Biblical religions of the Kingdom of God in the genuine Israelitish and Christian sense and especially in its eschatological conception, we think at once of the Germanic doctrine of the "Götterdämmerung", or if that is supposed to rest on Christian traditions, especially of Parseeism. No doubt the originality of the Parsee eschatology also is suspect. But it can scarcely be entirely explained as of Jewish origin. Perhaps, a careful study of the data will commend to us the conclusion, that "neither has Parseeism been directly influenced by Judaism nor Judaism by Parseeism (at least so far as the Kingdom of God is concerned), but that both religions, each after its own fashion, have

developed conceptions and ideas, which belong to humanity as a whole, and their notable resemblances find therefore their explanation ultimately and simply in the earnest ethical bases of both." The essay is confessedly fragmentary and seems rather suggestive than conclusive. It will repay reading, however, by those who are interested in the questions now so vigorously debated concerning the origin of Christianity and Judaism in oriental thought.

Princeton, May, 1906.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE APOSTOLIC AGE IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN CRITICISM. By JAMES HARDY ROPES, Bussey Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in Harvard University. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906; pp. 327.

As Dr. Ropes himself tells us, the view of the Apostolic age and its contribution to history underlying his book is substantially that maintained by Ritschl. The book is intended for a wider circle than that of technical scholars; and while the acquaintance and interest of the author with the detailed problems shines through on every page, these are not brought unduly to the attention of the reader. The author writes in a vivid, interesting style, which from the point of view of form raises his work above the average and renders it eminently suited to serve its popular purpose.

On the teaching and work of Jesus as the presupposition of the development of the Apostolic age Dr. Ropes scarcely touches. In this lies a serious disadvantage of the method of treating the Apostolic age by itself. It is only fair to say, however, that in the present case this is in no wise due to scepticism with regard to the trustworthiness of the Gospel-traditions, at least so far as the synoptical record is concerned. The author does not belong to the group of critics who think that the first safe ground from which to approach the history of the Apostolic age are the Pauline records. "The picture of the life and character of Jesus as given in the synoptic gospels shows on the whole a remarkable and convincing consistency and credibility." With regard to the Fourth Gospel his views are less conservative. We are told that "its chief value lies rather in the realm of truth than of fact," but this does not mean that its teaching, rather than its history, is authentic. "Truth" in this antithesis means that sort of super-historical truth which can coëxist with the total or partial fictitiousness of its setting. The Gospel is great as a product of human thought. In regard to Acts Dr. Ropes takes the position recently advocated by Harnack. The book as a whole as well as the we-pieces, and, consequently, the Gospel are the work of the man named Luke. This does not preclude, however, a semi-sceptical attitude towards the tradition of the earliest history recorded in the pre-Pauline part of the book. While the results of criticism give a fair degree of confidence in the pictures of the general development of events, the detail is held in many cases to be merely a part of the telling of the story. The speeches are probably no more than the free composition of the writer. On page 78 we get a suggestion of

Von Dobschütz's hypothesis, that the account of John xx, 19-23 represents another version of the story of Pentecost. The early disciples are characterized as "fundamentally Jews, and Jews of a popular, semi-pharisaic, messianistic type; a measure of the spirit of freedom of Jesus with regard to Jewish legal prescriptions is supposed to have lingered among them. Soteriologically they combined the methods of salvation by law and by the death of Christ. The representation of Acts with reference to the persecution or non-persecution of the early disciples is not criticized. The epoch-making character of Stephen's speech from a doctrinal point of view is denied. On the conference of Acts xv. Dr. Ropes' view both as to the reliability of the account and the significance of the proceedings is conservative. In this connection we meet with the following curious statement: "A Christian Church excommunicated by the mother church . . . would probably have been a failure. What form the presentation to the world of pure spiritual religion would have taken we cannot know, but Christianity as we know it would never have come into being (*i. e.* in the case of failure of the leaders to agree at Jerusalem). This suggests a theory about the separability of the essence of pure spiritual religion from all its historic embodiment, which we confess it is hard for us even to imagine. It is assumed that after the conference the Jewish Christians grew more and more one-sidedly Judaistic, a body of sectarian separatists, although James continued faithful to the attitude of approval of Paul. What the church owes to Jewish Christianity are the following four things: (1). The tradition of the life of Jesus in the Gospels; (2). The idea of the Messiah and the whole theological system which this implies; (3). The apocalyptic spirit, *i. e.*, interpreted in modern language, historical optimism; (4). The Old Testament. In passing we observe, that the First Epistle of Peter is, with some hesitation, accepted as genuine; that the Second Epistle is declared a late production of the second century; and that the Epistles of James and Jude are not mentioned anywhere by Dr. Ropes.

The chapters on Paul and Paul's theology are easily the most interesting and eloquent part of the book. The personality of the Apostle is drawn in bold lines. All the epistles, with the possible exception of II Thessalonians and the positive exception of the Pastorals, are recognized as genuine writings of Paul, Ephesians included. We have only two criticisms to make here. The one relates to the somewhat insistent protestation that Paul was not a theologian. It has become a vogue of late to celebrate the Apostle as a man of energy, will, action, organizing talent, the prototype of the ideal modern minister, or, so far as his mental qualities are concerned, the mystic, the poet. He is permitted to be all things to all men, only not a theologian to the theologians. Dr. Ropes exclaims with a degree of pathos: "Has ever a man been so misunderstood and shamefully entreated as Paul out of whose poetry men have made the propositions of a logical system?" We venture to assert, that, if Paul could come back, he would look upon the theological treatment of his teaching as among the least hard to bear of all

the perversions to which he has been subjected. It is quite possible that he would even sympathize with theologians in their present reproach and eclipse. At any rate, the only basis on which such a denial of the theological strand in Paul's preaching and teaching can be made is an arbitrary definition of a theologian as one who cultivates the intellectual and speculative interest for its own sake. But to how many of those who have nobly borne the name of theologian in the history of the Church will such a definition apply? It is simply a modern, vulgar caricature. Dr. Ropes himself admits that Paul was trained in the Jewish theology, and that he carried over this substantially Jewish view of the world and of history into his Christian consciousness, only reorganizing it by the new principle given with the latter, nay on a later page speaks of the Apostle's flight of noble speculation, which the church as a whole was not able to follow. And if Paul was not a theologian, then the title of the author's fifth chapter, "Paul's Theology", is a misnomer. There surely is an inconsistency here. On the other hand, we are thankful for the emphasis which is laid (and to which even the one-sidedness just dwelt upon in a way contributes) on the inseparable connection between fact and truth, history and theology, in the Apostle's mind, on what Dr. Ropes felicitously calls the "dramatic" element in his conception of religion: "Paul's thought of God and Christ and the world is not as of an eternal, unchanging organism, whether mechanical or biological. It is rather always that of a moving panorama. He views the universe not as static, but as dramatic. In history the infinite and the finite meet. This is thoroughly Jewish, and for the religious life thoroughly wholesome." Only we do not quite like the implication of the qualifying adjective "religious" in the last clause, suggesting, as it were, that side by side with the religious view of the world there may be another to which other standards of wholesomeness do apply. We should also like to know how much of this dramatic conception of life is included in that "background of thought and a view of the world" of which we are told on another page that it has now "disappeared", and is the cause of "the repellent strangeness" of much of Paul's method and thought. Nor must it be overlooked that, while the dramatic, eschatological view-point preponderates, another more static representation involving the contrast of the eternal and the temporal worlds as coëxisting spheres, is also to be found in Paul, and not merely in the later epistles, but from the beginning, as a passage like II. Cor. iv. 18 clearly shows. The two do not form a contradiction, the temporal world not being eternal; the static dualism is resolved into the dramatic eschatology, but it was reserved for the author of Hebrews to work out this adjustment more clearly. It is not necessary to derive this strand in Paul's teaching from Hellenic influence, as Pfeiderer and others do; but certainly it is an element that comes to meet the Greek type of thought, and we would not go quite so far as to speak of "the peculiarly unhellenic character of Paul's view". Its presence is also noticeable in the Apostle's doctrine of the Spirit, as the element con-

stituting and characteristic of the heavenly world. Dr. Ropes entirely neglects this side of the Pauline conception of the Pneuma; he deals with the Spirit exclusively from the point of view of a soteriological power.

The other point on which the author's treatment of Paulinism seems to us open to criticism concerns the manner in which he defines the historical connection between the Christianity of Jesus and that of Paul. "Paul's thought is not a continuous development from the thought of Jesus, but is in a measure a new start, yet so controlled by the supreme expression of Jesus' nature, not in words but in his life and death, that it is fully dependent upon Jesus and in fundamental harmony with Him." In other words, because Paul interpreted the life and death of Jesus as a supreme manifestation of God's love, the new start he made happened to coincide with the central principle of our Lord's teaching, viz., that God is love. And Paul thus interpreted the life and death of Jesus, because indirectly he had come under the influence of the revelation of divine love made in the historic life of Jesus and in his teaching. We would remark upon this: 1.) That in order to establish a true historical connection here it must be shown that the Pauline or the earlier apostolic doctrine of the saving significance of the death of Christ was the outcome of Jesus' revelation of the love of God in his life and teaching. Did the early Christians and did Paul come to believe that Christ's death was a saving act, because they had learned to view his whole life and appearance as a revelation of love, or did this idea spring from other sources? 2.) The close resemblance which Dr. Ropes traces between the Pauline doctrine of the death of Christ and what he takes to be our Lord's teaching on the love of God exists only because in his rendering of the thought of Paul the substitutionary, penal significance of the cross is obscured. To be sure, the cross reveals the love of God, but it likewise reveals the divine justice according to Paul. Of the latter Dr. Ropes does not speak at all. He admits the death was to Paul vicarious, but vicarious he curiously enough interprets as equivalent to "non-penal". What the real rationale of the cross was for Paul, how and why it expressed the love of God, apart from his righteousness, we do not learn. No one who rules out the idea of justice as entering into the transaction of the cross has ever succeeded or will ever succeed in explaining this. The Pauline doctrine becomes irrational when everything is thus staked on the divine love to the exclusion of God's righteousness. Once we take the Pauline statements at their full substitutionary value, the assumed harmony with what is alleged to be the Synoptical teaching on the fatherhood of God disappears, and not merely in the point of historical nexus, but also in the point of identity of conception the proposed theory of the continuity of development between Jesus and Paul appears unsatisfactory. There is no escape on such premises from the position of Wrede, that Paul was the true founder of Christianity, that is, of Christianity historically and soteriologically considered and not as a mere abstraction. The only remedy here lies in a different

interpretation of our Lord's teaching, such as will do justice to some other elements contained therein as well as to that of the divine love.

The Ritschlian predisposition of the author in a theological and not merely historical sense reveals itself in the reserve which he maintains towards the intrusion of the supernatural as a veritable reality in the historical sphere. His observations on the appearances of Christ and on the conversion of Paul go no farther in each case than that the reality of the experience as an experience is affirmed: "There can be no doubt that the first disciples passed through real experiences which they believed to be the appearance to them of the crucified and risen Christ." . . . "There were real events and their effect was momentous." And with regard to St. Paul's conversion we learn that his experience must be conceived in analogy with other conversions; and that, while thus "the non-natural and anti-natural character of the conversion is abandoned", this is by no means equivalent to denying "the divine character of this great event". These quotations sufficiently indicate how the supernatural is here reduced to mode of divine operation by way of immanence. In one of the opening pages of the book occurs a passage which distinguishes between the critical and the non-critical historian after this fashion, that the former takes history as a chain of causes and effects, in which immanent divine forces have wrought out the purposes of God, whereas the latter makes out of it an inscrutable series of divine acts, which one may observe, but the processes of which he cannot expect to understand except as God may directly reveal knowledge of them to us. But such a supernaturalism as would deny itself all recourse to immanence and make everything a miracle has never existed in fact, nor can it be shown that this is the logical outcome of any sane form of it. It is a pure figment of the critical imagination. The exclusiveness of this matter lies with the positivistic theologian, not with the supernaturalist. Dr. Ropes would, in the sphere of history, explain everything from immanent processes. While professing his willingness to accept miracles, he will treat them only as "ultimate facts", *i. e.*, he is not willing to deal with them in his capacity of a historian, and recognize them as direct supernatural interpositions, and so to accord them the significance wherein their value as miracles consists.

By a strange oversight the quotation about the muzzling of the ox in I. Cor. ix. 9 is on page 195 derived from Proverbs instead of from Deuteronomy.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

THE FOURTH GOSPEL: ITS PURPOSE AND THEOLOGY. By ERNEST J. SCOTT, M.A. (Glas.), B.A. (Oxon.). Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1906. (The Literature of the New Testament.) Pp. vii, 379. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.00 net.

A certain lassitude with regard to the discussion of the Johannine problem, so far as the external evidence is concerned, has of late become

perceptible, especially in advanced critical quarters. The feeling seems to be gaining ground that the opponents of the historicity of the record and its discourses can, to say the least, secure no advantage of position by approaching the Gospel on this side of its external attestation, or even from the point of view of its internal evidence so far as the latter is of the nature of a direct self-witness and not merely inferential or based on a comparison with the Synoptical narrative and teaching. In Mr. Scott's book we have an exposition of the Gospel which entirely and on principle dispenses with every presentation of the Johannine question. The author tells us that he simply takes for granted the results of the critical investigation, his position being that "which is now generally accepted by continental scholars". The first or second decade of the second century is broadly fixed upon as the date of composition. But, far from being enthusiastic about this preliminary assumption, the author says: "It may be granted that the external evidence is not sufficient to warrant a decisive verdict on either side." Some might consider this an understatement, but the interesting point to observe is the admission that the external evidence is at least equally balanced. Time was when opponents of the Johannine authorship would not have lightly made such an admission. But, whatever the motive, whether the conviction that the debate about externals has led to an *impasse*, or a general sense of weakness, at any rate Mr. Scott and others with him take refuge into the discussion of what the Gospel itself can teach concerning its date and origin. The whole discussion before us, far from being purely biblico-theological, is professedly critical, and throughout keeps in sight the purpose of solving the Johannine problem by feeling, as it were, the theological and ecclesiastical pulse of the Gospel. Now, it ought not to be overlooked that this is different from placing the internal evidence above the external in weight, because the latter is believed to be inconclusive; it amounts to favoring unduly a very particular kind of internal evidence, that derived from doctrinal and historico-philosophical considerations, and passing by a not inconsiderable volume of internal evidence of much more concrete and direct and emphatic character which the Gospel offers concerning its own origin and claim to truthfulness. Even *à priori* it would seem somewhat precarious to stake everything on an enquiry of this kind, for, as the author himself seems fully to realize, the results which his investigation yields ought to appear entirely untenable for anyone who should feel constrained by the sheer weight of external testimony to accept the Johannine authorship of the Gospel in the old solid sense of ascribing it to the Apostle, the son of Zebedee. In the preface he quite summarily, but we are compelled to believe justly, waives aside the view of Drummond, who would unite the Johannine authorship with the interpretation of the story and teaching as in large part unhistorical. The Damocles-sword of an exceptionally strong external witness (and we need only to read Zahn's and Drummond's presentations to be profoundly impressed with the strength of it) must perforce continue to

hang above every such argument as Mr. Scott endeavors to weave. As to the nature of the argument itself, it is evident that the subjective factor must to a considerable extent enter into this. The explanation of the ideas and tendencies of a document out of an assumed historical milieu, and the dependence on this for fixing its approximate origin and date, will always remain a very delicate procedure. Notwithstanding his deftness of touch and uncommon skill in dovetailing the characteristic outlines of the Gospel into the historical situation as he sees it, we cannot altogether acquit the author of the fault of being too imaginative and credulous in his search for adjustments to environment. He thinks the Gospel is essentially "a work of transition in which primitive Christianity is carried over into a different world of thought". The transition is, in the first place, one from the time in which the primitive tradition was still a living force to a modern time which felt itself separated from the historical origins. The message had to be reinterpreted into new modes of thinking, specifically its universalism required new expression. In the second place, the transition was one from Jewish to Hellenic culture, and the transposal in this sphere was made by means of the language of Greek speculation, which, while it modified the ideas of Jesus and was something alien to the whole spirit of His teaching, yet proved in some respects more adequate to the expression of the substance of the gospel than the Jewish modes of utterance Jesus actually employed, as is illustrated from the ideas of the Messiah and the Kingdom of God. In the third place, the Gospel carries over the revelation of Christ from the world of outward fact to that of inward religious experience, thus avoiding the twofold danger, threatening at the time, of sublimating the history of the life of Jesus into a philosophical allegory on the one hand, or of making religion a matter of mere tradition, destitute of inward impulse and spiritual reality, on the other hand. It is obvious that a view like this offers the largest conceivable opportunity for elucidating the doctrinal phenomena of the Gospel almost without a residue of the mysterious. What cannot be explained from the goal of the process of transition can always be explained as a remnant of the stage that formed its point of departure. As Mr. Scott assures us, the author, writing in such a period, is continually striving to find place within the same system for opposite types of thought and belief. There is in the Gospel "a union of opposites". It is gnostic and anti-gnostic, sacramentarian and anti-sacramentarian, traditional and allegorical alike. Nearly every sentence in it might be paralleled with another which appears to indicate a view of different tenor. We confess that we are vividly reminded by all this of the old Tübingen-criticism, and that not only so far as its general tendency-principle is concerned, but specifically so far as it made every doctrinal precipitate the product of the union or compromise of opposites. In the present case this method ascribes to the author of the Gospel a complexness and refinement of theological, polemical and ecclesiastical purpose which it seems difficult to reconcile with the

impression of simplicity and straightforwardness it makes on the average reader. And, besides this, it carries the tracing of divergent strands of thought and the discovery of cross-purposes of policy to such an extreme as to place the Evangelist at not a few points flatly in contradiction with himself and to make him an object of our pity on account of the clumsiness of his methods. As a concrete instance, we may mention what is said about his attitude towards the Lord's Supper. The omission of the account of institution and the substitution for it of the account of the footwashing are interpreted as expressive of the view that not a ritual ordinance but the inward spirit of love, truth, and peace was Christ's real bequest to his disciples. And yet, in the discourse following the feeding of the five thousand in chap. vi. the spiritual process of assimilating the nature of Jesus is associated quite definitely with the ordinance of the Eucharist. The statements towards the close of the chapter are direct allusions to the Eucharist as "the medicine of immortality". And it is granted "that John in this chapter lays an emphasis on the outward rite, which cannot be wholly reconciled with his higher, more spiritual view". "We are compelled to recognize that he himself was affected with the sacramental ideas, against which, in their crude and unreasoned form, he makes his protest." We must confess that the combination of such things in one mind and purpose appears not merely a strange inconsistency, but a psychological riddle to us. The living personality of the Evangelist seems to evaporate under such criticism. What we have left is the pure abstraction of a mental field in which the various theological and ecclesiastical tendencies of the date of writing cross each other. And this dualistic self-contradictory signature is more or less characteristic of the Gospel as a whole. The inconsistencies "to a great extent have their root in one grand antinomy which pervades the Gospel from end to end, and creates an actual cleavage in its religious teaching. The revelation through Christ is explained in the prologue as a temporary appearance in the flesh of the external Logos. This doctrine of the Logos, borrowed through Philo from the Greek philosophical thinkers, had nothing to do with the original Christian message. For the ethical view of the personal life of Jesus it substituted a view which can only be described as metaphysical. . . . No one can read the Gospel in any spirit of sympathy without feeling that the theological view is combined with another of altogether different character. . . . The doctrine of the Logos was . . . by its very nature inadequate to his purpose. It belonged to a world of abstract speculation, and Jesus had revealed the Father by His love and goodness, by the moral glory and divineness of His life. In the Fourth Gospel we have really two distinct conceptions, which are constantly interchanging but can never be reconciled." We gratefully observe that in these statements and throughout the book due recognition is given to what the author calls the metaphysical element in the Gospel. Over against the attempt of Harnack and others to confine this to the prologue, as a mere accommodation to

prevailing modes of thought, and to explain it away in the body of the Gospel, this is gratifying. The Logos-name may be confined to the prologue; the substance of the Logos-doctrine, with its implications of the preëxistence, the deity and the life-giving power of the Son of God, is everywhere. Nor could we have seriously objected, if the author, for the purpose of sharply defining the peculiarity of this strand of teaching, had somewhat abstractly separated it from the other aspect of the religious significance of Christ in the conscious spiritual and ethical sphere of redemption. One might even become reconciled to Holtzmann's well-known distinction between a "theological" and "soteriological" hemisphere, although the terminology of this is unfortunate, since obviously to the mind of the Gospel the "theological" is preëminently "soteriological". But Mr. Scott goes much farther than all this. Wherever in his book he happens to touch on the distinction in question, he treats it, either explicitly or by implication, as an out and out antinomy. The metaphysical category and the religious or ethical category are to him mutually exclusive. Now, of course, it is not the historian, but the theologian, who pronounces this judgment. And yet in the hands of Mr. Scott it becomes a quasi-historical judgment, because in a certain sense it is affirmed that the contradiction had historic reality in the consciousness of the Evangelist, that it represented two different and antagonistic forces in his thought, explainable from two distinct sources. The one, the purely religious element, came from the impression made upon him by the historical Jesus; the other, the metaphysical element, he borrowed from the philosophy of Philo; the latter stood related to the former as the form to the substance; and the form in this case was not only inadequate to express the substance, but at bottom incommensurable with and injurious to it. He who is not an entire stranger in the theological world of the present day, will without difficulty diagnose this procedure as virtually a carrying back of the principle of Ritschlianism into the religious experience of John. There was first a time when the Evangelist had an entirely unmetaphysical spiritual consciousness; the Son of God and the Son of man, life and light and truth were to him purely religious and moral conceptions. Then he adopted the Logos-philosophy and subsumed these purely spiritual ideas under its metaphysical categories, and in result of this his theology is at war with the religious experience it seeks to express and convey. We do not hesitate to affirm that this is a construction suspended in the air. There is absolutely no evidence that to the mind of the Evangelist the religious and the metaphysical were ever separated for a moment, much less that he ever felt the latter in any way to be antagonistic to the former. The two are so closely wedded that their union must have been a much profounder process than the hypothesis of borrowing from Philo suggests. This we believe to be true even of the explicit Logos-idea, and much more of the high Christology and soteriology in the body of the Gospel itself. The simple reason why the Evangelist felt no disharmony here is that he was not a Ritschlian,

but had a very pronounced realistic sense of the process of salvation as belonging to the noumenal and not merely to the phenomenal sphere. And, altogether apart from the main issue of the authenticity of the discourses, shall we not have to say, that the same consciousness of a metaphysical background of salvation, though not in so pronounced a form, is yet substantially present in the teaching of the earlier New Testament documents? Mr. Scott might have found more of it, and accordingly estimated the distance between the Synoptists and John more moderately, if he had not interpreted the Synoptical teaching of Jesus after so one-sided a Ritschlian fashion. He does, in our opinion, scant justice to the passage Matt. xi. 27. And he tones down the Pauline Christology so as to make it appear essentially a lower, less metaphysical product than the Logos-Christology of the Fourth Gospel. Even in "the form of God" of Phil. ii. he seems to find nothing higher than in "the man from heaven" of 1 Cor. xv., which latter designation he connects (we think erroneously) with the preëxistent Christ. The whole definition of the difference between the Pauline and Johannine Christologies is vitiated by this.

There is one more point we must briefly touch upon. Mr. Scott, just as little as other advocates of the same position, offers us any psychological explanation of the free handling of the Gospel-tradition, both as regards history and teaching, which he ascribes to the Evangelist. The writer of the Gospel not merely adapted and modified his material after the most unscrupulous fashion, but he also freely composed the discourses. Not to speak of the ethical complexion of this alleged procedure, is there not, from the advanced critical standpoint, a serious psychological problem here? Even if we assume that the writer had not been an eye-witness or disciple of Jesus, it seems difficult to believe, that he, who (as Zahn well puts it) makes all knowledge of the truth and all possession of eternal life absolutely dependent on veracity, who traces back all deception and treason to the devil, that he should have pronounced upon himself a judgment almost too fearful to repeat, by representing as acts and words of Jesus things of which he knew better than his critics that Jesus could never have spoken or performed them. And, of course, if the author claims to be an eye- and ear-witness, as we are practically compelled to understand him, the problem becomes even more grave. It will not do to appeal to the Evangelist's own principle that the Spirit continues the teaching of Christ, so that later insight into the truth attributed to the illumination of the Spirit might be represented as originating from the Saviour and accordingly carried back without serious detriment to the truth into the earthly life of Jesus. For the Evangelist with the utmost clearness distinguishes between the Jesus-teaching of the days of our Lord's humiliation and the Spirit-teaching of the post-resurrection period, and emphatically declares that the latter could not be anticipated because it was dependent on the completion of our Lord's career. By carrying back this large body of Spirit-teaching into the earthly life he would have acted contrary

to his own principle and distinction. Here also the least that can be required of an interpreter is, that, in order to honor the Gospel's veracity, he shall recognize that the Evangelist was in his own mind sincerely and firmly convinced of the truthfulness of his record. To be sure, after that the problem would more urgently than ever appear to press for a solution, how such a conviction could exist in such a mind otherwise than as a result of the fact that Jesus had actually so lived and taught.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

THE JOHANNINE LITERATURE AND THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. By HENRY PRENTISS FORBES, A.M., D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Canton Theological School. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1907. Pp. vi, 375. Price \$2.00 net.

With this volume the series of *International Handbooks to the New Testament*, edited by Orello Cone, D. D., has been brought to completion. The series consists of four volumes:—*The Synoptic Gospels*, by George L. Cary, L. H. D.; *The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Thessalonians*, etc., by James Drummond, M.A., LL.D., Litt.D.; *Hebrews, Colossians, Ephesians*, etc., by Orello Cone, D. D.; and the present volume, which contains the index of the series. The "General Preface to the Series" indicates the character and point of view of the several volumes:

"These handbooks constitute an exegetical series covering the entire New Testament and constructed on a plan which admits of greater freedom of treatment than is usual in commentaries proper. The space generally devoted in commentaries to a minute examination of the grammatical construction of passages of minor importance is occupied with the discussion of those of special interest from a doctrinal and practical point of view. Questions of the authorship and date of the several books are treated in carefully-prepared Introductions, and numerous Dissertations are inserted elucidating matters of graver moment.

"The books of the New Testament are treated as a literature which in order to be understood must be explained, like all other ancient literatures, in accordance with the accepted principles of the grammatical and historical interpretation. The aim of the writers has been to ascertain and clearly set forth the meaning of the authors of these books by the application of this method in freedom from dogmatic prepossessions.

"The purpose has been constantly kept in view to furnish a series of *Handbooks to the New Testament* which should meet the wants of the general reader, and at the same time present the results of the latest scholarship and of the most thorough critical investigation.

"Accordingly, more prominence has been given to the statement of the results of the critical processes than to the presentation of the details of these processes by means of extended discussions of Greek grammar, philology, and exegesis."

Judging Dr. Forbes' book by this plan there can be little doubt that

it fills well its place in the series. The "freedom from dogmatic prepossessions" said to be characteristic of the series is indeed realized in this volume—as in other volumes which make a similar claim—only in a freedom from a certain kind of prepossessions. The claim as formulated is somewhat misleading, but its meaning is now very generally understood.

Dr. Forbes writes concisely, with a directness well adapted to the presentation of critical results. His Introductions are interesting and instructive, showing thorough acquaintance with the problems involved in his subject, as well as ready mastery of the more important—including the recent—literature of his subject. The most noticeable defect in this latter respect is the failure to make use of Dr. Harnack's *Lukas der Arzt* in his introductory discussion of Acts.

Dr. Forbes rejects the Lukan authorship of Acts, placing its composition late in the first century. After calling attention to the phenomena which in his judgment justify this conclusion, Dr. Forbes remarks (p. 4):

"Where evidence of a positive nature is wanting, dogmatism is offensive; but some weight may safely be allowed to tradition; a very reasonable supposition is that Luke was the author of the chief source used, the "we-sections"; and that thence the completed work was attributed to him, just as our first Gospel obtained its name and tradition of authorship from its large use of the Logia of Matthew."

Holding this view of its authorship and date, Dr. Forbes does not estimate very highly the historicity of Acts; and in confirmation of his estimate he points out certain concessions made by Prof. Ramsay which are thought to be damaging not only to the consistency of Prof. Ramsay's view but also to the historicity of Acts as well. Similar damaging concessions have recently been made by Prof. Harnack in his reply to Prof. Schürer (cf. *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1906, Nr. 16 S. 466ff.), but neither Prof. Ramsay nor Prof. Harnack seems disposed to yield his major thesis in favor of a theory constructed on these concessions.

Similar conclusions are reached in regard to the Fourth Gospel (pp. 172f.):

"Some time during the last third of the first century a disciple in the second sense indicated (*i. e.* not an immediate disciple of Jesus but an early Palestinian believer), John by name, perhaps a priest (Acts vi. 7), resident at Jerusalem, familiar with Jewish learning and with the earlier and later forms of Christian tradition as they developed at Jerusalem, went to Asia Minor, came into high esteem, lived on into the opening years of the second century, died of old age. He brought much Jewish Messianic-apocalyptic tradition, was the chief agent in its collection into the book of Revelation, of which he was perhaps a redactor; he became to the "elders" of Asia Minor a venerable source of Christian tradition, a "witness", a great authority; even during his lifetime, as the "memoirs" of the Synoptics came into circulation, his venerable age and his Palestinian origin brought about the beginning of confusion of his personality with that of the Galilean John, of whose end there was no widespread tradition. Soon after the death (for he

was dead when xxi. 23 was written) of this "disciple," "elder," "witness," an Asian Christian, discerning the demand for a presentation of Jesus in accordance with the higher Christology and other current conditions, composed from the traditions of this "witness," from the Synoptics, from oral sources, from ideal invention, a "spiritual" Gospel, and put it forth under the authority—not in the name of—this ancient witness, whose personality was in the common mind already confluent with that of the Galilean John."

In regard to the character of the Fourth Gospel Dr. Forbes says (p. 174f.):

"From the standpoint of historical criticism it is inferior to the Synoptics; its tone toward the unbelieving world is cold and repellent; its Christ is somewhat unreal, for to picture the finite and the infinite as united in one consciousness will always surpass human endeavour. To its age it was of the greatest service: its polemic rendered it useful for immediate exigencies; its prologue with the Logos-Christology disarmed the Gnostic and won for the Christian faith great masses of the Gentile world who would have turned their backs to a Jewish Messiah and who because of their former polytheism could never have accepted as Saviour any lesser personality than a deity; its appendix won for it and its doctrine the support of Rome and the West. Also to every age it has a message: its lofty teaching of God the Father, its fine mysticism, its exalted conceptions of future existence, its emphasis upon the *life* of Jesus as a revelation of the divine, its pleas for brotherhood, are all of perpetual worth and power; even those who cannot accept the Logos-Christ of its pages can follow the Jesus whose "meat and drink it was to do his Father's will."

"Thus even historical deficiencies may become a source of charm and command; the truth of fiction may be most life-giving; it is the ideal which endures."

The book of Revelation is regarded as composite and its redaction in Asia Minor by the Jerusalem John is placed late in the first century toward the end of Domitian's reign, 93-96 A. D. The theory that the author of the First Epistle of John was the same as the author of the Gospel is regarded as not irrational, "especially if an interval of some years separates their origin". The Second and Third Epistles are assigned to the elder of Ephesus, John the Presbyter, or to some one writing in his name; and to a time when "the era of monarchical episcopal authority had not come but was near at hand".

The comments, based on the English text, take up the greater part of Dr. Forbes' volume, and are necessarily concise. In the case of the Fourth Gospel a comparison with the Synoptic Gospels is frequently made, generally with the result of discrediting its account. The "Introductions" really furnish the key to the commentary which follows.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

THE MESSAGES OF JESUS ACCORDING TO THE GOSPEL OF JOHN, the Discourses of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, arranged, analyzed, and fully rendered in paraphrase. By JAMES STEVENSON RIGGS, D.D., Professor of Biblical Criticism in Auburn Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1907. Pp. xvi., 374. \$1.25 net.

This volume is the tenth of the series entitled *The Messages of the*

Bible, edited by Professor Frank K. Sanders, Ph.D., and Professor Charles F. Kent, Ph.D. It aims "to give an interpretation of the Gospel and to set forth the Gospel's peculiar structure and nature". While it is concerned mainly with the discourses of Jesus, as the subtitle indicates, they are given their proper place and value in the unfolding of the history; so that the entire contents of the Gospel are passed in review.

The book is convenient and attractive, pleasant to the hand and to the eye.

A few errors have been noted: Hieropolis for Hierapolis, p. 20, line 12; bishop for bishops, p. 37, line 5; hear for bear, p. 147, line 9; descend for descent, p. 191, third line from the end; some for sons, apparently, p. 196, line 2; our for one, p. 197, line 2; the second dash is misplaced on p. 205, line 19; *the* Perea, p. 224, line 13; their for three, p. 237, line 13; hear for bear, p. 297, line 8; Bernhard for Bernard, p. 296, last line, and p. 376, fourth line from the end; promise for province, apparently, p. 356, line 20; change for charge, p. 362, line 16; *every man* is omitted in the quotation on p. 362, third line from the end.

The plan of the work is excellent. The introduction discusses with sober judgment and ample learning the question of authorship, the influences formative of the Gospel, and the life of the apostle. Marginal notes give in a few words the substance of a paragraph. The Appendix treats briefly but clearly of the narrative of the woman taken in adultery, and gives a list, short but helpful, of books of reference. There is an index of Biblical Passages, confined to the Gospel. The analysis of the discourses is careful and clear, and it is a pleasure to follow Dr. Riggs as he expounds the teaching of Jesus with the ripe scholarship and loving sympathy of one who has long been accustomed to sit at the Master's feet. The devout and reverent spirit with which the great themes of the Gospel are approached wins our confidence. The book, like the Gospel with which it deals, is the fruit of long and loving meditation. Dr. Riggs has brought to the study of John not only the trained intellect of the scholar, but the docile mind and humble heart of the disciple. It is delightful to turn aside for a time from controverted questions, and surrender ourselves to the truth and grace of the Gospel as it is unfolded here.

The work is at once critical and devotional, a book for the study and for the closet. While the marks of careful and discriminating criticism are everywhere apparent, the style is so lucid and the matter so clearly arranged and presented that the unlearned may read with pleasure and profit. The volume is commended to all who are interested in the study of the life of Christ, and we know of no book which may better serve the purpose of an introduction to the Fourth Gospel.

Prof. Riggs' point of view is distinctly though moderately conservative, and his work is characterized by a certain judicial quality which commends him to us as a safe interpreter. John the beloved disciple is held to be the author, and the evidence both external and internal is ably and clearly presented. His residence in Ephesus is accepted. The

historic accuracy of the Gospel is maintained, even against the synoptic narrative, as in the account of the cleansing of the temple, and the date of the Last Supper; while it is held that the evangelist is not a reporter but an interpreter, and has given us not the very words of the Master, but rather a free though faithful rendering of his thought. It is justly remarked that this does not conflict with any tenable theory of inspiration. The skill shown in the analysis of the discourses and in tracing the sequence of thought is especially admirable. The parallel drawn upon pp. 76-80 between the prologue and the subsequent teaching of the Gospel is good and helpful.

While we find ourselves in hearty accord with the spirit and general teaching of the book, there are points in which we believe Prof. Riggs to be in error.

There is no good reason to question whether John the Baptist "understood that the sufferings of Jesus were to be expiatory"; and to hold therefore that he pointed to Jesus simply as the Lamb of God, while the words which follow, "that taketh away the sin of the world", are due to the evangelist (p. 92). The thought of expiation is clearly and explicitly set forth by Isaiah in the passage to which John refers, a passage which the Jews themselves originally applied to the Messiah. When John recognized in Jesus the Messiah, he at once applied to him the prophecy. It is said that these words carry us beyond the teaching of John as recorded in the earlier Gospels. That is true. But surely it is easy to believe that John has preserved for us the profounder teaching of the Baptist, as of Jesus. The Synoptic Gospels confine themselves to the period before the baptism of Jesus, and the Fourth Gospel records only his words after the baptism. The burden of his message in them is repentance and judgment, in John it is the atoning Saviour. There he cries, The Christ is coming; here he affirms, The Christ is come. There is no reason to doubt the literal accuracy of the evangelist.

We think that Dr. Riggs is in general too ready to ascribe to the evangelist what the narrative appears to ascribe to others. It should not be said of ch. 3 "We certainly have in verses 16-21 reflections of the evangelist rather than the direct words of Jesus" (p. 144). There is no indication of a change of speaker in the discourse itself, which flows on without pause or break.

Why may there not have been two cleansings of the temple, at the opening and the close of our Lord's ministry? We are not compelled to choose between the Synoptic narrative and John, but may accept them both (p. 103).

The explanation given of our Lord's words in ii. 19, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up", is not satisfactory (pp. 105-6). The reference to his body is said to be simply the later interpretation of the evangelist, who after the crucifixion and the resurrection "reads into the words of Jesus this deeper meaning". The phrase is unfortunate. Men may *discover* deeper meaning in the words

of Jesus, they never *read it into them*. There is no reason to question the literal truth of John's words, that Jesus had in mind the temple of his body. The passage has its difficulties, but they are not relieved by transferring the thought to the evangelist.

To render *hast a demon by insane* (p. 199) is to forsake the thought both of Jesus and of the Jews. Their charge was not that he was deranged but that he was possessed by an evil spirit, and these are not equivalent terms. Whatever difficulties demoniac possession may present, it was plainly the belief of the people and of our Lord himself.

The voice from heaven saying, "I both glorified it, and will glorify it again" (xii. 28), is resolved into a peal of thunder—a mode of interpretation to which we are glad to note that Prof. Riggs rarely resorts, and in the absence of prejudice against the supernatural it is difficult to see why he employs it here.

Prof. Riggs discovers the hand of John in framing narrative and discourses alike, and observes that all the persons introduced speak in the same uniform style, which is the style of the evangelist. The words of Jesus are cast in the same mould, and bear the impress of the same master hand. Yet nowhere is it suggested that the style of John may not be imposed upon the words of the Master, but rather drawn from them—that it is not John who has shaped the speech of Jesus, but Jesus who has shaped the speech of John. Here, indeed, in the relation between the Master and the most sympathetic and receptive of the disciples is a field which has not yet been thoroughly explored and which promises rich reward.

In spite of the work of Dr. Stroud, it is by no means established that Jesus died "literally of a broken heart" (pp. 328, 339). Dr. Edward M. Merrins, in two articles published in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* of January and April, 1905, has shown that, physiologically considered, the theory is at least extremely doubtful. After a careful review of Dr. Stroud's argument, he reaches the conclusion that "it is doubtful if a single medical writer would, in these days, support the contention of Stroud, that rupture of the healthy heart may be caused by mental emotion". "The Gospel narratives of the death of Christ do not support the theory under examination, for they do not record the usual and unmistakable symptoms of a complete rupture of the heart." "Even in those cases where the heart is diseased, and rupture occurs from the stress of mental emotion, seldom, if ever, is the rupture due to the depressing emotion of grief. It is more apt to be caused by the invigorating passions . . . under the influence of mental and spiritual depression, the heart beats languidly, and there is really less strain upon its tissues than if the patient were in a normal frame of mind." "This theory . . . does not satisfactorily account for the flow of blood and water". "In any event, neither passive grief, nor the stormy stress of emotional conflict, is ever sufficient to rupture the walls of a heart not previously diseased."

It is difficult to resist the impression that the evangelist regarded the

flow of blood and water as a miracle, and the most recent expert testimony confirms his judgment. John has given us his interpretation of the sign in his First Epistle—v. 6-8.

Too much is made of the influence of Paul upon John's mode of conceiving and presenting truth. Prof. Riggs does not push the theory so far as some critics have done; for here, as always, he observes the bounds of moderation. But it is of itself misleading to set the Old Testament, the Teaching of Paul, and the Ephesian Environment side by side as coördinate factors in the formation of the Gospel. There is no evidence, external or internal, to sustain the view that Paul exercised a considerable influence upon the theology of John. The formative influences which conspired to shape his interpretation of the words of the Master, as the Gospel itself indicates, were the Old Testament, the course of events, and the promised guidance of the Holy Spirit. It is not necessary, of course, to affirm that he was a stranger to the teaching of Paul, or even that he was entirely unaffected by it; but that it exercised an appreciable influence which may be traced in his unfolding of the truth there is no reason to believe. Beyond the general substance of their teaching, which they hold in common with all the writers of the New Testament, the points of difference are far more striking than the points of resemblance. There is in all literature no style more thoroughly individual than that of John. It would not have been amiss to omit some one of the references to the supposed influence of Paul, and suggest at least that the intimacy of the apostle with Mary the mother of Jesus may have left its mark upon this Gospel of her Son.

It is pleasant to close with words of praise, and we heartily commend the volume of Prof. Riggs to all who desire a thorough, reverent, and sympathetic exposition of the Gospel.

Harrisburg, Pa.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

THE TEACHINGS OF JESUS CONCERNING THE FUTURE LIFE. By WILLIS JUDSON BEECHER, D.D. New York: The American Tract Society. 12mo., cloth, pp. 197. Price 75 cents.

Not the least valuable feature of this brief discussion is the insistence placed upon the figurative nature of the language universally employed in reference to the future life. This was true of the Egyptians and Greeks, as well as of the Old Testament writers. So, too, in considering the teachings of Jesus, and of His disciples, we are cautioned against confusing figures of speech with the realities which underlie the pictorial imagery. If the scope of these teachings is limited by this suggestion, their character is shown to be definite and positive. "Jesus treats of the future life as a matter of revelation from God." Its nature is that of "conscious individual existence", characterized by experiences of knowledge, faith, hope, love, for the redeemed, and of suffering for the impenitent. The resurrection body is identical with the present body, but the identity is not that of constituent material.

The judgment is depicted in figures of speech, beneath which is a reality of such tremendous importance, and such immanence, that our daily lives should be adjusted to the Saviour's word: "What I say unto you, I say unto all. Watch." Such are the chief features of this admirable and scriptural discussion.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE TEACHING OF JESUS CONCERNING HIS OWN PERSON. By WAYLAND HOYT, D.D. New York: The American Tract Society. 12mo, cloth, pp. 200. Price 75 cents.

In his peculiarly picturesque and lucid style the author has placed before us, first, *The Fact of Jesus*, his universality, teachings, claims, sinlessness, power; and, secondly, *The Answer of Jesus*, in which our Lord is shown to have claimed and revealed, not merely sinless and ideal humanity, but absolute deity. Some "conclusions" are added in relation to the "Supernatural Birth", "The Miracles", "The Resurrection". The discussion is most helpful and convincing and cannot fail to attain the purpose of the writer, which is to lead the reader to closer "personal allegiance, to the Personal Christ".

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE LYNCHING OF JESUS. By E. T. WELLFORD, Pastor First Presbyterian Church, Newport News, Virginia. Cloth; pp. 110. Price, 50 cents net.

The author gives us a careful review of the legal aspects of the trial of Christ, and demonstrates the injustice and illegality of the condemnation and crucifixion of our Lord. The purpose is established by careful citations from existing Jewish laws, and by following the incidents of the arrest and successive trials which culminated in the death of Christ. The purpose is, of course, no novel one, and the facts discussed are as familiar as they are important. The original features of the book are its startling title and its striking phrases. It is to be questioned whether either the title or the phrases are to be commended. The word "Lynching" necessarily conveys certain implications quite foreign to the events connected with the death of our Lord, and there are facts in connection with that event which the title of this book by no means includes. Among these latter might be suggested, the bitter envy, the dark treachery, the malignant cunning of the rulers, and the proud selfishness and weak vacillation of Pilate. The discussion is clear and logical, but it is possible that its most striking features are the least fortunate and felicitous.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

THE FORMATION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By GEORGE HOOPER FERRIS, A. M. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press. 1907. Pp. 281. Price 90 cents net.

The studies which have resulted in this book on the Formation of the New Testament were begun some fourteen years ago while Mr. Ferris was still a student in the Theological Seminary. As his investigations in early Christian literature were pursued he became interested in "the ground of authority underlying the Christianity of Clement of Alexandria." Among many related subjects suggested by his investigations Mr. Ferris says he has tried only to trace the conflict between the early principle of an "open vision" and the ecclesiastical principle of a closed "canon" (p. 7).

Mr. Ferris has written an interesting and readable book. The view presented is not entirely new but it is ably and attractively presented. The book is not burdened with learned footnotes but the sources are cited when occasion demands and some incidental references are made to the literature of the subject in addition to the general acknowledgments of the Preface. Perhaps in the absence of more frequent references to the literature in the footnotes the failure to give a selected bibliography constitutes the chief formal defect of the book.

The author's point of view as well as the end toward which his discussion moves is revealed by his remark that "a New Testament church is a church without a New Testament" (p. 13, cf. pp. 20, 104, 121, 134, 169). Near the end of his book Mr. Ferris seeks to explain the history and influence of the New Testament as "due to the true and reliable picture of the spirit and character of Christ which it contains", and concludes:—"Therefore, no sharp line is to be drawn between the New Testament times and ours, save that which exists between the character of Christ, and its unrealized expression in the church that now bears his name" (pp. 275f). The point at issue in the discussion is thus the validity of the idea of a New Testament canon. In his view the New Testament church had no New Testament canon, *i. e.* no authoritative New Testament, and the New Testament has no authoritative value for those who adopt the standards of primitive Christianity. This view raises at once the question of the origin of the idea of a New Testament canon, and with this also the closely allied question of the idea of authority in religion. The connection of these ideas has not escaped Mr. Ferris' attention. He states the issue plainly in the form of questions which present a familiar alternative:—"In order to get a closed canon must we admit the Catholic doctrine of an inspired church? If we reject the Catholic doctrine of an inspired church can we get a closed canon? Indeed, how did we get our New Testament anyway, and just what attitude must a man manifest toward it, who cannot accept it unquestioningly, merely because it has been so accepted for many centuries by the great Christian body? These are questions of living interest, involving claims to catholicity put forth by others than

the Roman Church, entering into the foundation of every Protestant body, and raising anew the very problem of the seat of authority in religion" (p. 15f.). These questions suggest the trend of the subsequent discussion. If the New Testament canon be conceived as a closed authoritative collection and as such the creation of the Catholic Church of the second century or of its leaders, the conception of the New Testament as a canon must be given up by all who do not adopt also the conception of an authoritative church. In other words the idea of a New Testament canon has a rightful place in the Roman Catholic Church but not in the Churches of the Protestant Reformation.

The issue raised by Mr. Ferris' book concerns then the nature and source of authority in religion, or, more specifically, in the Christian religion, since Mr. Ferris is treating of the relation of the New Testament to the idea of authority. The validity of the idea of the New Testament canon, *i. e.* of the idea of the authority of the New Testament in the Christian religion, alike in the Roman Catholic Church and in the Churches of the Protestant Reformation, is one thing. The history of the process by which the books of the New Testament were collected, the principles on which the collection was made, and the final determination and general acceptance of the extent of this collection, is another thing. Knowledge of this process must be gained, of course, from the fragmentary remains of Christian literature dating from the close of the first century to the last quarter of the second century, by which time the process was practically complete. The account given of this process by different writers depends on their interpretation of this literature, and with their interpretation not infrequently a considerable amount of questionable inferential reasoning is intermingled. Differences of opinion may well arise concerning Mr. Ferris' interpretation of early patristic literature or concerning his judgments of value. Mr. Ferris, for example, estimates some of this early Christian literature very highly, comparing not unfavorably the Epistle of Barnabas with the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Shepherd of Hermas with the Apocalypse of John. These differences, however, are of comparatively little importance. A more fundamental difference of opinion lies back of them. This concerns the validity of two ideas which form an essential part of Mr. Ferris' view of the formation of the New Testament; *viz.*, the idea that the authority of the canon depends on the authority of the Church and the idea that the canon is to be conceived of as a "closed" collection.

That the idea of a canon is very closely related to the idea of authority, we have seen, is recognized by Mr. Ferris. A careful investigation of the origin and nature of the idea of authority in the early Church would, however, require some qualification of his statement that "the New Testament church was a church without a New Testament". For the New Testament Church at a very early time certainly had in its possession some elements of the New Testament. These were preserved, read in the churches, collected, and cannot have been altogether without authority in view of their character and the sources

from which they came. Such an investigation of the idea of authority in the early Church, would, moreover, have made plain the fact that the New Testament Church began its life with a very clear idea and very vital conviction of an external authority in religion, *i. e.* in the Christian religion. In this respect the New Testament Church does not differ from the Catholic Church of the second century. However much the two may have differed in other respects, they had in common the idea of an external authority and the idea of a canon. That which differentiates the New Testament Church from the Judaism from which it sprang is not its freedom from the notion of external authority, but the fact that along with its recognition of a canon (*viz.*, the Old Testament canon), it recognized also another authority from which another canon came. The possession of this other canon in greater completeness and not the creation of a new canon constitutes the distinguishing feature in this relation of the early Catholic Church.

But if the early Catholic Church did not originate the idea of an external authority in the Christian religion or introduce the idea of an external authority, its work of collecting the New Testament books cannot be regarded as the creation of the canon. Only when the collection of the New Testament books is regarded as giving them an authority which they did not possess before, collecting being made equivalent to canonizing, can the authority of the New Testament be regarded as dependent on the authority of the Church. But if the authority of the books of the New Testament be grounded in their nature and source, then the question in regard to what books are authoritative must be settled by the data which reveal the character of the several books and the source from which they come; and the question in regard to the validity of the extent of the collection must be settled by the correctness of the application of this principle. The Church's work, as well of inclusion as of exclusion, must submit to the test of sufficient reason. Did the Church act in accordance with a valid principle, and did she rightly apply this principle? To regard the Catholic Church as the creator of the New Testament canon confuses the work of collection, whether of inclusion or of exclusion, with the ground of authority. The books included in the collection did not receive their authority from their inclusion but were included because for sufficient reason they were regarded as authoritative. In other words the New Testament canon is not an authoritative collection of books but a collection of authoritative books.

But if the authority of the New Testament books resides not in the fact of their inclusion in a collection made by the Catholic Church at the close of the second century, but in the source from which they come, then the New Testament was in principle complete when the various elements coming from this source had been completed. The realization of this completeness, the gathering of these elements together and thus actually accomplishing the unification and general recognition of the complete canon, was the result of a long process in which many

forces were operative and in which many differences of opinion found expression. This conception, however, involves a distinction which is not allowed by Mr. Ferris; for Mr. Ferris conceives of the canon as a closed authoritative collection. The distinction however certainly exists in the word *κανὼν* which has an active "*norma normans*", as well as a passive meaning, "*norma normata*" (cf. Holtzmann, *Einleitung*, p. 143), and is borne out by phenomena in patristic literature which point to the early existence of small collections of different elements of the later and more complete collection. But if this be true, then the New Testament was in existence in more or less incomplete form in the Church before the collection had attained a completed and more or less generally recognized extent. With this distinction in mind a study of the patristic literature will yield a view of the historical process, by which the collection of the books of the New Testament was made, very different from the view presented by Mr. Ferris.

But in any event it should be borne in mind that the conception of the New Testament Church "as a church without a New Testament"—however long or short this Church's life may be supposed to have been—does not alter the fact that the New Testament Church from the beginning of its life acknowledged an external authority. The issue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Churches of the Protestant Reformation did not and does not now concern the fact or validity of such an authority but simply the seat of this authority. The fact constituted an essential element of that primitive Christianity from which both Catholic and Protestant Churches have sprung. He who would reject the principle of external authority in the Christian religion must not only go back of primitive Christianity; he must also ground his position by other means than historical evidence.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

BIBLIOTHÈQUE DE THÉOLOGIE HISTORIQUE, publiée sous la direction des Professeurs de Théologie à l'Institut Catholique de Paris. LA THÉOLOGIE DE SAINT HIPPOLYTE par ADHÉMAR D'ALÈS. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie. 1906. 8vo.; pp., liv, 242. Price 6 francs.

In 1905, M. Adhémar D'Alès, prêtre, published as one of the early issues of the "Library of Historical Theology", prepared "under the direction of the Professors of Theology at the Catholic Institute of Paris", a thoroughly worked-out treatise on the *Theology of Tertullian*, in a thick, closely printed volume of over 500 pages. He has now added to this, under the same auspices, this thin, loosely printed volume of half the number of pages, called *The Theology of Saint Hippolytus*, though in fact it is less occupied with the theology of Hippolytus than with his enigmatic personality and the puzzling questions which cluster about his relations to the Church and the Bishop of Rome. On a surface view of their contents the *Philosophumena* of Hippolytus appear to give us at once a heretical pope and a schismatic saint. As a good son

of the Roman Church Father D'Alès is disinclined to accept this presentation without first attempting to look below the surface. And, looking below the surface, he thinks himself entitled to say that he finds there reason to believe that the pope was misrepresented by the saint and the saint was (afterwards) recovered from his schism. There is nothing, of course, new in this; and Father D'Alès has avoided some of the extremities of opinion which others before him have fallen into,—as, for example, Hagemann's identification of Callistus with Tertullian's Praxeas and the transformation of Tertullian into the real heretic of that controversy. But he has not escaped the temptation to explain Callistus' errors away by a very much too "benign interpretation". And in his engrossment with this task, "the theology of Hippolytus" has very nearly slipped through his fingers. He has given us a very interestingly written book; but we shall go to it in vain to obtain any full exposition of Hippolytus' theological teaching, or even any connected view of his theological conceptions.

If, however, Father D'Alès' discussion of Hippolytus' theology is slight, we have no complaint to make against it on the score of injustice. If we compare the estimate placed on Hippolytus' theological ideas with that placed on Tertullian's, we may even think it overfavorable. Tertullian is supposed to have borrowed from Hippolytus, for example, in his anti-Monarchian polemic; and yet is interpreted as having attained less clarity than Hippolytus in the elements of the doctrine of the Trinity. Not, however, as if Hippolytus had reached exactitude in his conceptions of the nature and relations of the Divine Persons: that is reserved for Callistus. But only as if Tertullian had fallen below even Hippolytus' erroneous construction. On the whole, Hippolytus' conceptions on the subject are very fairly estimated: but on the one side Tertullian is unduly depressed, and on the other Callistus is very much unduly exalted. Such sentences as the following, for example, in which the relations of the three with respect to the Monarchian controversy are summed up, seem to us as misleading as they well could be:

"Illuminism complicated by rigorism led Tertullian into heresy; intellectual pride and a certain rigoristic tendency betrayed Hippolytus into schism. The two sects approached each other at many points, but probably did not coalesce. Between the fanaticism of the one and the arrogance of the other, the pope Callistus governed the Church with prudence and not without boldness. In recalling the minds of men to the consideration of the divine unity he deserved well of catholic doctrine; and we may well believe that in raising himself above the reproach of feebleness he equally deserved well of souls" (pp. 69-70).

What appears to us to emerge from the confused history of the times as the actual facts in this controversy, on the contrary, is that it was "the pope Callistus" and "the saint Hippolytus" who lapsed into heresy, while it was Tertullian who, beating his way upwards, laid the foundations of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

The actual teachings of Hippolytus, however, though in such passages as the foregoing there seems to be a disinclination to brand him with

the name of heretic, are not unfairly characterized by Father D'Alès. Take, for example, the following passage:

"Less grossly materialistic than Tertullian in his conception of divine things, Hippolytus is not less incorrect in his explication of the Trinity. For he defends this mystery against the Modalistic attacks only at the expense of the eternity of the divine processes. If the Word exists before all time, He does not take possession of His personality as the Son of God except at the price of a double temporal generation, one divine and the other human. The Person of the Holy Spirit is still more effaced. The fragment *Against Noëtus* does give Him some place; the *Philosophumena* leave Him almost entirely to one side, and explain only for the use of the great public, how the Word appears at the side of the Father; and the explanation too strongly recalls the *θεολογία* of Plato not to arouse the reproaches of those who objected to the intrusion of Greek speculation into the domain of Christian dogma" (p. 30).

The simple fact is that Hippolytus' speculative gifts were of too low an order to enable him, under the spur of the Monarchian attack, to advance from his inherited Logos Christology towards that higher and better construction which gave us the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. His thought moved wholly within the limits of the Logos Christology and over against the subtle Monarchianism of a Callistus he fairly enunciated a developed ditheism. This, Tertullian, with his indefinitely greater intellectual vigor, escaped; and in escaping it he became the father of the Church doctrine of the Trinity.

Had the Church been left to the leading of Rome at this epoch, it is scarcely likely, then, that she would have found in this century the pathway to the formulation of this fundamental Christian doctrine. Rome was divided between rival heresies. It was from Africa that there broke in the light. And at Rome it was not the official leaders of the Church who were in the van. Father D'Alès says truly (p. 208):

"The career of Hippolytus is intellectually the most brilliant of primitive Christian Rome; he personifies Roman Christianity, somewhat as Tertullian at the same date personifies Carthaginian Christianity, with a mingling of light and shadow. . . ."

And this means that the Church of Rome had not yet come to her hegemony in the Western Church. Served by bishops who, so far from being, as Father D'Alès represents, "the exact guardians of orthodoxy", were themselves fomenters of heresy—through four successive episcopates the modalistic theology seems to have been the official faith at Rome—the Roman Church did not produce even among her less highly placed children, a single capable theologian throughout this whole age. The diligence of Hippolytus was, indeed, beyond praise; and he possessed a certain sanity of judgment which enabled him not merely to escape the snares of the modalists to which the official heads of the Church succumbed, but greatly to moderate the Chiliasm of his master Irenaeus. But his intellect was plodding rather than creative, and he was wholly incapable of fulfilling successfully the rôle of leader in the strenuous times in which his lot was cast. He was, however, the best Rome had, and by enrolling his name in the catalogue of her "saints" time soon revenged him on the Church which branded him as

a heretic and cast him out of her bosom as a schismatic. Thus the children of those who stoned the prophets are once more found building their tombs: and not only ready but eager to give them the advantages of as "benign" an interpretation as is consistent with their greater loyalty still to those who stoned them.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

HISTORY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE U. S. A. AND ITS ALUMNI ASSOCIATION.

By JAMES CURRY, D.D. Vacaville: Reporter Publishing Company. 1907. 8vo, pp. 206.

This volume presents, in lucid outline, the history of one of the important theological schools of the Presbyterian Church. This seminary has not filled so large a place in the work of the Church as some of its older sisters. Its remoteness has made it small, but it may well be, by and bye, that that same remoteness may make it great. It was the vision of a statesman that led those pioneer Presbyterians to plan and plant for a distant future. Scott and Burroughs and Poor and Alexander were strong men, and they laid firm and deep the foundations of Pacific Coast Presbyterianism. How they did it and why and with what small resources, this book tells. It also tells the story of their successors in the faculty, of the students now scattered over all that far west and not unheard of and unfelt in the east, and of the devoted men who as givers and directors have had their part in making this seminary. Schools, like men, must grow. This school has passed through its infancy and early youth and now enters upon the strength of its course and the maturity of its powers.

The material is admirably handled, the plan is clear, and the whole book altogether attractive. It was obviously a labor of love by one of the oldest and most honored of the alumni of the seminary.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

A SHORT HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE APOSTOLIC AGE. By GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT, Ph.D., D.D. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 8vo, pp. 239. Price \$1.00 postpaid.

This volume is one of the "College and Academy Series of Constructive Bible Studies". It is designed "to furnish Bible students a guide and companion in their investigation of the apostolic age". The book is attractively illustrated, carefully divided into parts, chapters and sections, and to each chapter is added "Questions and Suggestions for Study" and "References to Literature". The spirit of the book is catholic and its methods admirable; but its value is much impaired by an apparent distrust of the New Testament narratives, and by a denial or minimizing of the supernatural elements.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. *A Compendium and Commonplace-Book.* Designed for the use of Theological Students. By AUGUSTUS HOPKINS STRONG, D.D., LL.D., President and Professor of Biblical Theology in the Rochester Theological Seminary. In three volumes. Volume I, *The Doctrine of God*, pp. 370; Volume II, *The Doctrine of Man*, pp. 371-776. Philadelphia: The Griffith and Rowland Press. 1907.

We have here the first two volumes of Dr. Strong's well-known Systematic Theology. They are a "revision" and "enlargement" of the author's work on this subject, which was first published in 1886, and which has gone through seven editions previously to the present one. The first edition was reviewed, in *The Presbyterian Review* of April, 1887, by Dr. F. L. Patton (vol. VIII, pp. 365-367).

Volume I, which is on Prolegomena and Theology proper, is divided into four parts entitled respectively: Prolegomena; The Existence of God; The Scriptures a Revelation from God; The Nature, Decrees, and Works of God. The first volume, however, closes with the chapter on the Decree, so that volume II begins with the closing chapter of Part IV, which chapter treats of "The Works of God", and closes with a section on Angels.

Volume II, after concluding Part IV with a chapter on the Works of God, contains Part V entitled "Anthropology or the Doctrine of Man", and Part VI under the title "Soteriology or the Doctrine of Salvation through the Work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit". This volume, however, closes with the Work of Christ; the Application of Redemption by the Holy Spirit being left for volume III.

Dr. Strong upholds the authority of the Scripture, and bases his theology upon the Bible. He maintains the validity of the theistic arguments, devoting 19 pages to their discussion. This is an improvement upon the manner in which this subject is too often dealt with in current hand-books on Systematic Theology, the theistic arguments being sometimes misconceived and dismissed in two or three pages. The chapter on the Trinity reiterates the author's Trinitarianism, and his doctrine of the decree remains Calvinistic.

In his chapter on Sin and Imputation, Dr. Strong reasserts his former teaching that inherent depravity involves guilt, and also his doctrine as to the way in which the race participates in the guilt of Adam's sin, which doctrine Dr. Strong calls the "theory of Adam's natural headship", but which is in fact the "realistic" view.

Under the head of Soteriology, the author discusses the Person and Work of Christ, and reaffirms his previous conception of the Atonement which he calls the "ethical theory". He holds that Christ, by His Incarnation, became a member of the guilty race in a "realistic" sense, and consequently was Himself involved in the guilt of Adam's sin in the

same way in which we all are. This, he holds, explains how Jesus bore the sin of the human race both by "sharing" and by "substitution"; for it is because Christ was realistically involved in the guilt brought on the race by Adam, that our sins also can be laid on Him.

Dr. Strong shows in these volumes that he is still an Augustinian in his theological views. We are glad to see that his philosophical opinions have led him to depart so little after all from the theological position which he maintained in the first edition of his work. For we cannot agree with Dr. Strong that his "idealistic" and "monistic" conception of God and the world has worked or can work any improvement in his statement of Christian doctrine. On the contrary, we think that it is out of harmony with the supernaturalism of the Christianity of the New Testament, and we rejoice to note that the author's philosophy has, after all, wrought so little havoc with his conception of Christianity. For what is this "ethical monism" as stated and accepted by Dr. Strong? He defines it for us as follows (vol. I, p. 90): "Ethical monism: Universe = Finite, partial, graded manifestation of the divine life; Matter being God's self-limitation under the law of necessity, Humanity being God's self-limitation under the law of freedom, Incarnation and Atonement being God's self-limitation under the law of grace." This monism, Dr. Strong affirms, is entirely consistent with what he calls "Psychological Dualism or the doctrine that the soul is personally distinct from matter on the one hand and from God on the other".

We confess that we are unable to see how this can be. If, as Dr. Strong seems to hold, the whole external world is force and that force the divine will energising, and if humanity is also a "self-limitation" of God, it would seem to follow that there is no place left for any real distinction between either the body and soul or humanity and God. Idealistic Pantheism, according to Dr. Strong, must affirm that God is impersonal, whereas "Ethical Monism" maintains the personality of both God and man. But if the universe and humanity are each God's "self-limitations", it is difficult to see how any doctrine of Creation can be maintained or how idealistic pantheism, with its destruction of Christian doctrine, can be avoided. We have no desire to maintain an "atomic" rather than a "dynamic" conception of matter. That is a question for physical science. But if the "dynamic" conception shall prove to be the true one, this physical force must be conceived as finite and created. Any view which identifies it with God, or regards it as a "self-limitation" of God, cannot be kept from deforming Christian doctrine.

Accordingly, we shall find Dr. Strong's doctrinal views showing the bad effects of his metaphysics just at those points where it was to have been expected.

Take, for example, the case of Miracles. If the external world and all physical forces are simply the divine energy, no basis remains for the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. Accordingly we find that Dr. Strong's idea of a miracle is defective. His "prelim-

inary definition" is not so bad. Thus he says (vol. I, p. 117): "A miracle is an event palpable to the senses, produced for a religious purpose by the immediate agency of God. . . ." But in what way, we ask, according to Dr. Strong's metaphysics, is the immediate agency of God to be discriminated, since it would seem that His is the only agency so far as the physical universe is concerned? Hence we find that Dr. Strong's supernaturalism weakens in his "alternative and preferable" definition of a miracle, and that it disappears altogether in his explication of that definition. Thus (I, p. 118) his "alternative and preferable" definition is: "A miracle is an event in nature, so extraordinary in itself and so coinciding with the prophecy or command of a religious teacher or leader, as to fully warrant the conviction, on the part of those who witness it, that God has wrought it with the design of certifying that this teacher or leader has been commissioned by him". Does the distinguishing mark of a miracle, then, lie simply in its purpose, or merely in the subjective conviction that God has wrought it? What is its relation to nature? Dr. Strong tells us what this relation is, and in his explication of his definition we see, as was said, that any distinction between the natural and supernatural, and consequently Christian supernaturalism, vanishes. Thus, he says (p. 119) that his definition of a miracle "leaves it possible that all miracles may have their natural explanations and may hereafter be traced to natural causes, while both miracles and their natural causes may be only names for the one and self-same will of God". Also (p. 119) he says: "Miracle is an immediate operation of God; but, since all natural processes are also immediate operations of God, we do not need to deny the use of these natural processes, so far as they will go, in miracle".

Here, then, is an explicit avowal that there is no warrant for distinguishing a miracle from any other event in the external world, so far as the question of its cause is concerned. And this view, which if carried out would be fatal to evangelical Christianity, is simply the result of Dr. Strong's "Ethical Monism". It is no more consistent with the Christianity of the New Testament writers than any other form of monism which breaks down the essential distinction between the Infinite and the finite.

In the chapter on Creation at the beginning of volume II, precisely the same kind of conflict can be seen between Dr. Strong's older and more Scriptural views and his monistic philosophy. His statement of "Ethical Monism" in the first volume would leave no room for any doctrine of Creation, for we saw that humanity, as well as the physical universe, was regarded as a self-limitation of God. Nevertheless, the author's scriptural inheritance with its more adequate doctrinal implications again intrudes upon the monistic metaphysics in the case of his formal definition of Creation. "By Creation", he says, "we mean that free act of the triune God by which in the beginning for his own glory he made, without the use of preëxisting materials, the whole visible and invisible universe" (vol. II, p. 371). This is a fairly ade-

quate definition of Creation. But in the immediately following explanation of this definition, we see the leaven of the monism at work, when he describes Creation as a "self-limitation" on the part of God. This shows that what Dr. Strong has done is simply to superimpose his monism upon his previous and more adequate views, without ever really having effected a reconciliation between them. The question is not whether the "dynamic" conception of matter is correct or not. The question is whether, when God created the world, He created a something which was not part of Himself and which has some principle of relative persistence. By affirming that the whole of finite existence is a "self-limitation" of God, Dr. Strong really leaves no room for asserting the creation of finite persons, so that his view cannot consistently be made to harmonize with that of Lotze, which latter view Dr. Strong affirms to be very like his own.

There are other sections in these volumes which we cannot but regard as unsatisfactory.

One is the section on the imputation of Adam's sin (vol. II, pp. 593ff.). Dr. Strong affirms that the guilt of Adam's sin was imputed to his posterity because it really was their own, or rather, because it was their own in a "realistic" sense. In other words, he accepts the doctrine known as "Realism", *i. e.* that the race was in Adam *realiter*, and so sinned in him. The federal or representative basis for the doctrine of imputation Dr. Strong rejects, and says that it makes the idea of imputation "arbitrary" and "mechanical". This criticism of the federal view is unfair. This view does not regard the imputation as either arbitrary or mechanical. The federal theologians held that Adam was appointed the federal head of the race because he was its natural head. The sin of Adam or the guilt of his first sin is imputed to his posterity because it is properly theirs in accordance with this representative principle. This, we believe, gives not only a more Scriptural, but also a more adequate ground for the participation of Adam's posterity in the guilt of his sin. For what is sought is precisely a just ground for the participation of the race in the guilt of Adam's first sin. Now, the "realistic" view, besides resting on a well-nigh exploded metaphysics and one that would have a destructive influence on other Christian doctrines, seeks a ground for the personal responsibility of each individual, in regard to Adam's sin, in an act that was totally unconscious and involuntary so far as each is concerned. This appears to us far more arbitrary than the principle of representative responsibility.

The author's conception of the Person of Christ and of the Humiliation of Christ (vol. II, pp. 669-710) is also inadequate. Dr. Strong formally accepts the Chalcedonian Christology. But he asserts that the doctrine of two consciousnesses and of two wills is an unwarranted addition to the Chalcedonian doctrine of the two natures, and he affirms that Christ had but one will, consciousness, and knowledge. But what meaning, then, can attach to the bare assertion that there were two natures in Christ? Was the one will omnipotent? If

so what becomes of the reality and completeness of the human nature? Or was the one will finite and limited? If so what becomes of the divine nature? In other words, the doctrine of the two wills is a necessary implication of the doctrine of the two natures, and the assertion that our Lord after the incarnation had but one will, consciousness, and knowledge, must lead either to docetism or to kenoticism. It has led to the latter in the case of Dr. Strong. He distinguishes his view from the kenotic theory, it is true. He says that the kenotic theory holds that in the Incarnation, the Logos laid aside some or all of the divine attributes; while his view is that the Logos incarnate gave up the "independent exercise" of these attributes. But when we ask what this vague phrase means, we find Dr. Strong affirming that "omniscience gives up all knowledge but that of the child, the infant, the embryo, the infinitesimal germ of humanity. Omnipotence gives up all power but that of the impregnated ovum in the womb of the Virgin." This, of course, is just the extreme form of the kenotic theory, as held, for example, by Gess.

The theory of the Atonement set forth by the author we cannot but regard as being as unsatisfactory as his doctrine of the Person of Christ. To begin with, it is unfair to call the Anselmian view "the Commercial theory." It is still more unfair to fail to recognize the advances over Anselm's statement made by the Satisfaction doctrine since Anselm and especially in its modern advocates. For example, as Dr. Patton pointed out in his review of the first edition of Dr. Strong's book, it is neither in accordance with fact nor is it just to apply to the view of the Atonement advocated by Dr. Charles Hodge a term that is most generally understood to indicate a view of this doctrine which Dr. Hodge always opposed.

Dr. Strong reaffirms what he calls the "Ethical theory", holding that Jesus by His incarnation became really or rather, we should say, "realistically" involved in the guilt of the race, and that for this reason our sins also can be laid upon Him. This is what Dr. Strong calls a combination of the ideas of "substitution" and "sharing." This we regard as an eclectic view which raises more difficulties than it solves. According to Dr. Strong, Jesus in His incarnation assumes human nature which was in Adam *realiter*, and had been corrupted by him. Our Lord, however, had no guilt resulting from any personal sin: He had none of the depravity of human nature; for, according to Dr. Strong, the Savior was purified from this by a special action of the Holy Spirit in the womb of the Virgin. Jesus had, then, by a participation in the "realistic" sense, the guilt of Adam's sin which attached to humanity. In a word, sin was not imputed to Him, but He had just as much of the race sin as He was not relieved of. The question, then, would naturally arise whether our Lord did not owe the penalty of death on His own account. Dr. Strong is, of course, ready with an answer to this obvious objection to his view. He says that, while it is true that Christ owed the penalty of death for Himself on account of

this Adamic guilt, nevertheless, this realistic relation to humanity explains why the guilt of all our sins could also be imputed to Him. This guilt Dr. Strong affirms that Christ bore for us.

This, however, does not help matters for Dr. Strong's theory. According to his doctrine of responsibility, it can attach only to a sin which one has "originated" or "in the origination of which" one has "had a part" (vol. II, p. 510). Here, then, is a dilemma, viz.—if Christ can be said to have "had a part" in the origination of our sins, by reason of his connection with humanity, then, He would be responsible, according to the logic of Dr. Strong's view, just in the sense in which He is held by Dr. Strong to be responsible for Adam's sin. Hence, Christ would owe the penalty of death on His own account for our sins, and, hence, could not be our substitute. On the other hand, if Christ had no part in the origination of these sins of ours, then, according to Dr. Strong's theory of responsibility, Christ would have no actual responsibility for our actual sins, in which case it is, to say the least, a fair question whether the representative relationship on the basis of the Covenant is not a more adequate basis for the imputation of our sins to Christ, than the realistic view of Dr. Strong. Indeed, the logic of Dr. Strong's view demands a responsibility of our Lord *on His own account* for all human sin, as Dr. Strong acknowledges (vol. II, p. 758). But if this is so, how can Christ be said to bear our sins as our substitute? This will suffice to show that the ideas of "sharing" and of "substitution" cannot be harmonized or brought into one consistent view of the nature of the Atonement.

There are some inaccuracies in these volumes to which attention should be called. We have alluded already to the author's characterization of the view of the Atonement which is usually known as the "Satisfaction" doctrine. Another error is the attribution to Gausson of the mechanical or "dictation theory" of Inspiration (cf. vol. I, p. 209). It is true that, in his work on Inspiration, Gausson does use the word "dictation" in giving his view of the nature of the inspiration of the Scripture. But when Gausson comes to explain his view, he again and again repudiates what is generally known as the "dictation theory", and it is a mistake to classify his view under this head.

Another and more serious historical error is the statement in vol. I, p. 46 that Cocceius "founded" the Federal or Covenant Theology; and also the statement, in vol. II, p. 612, that the Federal Theology "had its origin" with Cocceius. This is not the fact of the matter. It is not accurate even to say that Cocceius was the first to give this idea a central place and teach what may be called a Covenant Theology. In Holland, for example, Cloppenburg taught a Covenant Theology before Cocceius (cf. Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek* III p. 200; also G. Vos, *De Verbondsleer in de Gereformeerde Theologie*). And if we look simply for the idea of the Covenant of Grace we can find it long before Cocceius, in Zwingli, Bullinger, and Calvin, and quite fully treated by the Heidelberg theologian Ursinus, a contemporary

of Calvin (*op.* vol. I, pp. 98ff.), and also by Olevianus in his *De Substantia Foederis* (cf. Südhoff, *Ursinus und Olevianus*, p. 573ff.), and by Sohnius, *Meth. Theol.* (cf. Bavinck, *op. cit.*), and in Switzerland by Musculus, *Loci Com.* 1599, Polanus, *Syntagma* 1609, and Wollebius, *Compend.* 1625. For a fuller statement compare the works of Bavinck and Vos already cited. Dr. Vos has shown clearly that the Covenant idea in theology had a development in England and Scotland long before the time of Cocceius. When, now, we turn to the Covenant of Works, we find that it is taught clearly though briefly by Ursinus (*Summa op.* I, p. 10). Also in the Roman Catholic theology, we find the idea of the Covenant of Works and the federal headship of Adam clearly affirmed by Catharinus at the time of the Council of Trent (cf. Sarpi, *Hist. of the Council of Trent*, E. T. ed. 1640, pp. 175, 176). Indeed, the roots of this idea can be traced way back to Scotus in the middle ages (cf. Scotus, *In Sententiis* 2 dist. 22, n. 8, quoted by Schwane in his *Dogmengeschichte d. mittleren Zeit*, pp. 411, 412).

In closing this review of Dr. Strong's theology, we do not wish to leave upon our readers the erroneous impression that our attitude to the book is simply one of adverse criticism. This is not the case. These volumes of Dr. Strong in their statements of doctrine and definitions as contained in the larger print, are remarkable in most instances for their clearness and conciseness. It is only when the author comes to the further elaboration of his views, that the leaven of his "monism" is found to enter. The volumes, moreover, exhibit Dr. Strong's wide culture in the sphere of Systematic Theology. We rejoice, furthermore, in his defense of generic Augustinianism, and wish to congratulate him upon the completion of the first two volumes of the eighth edition of this his *magnum opus*.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

JESU IRRTUMSLOSIGKEIT. Von Professor D. LUDWIG LEMME. Heidelberg: Gr. Lichterfelde; Berlin: E. Runge. 1907. 8vo, pp. 43.

This pamphlet is one of the series of "Biblische Zeit- und Streitfragen" now publishing by the conservative theologians of Germany as some sort of a reply to the popular liberal series called "Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher". It presents a striking contrast to the contemporarily published brochure of Arnold Meyer in the rival series, entitled *What is Jesus to us to-day?* both in positiveness of tone and in definiteness and strength of argument. Prof. Lemme introduces the problem which he takes up and states the issue in a striking and trenchant way. Ours, he says, is a time which rejoices in freedom from all authority and rejects especially the absoluteness of the Christian revelation. It prefers a Relativism which admits its superiority but not its finality. In other words, the issue is one between naturalism and supernaturalism, between relative superiority and absoluteness;

for with the denial of Jesus' infallibility, which is necessary to his divinity, the absoluteness of Christianity falls to the ground. That Jesus claimed to be infallible is evident from the Synoptics (Matt. xi. 27) as well as the Fourth Gospel. The author puts the alternative rightly: Jesus' claim is that of a self-deceiver or of a divine being. There is no redemption without an absolute revelation, and no absolute revelation without a transcendent personality, one that is infallible. The roots of the present denial of Jesus' infallibility are found in the theory that religion and knowledge can be separated. After Kant's blow to religious metaphysics, Schleiermacher located religion in the feelings. The truth of the Christian revelation was not a question to him. Ritschl separated religion and knowledge still further. Prof. Lemme's refutation of this false position is clear and strong, showing that the absoluteness of the Christian religion includes in itself the claim to absolute truth.

An inexplicable digression occurs at this point. A long excursus is inserted on the superiority of Jesus' world-conception (*Weltanschauung*), *i. e.* that of the kingdom of God or New Testament Theism, to Atheism, Pantheism, Deism, and evolutionistic Immanence. It is an excellent piece of work, but seems nevertheless to wander from the subject immediately in hand, which is the errorlessness of Jesus. The author ultimately, however, returns to his proper subject and brings his argument to a close by raising and attempting to meet the objections that Jesus betrayed his fallibility in that he was deceived as to the time of his second coming and in that he shared the superstitious beliefs of his contemporaries regarding demons. Similar objections, drawn from the case of the fig-tree, the reference to Jonah, and the ascription of Ps. cx to David, he postpones the discussion of to a later occasion; thus leaving his present discussion regretfully incomplete.

To the first of the two objections which he takes up the reply is offered that it is based on a mistaken exegesis. Jesus, in Lemme's view, did not mean to promise a sensible, visible "coming in the clouds of heaven", in the literal sense. He meant only to promise the coming of the kingdom of God in power, the spreading and effective working of the Gospel. His words to the high priest, "From now on" (Matt. xxvi. 64), indicate, says Lemme, not a momentary event, but a permanent manifestation. His coming will not be local, but as the lightning's shining from horizon to horizon, which prophecy was and is being fulfilled. Whether or not one recognizes the truth of Christ's prophecy of His coming depends, therefore, on whether one admits the reigning power and authority of the resurrected and ascended Lord. The second objection Lemme seeks to meet by a definition of his own of what are called "demons" or "devils". They are, he says, psycho-physical powers, mysterious in origin and character, which injure the soul in an unethical way ("*widersittlich*" or "*unethisch*"), and leave the nervous system in bondage to disease. Jesus did not, he says, like the common folk, consider them personal beings, for He did not use the

customary superstitious formula (cf. Josephus) when expelling them. He commanded them to go out of the possessed, no doubt; but this no more proves that He shared the contemporary superstitions than does His rebuking the winds and the sea. His parable of the unclean spirit is readily explained as symbolic-poetic phraseology. He meets His greatest difficulty in applying that view in the account of the Gadarene demoniac. But really, he remarks, the critics (such as Edouard von Hartmann) have no right to employ this incident for their purposes, since they declare it unhistorical. It is, however, as great a stumbling block to Lemme as to the "critics" he is criticising; and he can get over it only by himself supposing that Mark "fructified" his recollection of Peter's teachings with Palestinian enquiries, which resulted in the creeping in of the popular tradition. This belief of the people Jesus himself, however, Lemme insists, by no means shared.

This brochure is, as we have seen, but a partial treatment of the theme. It is to be commended, however, at least as exhibiting a courageous attitude toward the present rationalistic tendencies which would fain whittle Christianity down to nothing. It is one thing to say that Jesus "increased in wisdom" and even late in life was ignorant of some things (Mark xiii. 32), but it is quite another thing to accuse Him of positive error in thought and speech, as Beyschlag, Meinhold, Schwarzkopf, and Max Meyer, for example, do. Unquestionably His authority as Revealer is thereby threatened. The attribution of ignorance of certain things to Him may easily be borne by those who believe in the two natures. But when we speak of error, where will be our anchoring ground? If one statement is untrustworthy, why not another? If it be suggested that his fallibility extended only to things of no soteriological importance, we are constrained to ask how we are to decide between things soteriologically important and things soteriologically unimportant? And can we include under the latter such matters as the authority of the Old Testament Scriptures or the fact of our Lord's second coming? The question is a large one. And it is to be hoped that Prof. Lemme will return to it later and give it a more exhaustive treatment and from an even more positive point of view.

Halle.

H. D. DAVIES.

WAS UNS JESUS HEUTE IST. Von Professor D. ARNOLD MEYER. Zurich, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1907. 8vo, pp. 56.

This brochure is one of the series of "Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher" now publishing in Germany on the part of the liberal theologians in an effort to deal in a scientific way with the many significant religious problems which confront the thinking Christian public. The contributors include in their number such writers as Wernle, Bousset, Wrede, Schmiedel, Pfeiderer, etc. The appearance of their brochures has occasioned the publication of an opposing conservative series entitled "Biblische Zeit- und Streitfragen", to which such scholars as

Zahn, Karl Müller, Grützmacher, König, Kähler, and Haupt have contributed.

The author of the pamphlet now before us begins by enumerating the various views of Christ's person which have been held heretofore, though, to be sure, even this preliminary estimate of the history of the subject will not command the assent of all readers. To Peter, we are told, though Jesus was the Messiah, He was no more than a human personage. Matthew, no doubt, adds "Son of the living God" to his confession; but this is a later gloss. Nor was Paul's Messiah God. His strict Jewish monotheism forbade that. Not until the Gospel came to the Greeks was Jesus called God. The Greeks were familiar with divine powers and appearance-forms, ascribing divinity to Godlike men. The Fourth Gospel took the bold step of asserting the incarnation of the highest of these divine powers, the Logos, in the man Jesus. Athanasius needed the deity of Christ to secure the doctrine of immortality. To the Romish Church Jesus was its heavenly king, as Jupiter was the ruler of the civil state. To Anselm Jesus was the knight who paid the people's ransom to God as an offended King. The German mystics saw in Christ the world-principle of life poured out from God. Luther's Christ was the mighty Victor over Death and Satan, conceived as personal powers. Following Strauss and Renan German investigation found in Jesus a child of his own time, sharing its ideas and errors.

But what is Jesus to us to-day? Certainly an overwhelming majority of his followers hitherto have believed in His deity. But now it is only by denying his deity that men can stand on the sure ground of truth and religion. There are three cogent reasons for denying it: (1) The doctrine was a late development of Christian thought. Paul did not teach it. The persistency of the doctrine rather astounds the author, but is explained as follows. A god-man was necessary so long as men believed that such personal powers as Death, the Devil, and Demons stood between them and God. Now, men see that these powers are only a part of the natural course of things and that there is no need of God's descending from heaven. He can now speak to men through nature and especially through the one real man Jesus. (2) Jesus Himself did not claim to be divine. He presented Himself for the baptism of the forgiveness of sin; and He refused the title "good", as belonging to God alone. (3) The religious ground for rejecting the deity of Christ is the need of a direct, immediate relation to God. Hence it is a contradiction to speak of Jesus as a Mediator. Christ completed His work when He secured for us an immediate communion with God, such as He Himself had.

The author's positive reply to his question he has summarized as follows: Jesus is for us the founder of our faith, that unique personality that draws us into its own faith and love; the one whose cross signified the victory of the good; the one who redeemed us from sin and guilt by bringing us into relation with his conquering love, which awakens in us self-reliance and new joy; the one who above all recog-

nized the value of humanity; the voice of God to us, revealing His love and calling us home to the eternal Father heart. In one sentence: "Jesus draws us into his own belief in the holy Father-love of God and into His holy life of love and makes us thereby truly happy and free, and gives our life true worth and significance."

The author expects, of course, much contradiction to this reply. A fuller list of objections to it could scarcely be drawn up, indeed, than the one he has himself given us. It does not recognize the essential deity of Christ, His preëxistence with God, His incarnation, His miraculous birth, His miracles, His claims to divine honor, His foreknowledge of His death and resurrection, the atoning significance of His blood, His resurrection and ascension, His permanent mediatorship, His second coming, or His office in the last judgment. The author fully admits that he has broken with the church doctrine, saying, "We do not believe in the deity of Christ in the ecclesiastical sense, but see in Him rather the real man". In thus severing his connections with the church multitude, he in effect confesses that he is speaking for a very small number, when he says that Jesus "for us to-day" is but a simple man. But at least the frankness of his statement of his position is admirable. He wishes to avoid all compromise, and takes his stand firmly on openly Unitarian ground. He will not pray to Jesus, but only to God. To criticize his reply, then, would be only to criticize the general Unitarian position.

We cannot help seeing in this brochure, however, an illustration of what Prof. L. Lemme has spoken of, viz., that "theological rationalism lives on half-truths and obscurities". Particularly obscure is the author's explanation of how his human Jesus can be our Saviour from sin and guilt. No pretense is made of elucidating the declarations of the Scriptures on the matter; there is only a casual, poetic, sentimental reference to the parable of the prodigal son. Vagueness is indeed characteristic of the whole pamphlet, except at the one point where the author rejects the deity of Christ. In that he is clear and emphatic enough. It is a composition surcharged with the strongest negatives but containing only a few weak positives as a compensation therefor.

Halle, Germany.

H. D. DAVIES.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

THE FOREIGN MISSIONARY. An Incarnation of a World Movement. By ARTHUR JUDSON BROWN, author of *New Forces in Old China*, etc. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1907. Pp. 412.

This volume is in no sense an encyclopædia in its form, but it is in a very true sense encyclopædic in its scope. Such a fund of fact pertinent to any single subject is rarely found within so limited a

compass. Indeed, one of the first things which strikes the reader of this book is the comprehensiveness of the author's treatment of his subject. The table of contents promises completeness of treatment and it accurately indicates what the book contains. Its promises are faithfully fulfilled. We are never tempted by its title to read a chapter only to discover it all title and no treatment.

And the discussions are as clear and convincing as they are complete. We are always sure of Dr. Brown's meaning. He knows what he thinks and why he thinks as he does. This is no hasty compilation of borrowed opinions. He has evidently thought out each problem presented to a conclusion which under present conditions is as satisfactory to him as any can be. He does not pretend to have said the last word on any topic, but he does say with a definiteness which is refreshing what is in his judgment the best word. He is modest always, but none the less masterful. He is fair always, but none the less firm. He is charitable always, but none the less conclusive. Therefore, Dr. Brown's conclusions are hard to escape. Founded on irrefutable facts, presented often in a charming style and always with a love for the laws of logic, his missionary policy commends itself as scriptural, as sensible and as suited to the situation in which the church finds the mission fields to-day.

And Dr. Brown's conclusions are the more decisive because of the standpoint of the whole book. As he most pertinently remarks in the preface, it is "the missionary who incarnates this enterprise". He is "the chief human factor in the success or failure of the missionary movement", and it is he "whose character and methods are the objects of the sharpest criticism". Now, it is this "incarnation of a world movement", this "chief human factor" in this world movement, who speaks through these pages in trumpet tones. He opens up to us his heart that we may see his motives and aims and rewards. He admits us to his life that we may behold his back-breaking burdens and his heart-breaking problems. He listens patiently to our questions and answers them, and to our criticisms and makes us ashamed of them. He convinces us not only that his work is absolutely necessary, but that it is marvelously successful, so successful that naught but divinely approved men and divinely appointed methods with the divine blessing can explain the results attained in a single century. In a word, the foreign missionary is himself in his conceptions, character, conduct, and conquests, one of the very best arguments in the concrete for foreign missions. Of course, Dr. Brown is not the first to use this argument, but he has the honor of being the first to develop it in detail and to demonstrate its full power. And for this the church owes him a debt of gratitude.

Princeton.

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

LISTENING TO GOD. By HUGH BLACK. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1907. Pp. 310. \$1.25 net.

This collection of sermons obtains its title, according to well estab-

lished custom, from the first in the series. The volume is dedicated to "The Congregation of St. George's United Free Church, Edinburgh, in happy memory of ten years ministry", and is in the nature of a valedictory. These sermons, however, need no other introduction to the American public than that which their own merit gives them. They are abundantly able to make their own way to the hearts of those who now read them, as doubtless they did to the hearts of those who first heard them.

These are simple sermons, simple in the best sense. Their meaning is as clear as crystal. Their diction is direct and yet dignified. There is no straining for effect or rhetorical display, nor are the ideas of the author obscured by his idioms.

These are scriptural sermons. To the reader with an average knowledge of the letter of Scripture, many of the texts used will be quite unknown. And when the text employed is well known it is sometimes viewed from an uncommon angle. But whether it is the text or the viewpoint which is unfamiliar, the topic selected is suggested in and sustained by the text chosen. In a word, in no case is a passage used merely as a point of departure, although these are topical rather than textual sermons. And these sermons are not only based on Scripture, they are buttressed by Scripture. Scripture quotations are abundant and appropriate, and that the author's mind is full of Scripture is made evident from the amount of Scriptural phraseology prominent where definite Scripture passages are not cited.

These are spiritual sermons. They are not polemical, holding a brief for some school of criticism. Nor are they merely ethical in the interests of some code of morals. They are evangelistic in that they present the essence of the Gospel, and they are evangelical in that they embody the great doctrines held in common by the Reformed Churches.

We commend these sermons to the pulpit, to the pew, and especially to those who now sit in the pew but who are preparing to stand in the pulpit. To the last-named class they should serve not perhaps as ideals, for with all their excellencies they can hardly be called great sermons, but as models. And as models in those respects in which the pulpit of to-day is often weak, clear comprehension, careful expression and compelling statement of fundamental truths.

Princeton.

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

OUR MISUNDERSTOOD BIBLE. By H. CLAY TRUMBULL. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Company. 1907. Pp. 308. \$1.00 net.

Those who were readers of *The Sunday School Times* while Dr. Trumbull was the editor will find in this book much which first appeared in that periodical in the form of editorials. The matter selected for publication in book form is well worthy of thus being given more permanent shape. All the chapters are interesting and illuminating. The first five, which deal with some general rules for Biblical interpre-

tation, are especially helpful and should be read and remembered by every student of the Bible. The chapters following, which deal with specific texts and truths, command our attention even if they do not always win our assent to their assertions; as, for example, when, in the chapter entitled "Are children born condemned or redeemed?" Dr. Trumbull takes the Arminian position. In the main, however, we can heartily commend this little volume, especially to those who have no acquaintance with the original languages of the Scriptures. For, as the author writes in his preface, whether we agree with him or not, "good can hardly fail to come of readers being stimulated to a closer examination of the grounds for believing or of questioning as to the ideas they have been accustomed to connect with certain Bible words and terms and truths".

Princeton.

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

TAKING MEN ALIVE. Studies in the Principles and Practice of Individual Soul Winning. By CHARLES GALLAUDET TRUMBULL, Editor of *The Sunday School Times*. New York: Young Men's Christian Association Press. 1907. Cloth, 8vo. Pp. 199.

It is not often that a son is able to extend the influence of a father along its most helpful lines; yet this has been the privilege of Mr. Charles G. Trumbull in his studies and addresses, on soul-winning, of which this volume is in large measure the embodiment and result. When Henry Clay Trumbull published his little book entitled "Individual Work for Individuals", he declared that, looking back upon fifty years of active Christian service, he could see more direct results of good through individual efforts with individuals than through the words spoken to thousands of auditors, or through the pages of periodicals and books; and it is interesting to note that of the thirty volumes which came from Dr. Trumbull the one which seems to have the widest circulation and influence is this which treats of personal religious work for definite individuals. It was to this book, which consists largely in the narration of incidents from the life of the author, that Mr. Charles G. Trumbull turned as a text book from which to give instruction in soul winning. In the experience of his father he finds certain simple principles clearly set forth. These principles he classifies by continual references to his father's book, and by forceful extracts from its narratives.

Stress is laid upon the effectiveness and difficulty of this method of Christian work, upon the simple equipment of a personal knowledge of Christ, upon the necessity of a winning and sympathetic approach, upon the careful use of the Bible, and the acceptance of every possible opportunity for definite work. The book is arranged for the use of study classes, with topics and questions for discussion and review, but every individual reader will find here a personal message, and an impetus and an aid in Christian service.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE FRIENDLY YEAR. Chosen and arranged from the Works of Henry van Dyke. By GEORGE SIDNEY WEBSTER, D. D., Pastor of the Church of the Covenant, New York. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906. 12 mo., cloth. Pp. 185. Price \$1.25.

A true service was rendered to the wide circle who enjoy the writings of Dr. van Dyke, by the publication of this tasteful little volume of selections from his writings, so arranged as to bring a brief message for every day of the year. The necessity for this new edition demonstrates how truly the service has been appreciated. The extracts are marked by the broad sympathy, the genial optimism, and the felicitous style which characterize the writings of this popular author.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE TEACHINGS OF JESUS CONCERNING THE CHRISTIAN LIFE. By GERARD B. F. HALLOCK, D. D. New York: The American Tract Society. 12 mo. Cloth pp. 193. Price 75 cents.

This is a most suitable book to place in the hands of enquirers and young converts, and is full of suggestion for the mature Christian. In relation to the Christian life, as set forth by Jesus, the author considers, its importance, evidences, conflicts, maintenance, joys, trials, duties and rewards.

Each subject is treated with simplicity and clearness and with distinct reference to the exact words of Jesus. The volume well merits its place in the series on the Teachings of Jesus.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE MAKING OF SIMON PETER. By ALBERT J. SOUTHOUSE. Eaton & Mains. New York: Crown 8vo. pp. 291. Price \$1.25 net.

In a series of concise chapters, the author traces the development of the disciple from "Simon the Learner" into "Peter, the Man of Rock". In each chapter some historic incident is reviewed; the moral principle which it illustrates is stated; and then is made the application to life and experience. The reader is stimulated to seek a close and faithful fellowship with Christ.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE COMING MAN. By Gardner S. Eldridge. Eaton & Mains. 12 mo., pp. 197.

"The Coming Man" is a volume of brief compass which bears evidence of wide reading and studious thought. But, while there is much that will be found stimulating and helpful, we cannot but feel that the author's viewpoint is not well taken. His aim is apparently the exal-

tation of the human. "Man is slowly vindicating himself by essential worth" (p. 7). We read of "The deathless, intangible, almighty spirit of a man that sets out to conquer the world, develop humanity and invade heaven" (p. 60), of "The eternal spirit of manhood" (p. 62), of "A man's profound faith in his own underlying manhood" (p. 109). Such expressions accord but ill with Paul's, "In me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing."

Salvation in the author's view lies in "the better impulse that lifts its protests till it wakes the echoes of the Eternal Spirit" (p. 65). Man "builds himself towards nobler things" (p. 147). "Through his strivings after righteousness he is moralized" (p. 111). The method is that of evolution. "God holds himself responsible for the evolution of the race" (p. 103). Not only is "the evolutionary process the method of the Maker", "it is also to be the method of man". Sin, atonement, regeneration receive utterly inadequate treatment at the author's hands.

He betrays a curious inexactness in his Biblical quotations. Paul's use of "mystery" is misapprehended by him (p. 137). He reads Biblical history after a fashion of his own. Jacob's wrestling was "a battle with himself". Israel in its later history including the time of Christ "grew broader, deeper, nobler, diviner." (p. 116). His desire to be impressive leads him not infrequently into grandiloquence, e. g. "Prof. Drummond served modern thought in a large way when he wrested the universe from egoism and handed it over to otherism" (p. 128). We wonder whether the universe has yet recovered from the shock.

Huntington, L. I.

GEO. T. EDDY.

PATHS TO THE CITY OF GOD. By FRANK W. GUNSAULUS, D.D. Fleming H. Revell Co. 12mo., pp. 311. \$1.25 net.

The title of this book has its origin not only in the themes of the first four sermons, but in a unity of purpose which runs through all its varied themes and treatments. One marvels at the extent of Dr. Gunsaulus' grasp. He seems equally at home in the domains of history, poetry, science, or art; and from each he exacts a tribute to be brought to the feet of Immanuel. We gratefully recognize in his volume a loyalty to the great fundamental principles of the gospel which are too often called in question in these present days. A strong emphasis is laid upon such facts as the divine sovereignty, the sinfulness of sin, the atoning blood and saving faith. There is subtle discernment of the characteristics of the time, its difficulties and its needs, and a clear declaration as to the sovereign remedy for them. Lofty truth is made tributary to lowly duty.

Despite an occasional sentence which may seem obscure or involved from the richness or profundity of its thought, Dr. Gunsaulus' style is on the whole one of remarkable vividness, eloquence and power.

It would be difficult to single out any of these sermons for special mention. They are all of high worth.

Huntington, L. I.

GEO. T. EDDY.

RESTS BY THE RIVER. By the Rev. George Matheson, D. D., LL. D.
A. C. Armstrong & Son. 12 mo. Pp. 367. \$1.25.

The felicity of the title of this devotional work by the late Dr. Matheson is borne out by the character of its contents. There is the most happy union of spiritual insight with practical helpfulness, the blending of scholarly acumen with religious fervor. The book arouses thought while it inspires to duty. We feel as well that it has its value in revealing a personality of rare charm and power. A depth of personal experience is evidenced, the experience of one who has passed through the shadow and found the light beyond.

In Dr. Matheson's hand familiar passages often gleam with new light. Indeed the eliciting of surprise is his characteristic method. His thought is marked by compression as well as originality and is often eminently suggestive. The brief sentences are as clean-cut and beautiful as cameos. The method of expression is often poetic. Perhaps Dr. Matheson's evident fondness for alliteration is due to this element in his style and thought. He falls into rhythm and even into rhyme in one instance in a passage printed as prose (p. 86).

The book worthily fulfils its high purpose. It bears the test of practical use and affords a constant stimulus to thought. Dr. Matheson's place as a writer of devotional meditations must apparently wait long before it may be filled.

Huntington, L. I.

GEO. T. EDDY.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

THE ESSENTIAL KAFIR. By Dudley Kidd, with one hundred illustrations from photographs by the author. London: Adam & Charles Black. 1906.

We have always been interested in everything written about South Africa ever since as a boy we read Livingston's unabridged diary of his travels. Of all the books on South Africa which we have seen, however, this of Mr. Kidds is the best illustrated and the most uniformly interesting from beginning to end. The author has attempted to give us the essential spirit of the Kafir, to show us his real self, as he believes, and thinks, and works, his laws, customs, superstitions, folklore, wars, and prospects. He has succeeded in his attempt. He has shown also that the Kafir is "drifting along the surface of time in a rudderless bark", "in the presence of mighty and restless forces, which the economic development of the country has liberated". He has shown him to be thriftless, wasteful, and prodigal; cruel, superstitious, and lustful; without God and without hope for time or for eternity. The only remedy he can suggest seems to be that pointed out by Carlyle: to plant "knowledge into his deep infinite faculties,

his fantasy and heart, to help him to unlearn what he has wrongly learned, and to teach him to use his limited powers to the best advantage". The author ignores the knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ, His Son, as the quickening power of a new and abounding life. The one who believes in Jesus as the Saviour of the world, cannot but rise from the perusal of this book with a prayer of thanksgiving, that he and his have long and forever been delivered from the terrible curse of those who are ignorant of Him and with a prayer of supplication, that God in His mercy would speedily deliver those who sit in darkness and in the bondage of heathenism into the light and liberty of the Gospel of love, and righteousness, and peace.

Princeton.

R. D. WILSON.

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